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White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
FINAL
REPORT
TO
PRESIDENT CLINTON
VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, CHAIRMAN
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
February 12, 1997
President William J.
Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. President,
We are pleased to present
you with the report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security. You established this Commission by issuing Executive Order
13015 on August 22, 1996 with a charter to study matters involving
aviation safety and security, including air traffic control and to
develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security, both
domestically and internationally.
During the past six
months, we have conducted an intensive inquiry into civil aviation
safety, security and air traffic control modernization. Commission and
staff have gathered information from a broad range of aviation
specialists, Federal Agencies, consumer groups, and industry leaders.
After many months of
deliberations we have agreed on a set of recommendations which we
believe will serve to enhance and ensure the continued safety and
security of our air transportation system.
We are privileged to
submit these recommendations herewith.
Sincerely,
Vice President Al Gore,
Chairman
In compliance with the
Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996, the undersigned present the
report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
James A. Abrahamson Brian Michael Jenkins
Jesse Lee Beauchamp Raymond W. Kelly
Franklin R. Chang-Diaz John Michael Loh
Antonia Handler Chayes Bradford W. Parkinson
William T. Coleman, Jr. Federico Peña
Victoria Cummock Franklin D. Raines
John M. Deutch Patrick A. Shea
Kathleen Flynn Laura D'Andrea Tyson
Louis J. Freeh Carl W. Vogt
James E. Hall George H. Williams
Editor's Note:
l. The final two
sentences of the first paragraph of Recommendation 4.4 have been changed
to reflect the precise nature of the agreement by U.S. airlines.
2.
The typed version of the final report inadvertently omitted
manufacturers from the list of those to whom the Commission expressed
appreciation. That mistake has been corrected in this edition.
3. In this edition,
typographical errors have been silently corrected.
4. This edition contains
as Appendix I a dissent by Commissioner Cummock which was transmitted to
the Commission one week after the report was voted on in public session
and presented to President Clinton.
During the public
session, Commissioner Cummock dissented from three recommendations. The
dissent published in this document goes far beyond those registered in
public. It presents for the first time material and arguments the other
Commissioners did not have an opportunity to consider. However, many of
the arguments made in the dissent were considered and rejected by the
other members of the Commission.
Supplemental material
included in Commissioner Cummock's dissent is available upon request to
Richard K. Pemberton, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, U.S.
Department of Transportation.
Introduction
Change.
That one word sums up
both the challenges in aviation safety and security, and the means by
which government and industry must respond. Change is nothing new in
this field. The first powered flight, covering 120 feet in twelve
seconds, took place just over ninety years ago. Today, planes cross the
Atlantic Ocean in a matter of hours, as hundreds of passengers watch
movies and dine. An industry that essentially did not even exist before
World War I now occupies a central position in our economy. Today,
commercial aviation generates over $300 billion annually, and accounts
for close to one million American jobs.
The changes taking place
in aviation today are as profound as any this industry has seen before.
Since 1992, sixty new airlines have started service, opening up new
markets, attracting new passengers, and impacting the economics of the
industry significantly. The number of passengers flying in the United
States over the last decade has grown to more than half a billion. The
FAA has certified twenty new aircraft models in the last ten years, and
plans are under consideration for a new High-Speed Civil Transport.
As dramatic as these
changes have been, even more significant change looms on the horizon.
Information technology presents opportunities that will again
revolutionize the industry, in ways as significant as the introduction
of the jet engine forty years ago. Air traffic today is still controlled
through ground-based radar, and on a point-to-point basis.
Satellite-based navigation will bring a fundamental change in the way
that air traffic is directed, and may make the notion of "highway lanes
in the sky" as obsolete as the bonfires that used to guide early fliers.
Digital technology will replace analog systems, making communications
with and among aircraft dramatically faster, more efficient, and
effective. These and other new technologies offer tremendous
opportunities for improved safety, security and efficiency, and will
transform aviation in the same way that the Internet and World Wide Web
are transforming the way the world does business.
Other changes are even
more imminent. By the end of the century, the commercial fleet serving
the United States will have been completely overhauled, with aircraft
that make a fraction of the old noise and emit far less pollution.
Continuing success in the United States' efforts to open up foreign
markets to competition by our airlines likely will mean more airlines,
serving more markets, carrying more people. A continuation of the trend
toward greater competition and lower fares will make flying even more
available to average Americans than it is today. In fact, the FAA
projects that, in 2007, more than 800 million passengers will fly in the
United States --- three times the number who flew in 1980.
This is a time of change
for government, as well. President Clinton's declaration that "the era
of big government is over," coalesced a bipartisan drive to make
government work better and cost less. The Administration's commitment to
government reform resulted not just from a desire to bring down
government spending, but from a recognition that the same types of
changes facing industries such as aviation face government, as well.
Like the private sector, government must change with the times. The
question is, how?
Establishment of the
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
President Clinton created
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security to address
that question, and assigned it three specific mandates: to look at the
changing security threat, and how we can address it; to examine changes
in the aviation industry, and how government should adapt its regulation
of it; to look at the technological changes coming to air traffic
control, and what should be done to take best advantage of them. In the
wake of concerns over the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800,
President Clinton asked the Commission to focus its attention first on
the issue of security. He asked for an initial report on aviation
security in 45 days, including an action plan to deploy new
hightechnology machines to detect the most sophisticated explosives.
On September 9, 1996, the
Commission presented that initial report to the President. It contained
twenty recommendations for enhancing aviation security which are
presented again in Chapter 3 of this report. The response to the initial
report was unprecedented. In October 1996, at the request of President
Clinton, the Congress appropriated over $400 million, in direct accord
with the Commission's recommendations, for the acquisition of new
explosives detection technology and other security enhancements. In the
five months since they were presented, implementation has begun on
virtually all of the initial recommendations.
From its inception, the
Commission took a hands-on approach to its work. President Clinton
announced the formation of the Commission on July 25, 1996. A few days
later, Vice President Gore led a site visit to Dulles International
Airport, where he and other Commissioners saw airport and airline
operations first-hand, and discussed issues with front line workers.
This was the first of dozens of such visits. Over the next six months,
the Commission visited facilities throughout the United States and in
various locations abroad. Seeking to reach the broadest possible
audience, the Commission established a homepage on the Internet
(http://www.aviationcommission.dot.gov), both to make the Commission's
work available and to receive input. The web site has had almost 7,000
contacts, many providing valuable insights. The Commission held six
public meetings, hearing from over fifty witnesses representing a cross
section of the aviation industry and the public, including families of
victims of air disasters. Recognizing the increasingly global nature of
aviation, the Commission co-sponsored an International Conference on
Aviation Safety and Security with the George Washington University,
attended by over 700 representatives from sixty-one countries.
Out of this extensive
process, the Commission compiled the recommendations presented in this
final report.
A Vision for the
Future
To compete in the global
economy of the 21st Century, America needs a healthy, vibrant aviation
industry. In turn, the health and vibrancy of aviation depend on
improved levels of safety, security and modernization. For the last
fifty years, the United States has led the field of aviation. But, that
position is being challenged, both by competition from abroad and by
weaknesses in our own systems.
These weaknesses can be
overcome. The Commission believes that it should be a national priority
to do so. This report outlines steps that can set government and
industry on a course to achieve that goal together. Heading into the
next century, our activities, programs, and results should define
aviation safety and security for the rest of the world.
Leadership in aviation
goes far beyond having strong, competitive airlines. It means assuring
leadership in communications, satellite, aerospace, and other
technologies that increasingly are defining the global economy. It means
more than the highest possible levels of safety and security for
travelers.
The Commission's report
reflects a focus on this vision: to ensure greater safety and security
for passengers; to restructure the relationships between government and
industry into partnerships for progress; and to maintain global
leadership in the aviation industry.
Key Recommendations
In the area of safety,
the Commission believes that the principal focus should be on reducing
the rate of accidents by a factor of five within a decade, and
recommends a re-engineering of the FAA's regulatory and certification
programs to achieve that goal.
In the area of air
traffic control, the Commission believes that the safety and efficiency
improvements that will come with a modernized system should not be
delayed, and recommends that the program be accelerated for to achieve
full operational capability by the year 2005. In addition, a more
effective system must be established to finance modernization of the
National Airspace System and enhancements in safety and security.
In the area of security,
the Commission believes that the threat against civil aviation is
changing and growing, and that the federal government must lead the
fight against it. The Commission recommends that the federal government
commit greater resources to improving aviation security, and work more
cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities in carrying
out security responsibilities.
Although not specifically
directed to do so, the Commission also took up the issue of responding
to aviation disasters. In this area, the Commission believes that a
better coordinated and more compassionate response is necessary, and
that the responsibility for coordinating the response needs to be placed
with a single entity. The Commission is pleased with the progress made
to date in this area, including the designation of the National
Transportation Safety Board as that single entity.
Many of the Commission's
recommendations apply equally to each of the three major areas of focus,
including those relating to regulation and certification. Primary among
these recommendations is the call for greater use of partnerships in
meeting goals. Regulatory and enforcement agencies such as the Customs
Service, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Food
and Drug Administration have put new emphasis on partnerships with
industries, and are achieving tremendous results: seizing more drugs
while expediting travel for legitimate travelers; reducing workplace
accidents while increasing productivity; and getting important new AIDS
and cancer-fighting drugs to market in a fraction of the time it used to
take.
The premise behind these
partnerships is that government can set goals, and then work with
industry in the most effective way to achieve them. Partnership does not
mean that government gives up its authorities or responsibilities. Not
all industry members are willing to be partners. In those cases,
government must use its full authority to enforce the law. But, through
partnerships, government works with industry to find better ways to
achieve its goals, seeking to replace confrontation with cooperation.
Such partnerships hold tremendous promise for improving aviation safety
and security. A shift away from prescriptive regulations will allow
companies to take advantage of incentives and reach goals more quickly.
Transportation Secretary
Peña's cooperative program with airlines to establish a single level of
safety is an example of innovative government-industry partnership.
Another is Vice President Gore's January 15, 1997 announcement that
Boeing, in concert with government agencies, had developed a plan to
modify the rudders on hundreds of its 737 aircraft. By acting without
waiting for a government mandate, Boeing will complete many of these
safety-enhancing modifications before the government could complete a
rule requiring the action.
Partnership must extend
not only to regulated entities, but also to the various federal agencies
involved with aviation safety and security. A number of agencies outside
the Department of Transportation have expertise and resources that can
have a direct impact on improving safety and security. The Commission
urges the Administration to continue to work to expand and improve these
intergovernmental relationships.
In the last few years,
the FAA has begun to recognize and respond to the tremendous changes it
faces. Reviews such as the Challenge 2000 report examined ways of
improving the way the FAA regulates operators and manufacturers. Now is
the time for the FAA to build on that work, and aggressively reengineer
itself to adapt to the demands of the 21st Century.
It is important to note
that the FAA, alone among federal agencies, has been given some critical
new tools to help shape its own future. A new Management Advisory
Council will provide valuable input to the agency's decision-making
process. In 1995, the Congress granted the Clinton Administration's
request for unprecedented reforms of the FAA's personnel and procurement
systems. These reforms give the FAA almost unlimited latitude to design
new systems to meet the agency's unique and particular needs. The first
phases of these reforms were implemented in April 1996, and are already
producing dividends. The FAA used to have 233 procurement documents, and
today there are less than 50. Using its streamlined process, the FAA
recently completed a billion dollar procurement in six months, with no
protests. Under the old system, it would have taken three times as long,
and likely would have been delayed by costly protests. A stack of
personnel rules that used to be one-foot high has been reduced to 41
pages, and will allow the agency to hire people where they're needed and
when they're needed.
This flexibility will be
critical to meeting the challenges of the next century. As former FAA
Administrator David Hinson recently noted, this type of reform is "the
seed for what needs to happen at the FAA." The incoming leadership at
the Department of Transportation and the FAA must utilize fully the
flexibilities that have been granted if the agency is to keep pace with
the rapidly changing industry it regulates.
Responsibility for
Implementing Change
The Commission's goal for
aviation in the next century may be summed up by the words of Robert
Crandall, Chairman of American Airlines, when he said, "We would like
the public to take safety and security as a given. If that is going to
happen, change is necessary."
The responsibility for
achieving that change lies with all the partners in aviation. The
Administration, the Congress, the entire aviation industry and its
employees must work together to make the changes that are necessary to
keep pace with the challenges facing them. Commitments must be made at
the highest levels of every organization, in government and in the
private sector.
To ensure that the
government remains focused on the goals established in this report, the
Commission recommends three steps:
(1) that the Secretary of
Transportation report publicly each year on the implementation status of
these recommendations;
(2) that the President
assign the incoming leadership at the Department of Transportation and
the FAA the clear mission of leading their agencies through the
necessary transition to re-engineered safety and security programs; and
(3) that the performance
agreements for these positions, which the documents that senior managers
sign with the President outlining their goals and specific means of
measuring progress, include implementation of these recommendations.
Chapter One:
Improving Aviation
Safety
"The FAA, despite its
professionalism and many accomplishments, was simply never created to
deal with the environment that has been produced by deregulation of the
air transport industry."
Stuart Matthews,
President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation.
Commercial aviation is
the safest mode of transportation. That record has been established not
just through government regulation, but through the work of everyone
involved in aviation -- manufacturers, airlines, airport operators, and
a highly-skilled and dedicated workforce. Their combined efforts have
produced a fatal accident rate of 0.3 per million departures in the
United States. The accident rate for commercial aviation declined
dramatically between 1950 and 1970. But, over the last two decades, that
rate has remained low, but flat. Heading into the next century, the
overall goal of aviation safety programs is clear: to bring that rate
down even lower.
Focusing on the accident
rate is critical because of the projected increases in traffic. Unless
that rate is reduced, the actual number of accidents will grow as
traffic increases. Given the international nature of aviation, cutting
the accident rate is an imperative not just for the United States, but
for all countries involved in aviation. Accident rates in some areas of
the world exceed those in the U.S. by a factor of ten or more. Boeing
projects that unless the global accident rate is reduced, by the year
2015, an airliner will crash somewhere in the world almost weekly.
While fatality rates in
general aviation are higher than in commercial operations, the principal
causes of general aviation accidents are similar to commercial aviation
accidents. The Commission's recommendations will help address the safety
of general aviation as well.
Lessons from reinventing
government must be applied to aviation programs. Improvements in safety
and security will result from a focus on several key areas: expanded use
of partnerships; reengineering of the FAA's regulatory and certification
processes; greater focus on human factors and training; and, the faster
introduction of proven new technologies. These technologies are enabling
the introduction of increasingly sophisticated automation into virtually
every aspect of aviation operations. They offer opportunities for
improved safety, security, and efficiency, and are driving the aviation
industry toward an integrated system that will alter many of the things
that have remained unchanged in aviation for decades.
Adapting to these changes
will require renewed commitments from all partners, and a willingness to
re-engineer long-standing practices and procedures. This change also
calls for a cultural transformation of the FAA to improve its ability to
regulate and lead the development of the integrated aviation system on
the horizon. In the areas of regulation and certification, the Challenge
2000 report represents a good first step. However, it and other internal
reviews have not provided a comprehensive, agency-wide assessment of the
need for change. That is what is needed.
A strong
government-industry partnership is needed to develop and integrate the
research, standards, regulations, procedures, and infrastructure needed
to support the aviation system of the future. The FAA has applied this
approach successfully to cooperative research projects with NASA in the
development of advanced air traffic technologies. The Commission
encourages these agencies and others to expand their cooperative efforts
in aviation safety research and development.
Regular and random
inspection of airlines and facilities should remain an important part of
the FAA's safety and security oversight programs. However, given the
tremendous growth and globalization in the industry, it is neither
realistic nor desirable to expect the FAA to rely on hands-on
inspections to ensure safety. It is critical that industry be given the
incentives and flexibility to be full partners in this effort, and be
encouraged to monitor and improve their own performance. This will not
only produce better focus on results, but will also allow the FAA to
deploy its resources more effectively.
Recommendations
1.1 Government and
industry should establish a national goal to reduce the aviation fatal
accident rate by a factor of five within ten years and conduct safety
research to support that goal.
Historically, major
advances in aviation safety have been driven by technological
improvements in airframes, engines, communications, radar and other
areas. Today, information technology can help aviation make the next
leap forward in safety.
Aviation safety experts
at the FAA and at NASA are confident that a five-fold reduction in the
fatal accident rate could be achieved in the next decade given the right
resources and focus. The Commission urges the FAA, NASA and industry to
step up to this challenge. Achieving this goal will require the combined
efforts of government and industry focused on three objectives:
preventing equipment malfunctions; reducing human-caused mishaps; and
ensuring separation between aircraft and other air or ground hazards.
Government can play a strong role in research and development, but it
must be in partnership with industry, which ultimately is responsible
for operating safely. The Commission urges NASA, which has considerable
expertise and resources in the area of safety research, to expand its
involvement in the promotion of aviation safety.
1.2. The FAA should
develop standards for continuous safety improvement, and should target
its regulatory resources based on performance against those standards.
The FAA should promote
aviation safety and security by setting high standards, requiring
aviation businesses to monitor and improve their own safety performance,
and by developing objective methods of measuring the ability of
companies to monitor and improve its own safety. Significant efforts
have already been made in this direction. Current regulations, for
example, require commercial air carriers to implement a Continuing
Analysis and Surveillance Program to evaluate the effectiveness of their
maintenance and inspection processes. Significant investment and effort
have been put into developing the Safety Performance Analysis System,
which will allow safety inspectors to compare the performance of similar
operators to identify trends that could lead to reduced levels of
safety. Such approaches to aviation safety oversight should be
broadened. Operators should be encouraged to implement systems that
ensure their continued compliance with regulations and that promote
continuous improvements in aviation safety and security.
Last year, the FAA
undertook an independent review of its regulatory and certification
programs. That effort, known as Challenge 2000, recommended in part that
the agency move toward implementing rules that establish performance
standards where possible, and that the rulemaking process be streamlined
and reengineered. Further, the report urged that the regulatory process
be restructured to provide compelling technical and business incentives
for industry to develop and certify products that help fulfill priority
safety needs.
The Commission recognizes
the value of the Challenge 2000 report, and urges the FAA and industry
to work together to develop standards for continuous safety and security
improvement that recognize variations in company maturity and best
industry practices. These standards should serve as the basis for
certification, regulation and oversight of the aviation industry.
Objective criteria should be developed that enable the FAA to assess
each organization's safety improvement processes and performance, and
use this assessment to improve performance throughout the industry. As
an incentive to implement effective safety and security improvement
programs, FAA oversight should be adjusted to recognize the maturity and
actual performance of individual operators and manufacturers. Such an
approach will allow the FAA to target its inspector resources on those
operators demonstrating the greatest risk, while allowing mature
operators and manufacturers to manage their organizations without
unproductive FAA involvement. The FAA should adjust its internal
classifications and rankings of inspectors to reflect this change.
1.3 The DOT and the
FAA should be more vigorous in the application of high standards for
certification of aviation businesses.
In the past, both the FAA
and the DOT have devoted significant resources to helping new companies
meet regulatory requirements and manage their operations. The recent 90
Day Safety Review conducted by the DOT and the FAA determined that this
is an inappropriate role for the government and recommended many actions
that will improve the certification process. The Commission agrees.
While the government should assist companies in improving the safety and
security of their operations, it should not use its resources to
compensate for lack of experience, technical expertise or judgment in a
company's day-to-day operations.
In some cases, the FAA's
certification standards and processes have not kept up with the changing
needs of civil aviation. For example, current standards for hiring
security personnel do not take into account changes in explosives
detection technology. And the certification of engines and airframes
still reflects a time when these systems were produced as completely
independent systems. Today, engine and airframe development is
integrated, so the certification process must take into account the
entire system rather than its individual parts. In the future, as the
airplane becomes an integral component of the air traffic management
system, the certification of the aircraft, as part of an integrated
aviation system, will become even more important.
The FAA demonstrated its
ability to integrate these processes and work effectively with industry
in the certification of the Boeing 777 airplane. Lessons from the 777
certification should be applied to the way the FAA certificates
airplanes in the future. Additional certification tools and processes
should be developed to encourage the introduction of new technologies.
Considerable attention
has been given to the issue of outsourcing of maintenance and other
work, particularly in the wake of the Valujet crash. The Commission does
not believe that outsourcing, in and of itself, presents a problem -- if
it is performed by qualified companies and individuals. The proper focus
of concern should be on the FAA's certification and oversight of any and
all companies performing aviation safety functions, including repair
stations certificated by the FAA but located outside of the United
States,.
1.4. The Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be simplified and, as appropriate,
rewritten as plain English, performance-based regulations.
The Commission believes
that government can achieve better regulatory compliance if its
objectives are stated clearly and its focus is on goals, not process.
While that sounds simple, the FAA's rules too often do not meet those
criteria.
The Commission urges the
FAA to take two steps to address this problem. First, as appropriate,
all new rules should be rewritten as performance-based regulations, and
in plain English. Second, within 18 months, a bottom-up review of
existing regulations should be conducted to identify those in need of
rewriting as performance-based, plain English regulations. Such
clarifications would improve compliance and help the FAA resolve serious
problems created by differences in interpretation of regulations by FAA
officials across the country.
The current FARs and
supporting Handbooks, Technical Standards Orders, Security Directives,
and Advisory Circulars have become too prescriptive and complex and are
increasingly open to misinterpretation. Sometimes they provide
conflicting policy or procedural guidance. They often stifle the
creativity of those who would do more than the rules require. In many
cases, the FARs do not allow for advances in technology that increase
security, safety or efficiency. For example, the FARs currently have no
provisions for design criteria to protect aircraft from high intensity
electromagnetic fields such as those emanating from TV antennas, radars,
cellular phones, portable stereos, and laptop computers. These
electromagnetic fields are potentially hazardous to aircraft using
digital communications, avionics and flight controls. The FAA has been
working for more than eight years to develop standard certification
requirements to address these hazards, but today each certification is
handled through the use of special conditions. Mandating performance
rather than dictating procedures will break the regulatory logjam.
1.5. Cost alone
should not become dispositive in deciding aviation safety and security
rulemaking issues.
As noted earlier, the
rate of fatal accidents in commercial aviation in the U.S. is less than
0.3 per million departures. The rarity of accidents can make it
difficult to justify safety and security improvements under benefitcost
criteria applied to regulatory activities. Nevertheless, benefitcost
analysis can enlighten the regulatory decisionmaking process. For
example, such analysis can help identify the most costeffective way to
achieve a safety or security objective. Cost considerations and
mathematical formulas, however, should never be dispositive in making
policy determinations regarding aviation safety they are one input for
decisionmaking. Further, non-quantifiable safety and security benefits
should be included in the analysis of proposals.
1.6. Government and
industry aviation safety research should emphasize human factors and
training.
Over the past ten years,
flight crew error accounted for over 60% of all aviation accidents
world-wide. And over the past five years, two types of flight crew
error, loss of control in flight and controlled flight into terrain,
accounted for over 70% of all airline fatalities. Moreover, recent
airport testing of explosive detection systems revealed significant
deficiencies in the performance of security personnel. Research,
technology, training and sharing of safety data can reduce human error.
Aviation safety and security have always depended upon a talented and
dedicated workforce. Today, changes in technology are presenting that
workforce -- flight crews, ground and air traffic controllers,
maintenance technicians -- with new challenges. The aviation system will
continue to rely on these highly skilled people to be responsible for
all aspects of operations, and it is critical to assess and address
issues relating to human interaction with changing technologies.
The FAA, NASA, the DoD,
and the aviation industry jointly developed a National Aviation Human
Factors Plan that describes a strategic approach to solving the problem
of human-caused mishaps. Two additional studies, one by the FAA dealing
with flight deck human factors and the other published by
representatives from government, industry, and union organizations as
their 1997 Aviation Safety Plan, identify a wide range of safety issues,
including human factors. The Commission acknowledges the importance of
all three of these reports and urges the immediate development of an
implementation plan.
1.7. Enhanced
ground proximity warning systems should be installed in all commercial
and military passenger aircraft.
The introduction of
ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) in commercial aircraft in the
late-1970s led to significant reductions in controlled flight into
terrain, the second-leading cause of aviation accidents. These accidents
occur when pilots cannot reconcile their positions with changing
terrain. Current GPWS systems are not predictive, however, and only warn
pilots when ground impact is imminent. Several recent incidents indicate
the need for a forward-looking system that can provide better
situational awareness and advanced warning to pilots when they are
approaching hazardous terrain. Digital terrain elevation data developed
for military purposes can help provide this capability.
On January 15, 1997, Vice
President Gore announced that the Department of Defense is releasing a
version of its global digital terrain elevation database for use in the
civilian sector. Combined with advanced navigation systems, this will
provide pilots with the tools that they need to reduce, and maybe even
eliminate, these kinds of accidents in the future.
The Commission applauds
the voluntary introduction of advanced ground proximity warning systems
in commercial aircraft, and urges all segments of the aviation community
to install this vital safety system. To achieve this goal, the
Commission urges the FAA to work with industry to develop and promote
the use of such equipment in general aviation aircraft.
1.8. The FAA should
work with the aviation community to develop and protect the integrity of
standard safety databases that can be shared in accident prevention
programs.
The identification of
deviations from normal operations, adverse trends, and other incidents
can be a valuable tool in preventing accidents. The most effective way
to identify incidents and problems in aviation is for the people who
operate in the system (pilots, mechanics, controllers, dispatchers,
etc.) to self-disclose the information. There are a number of separate
safety data collection efforts ongoing within government and industry.
Many of these efforts either duplicate existing data, report the same
information, or are not interconnected or integrated. The FAA should
work with the aviation community to develop standard databases of safety
information that can be shared openly and encompass operations within
the aviation industry as well as those within the FAA, such as air
traffic control.
People and companies will
not provide or assemble safety data or information if the information
will disclose trade secrets, if it can threaten a person's job or be
used in an enforcement action against a person or company, or if it can
in any way cause them a liability. Data protection is the key to
self-disclosure. The Flight Safety Foundation has studied this issue and
concluded that legislation is the only way to guarantee protection of
safety data. The joint industry/DOT Aviation Safety Plan cites data
protection as a key to achieving Zero Accidents. The Congress, at the
request of the Administration, recently enacted legislation providing
for the protection from public disclosure of certain safety and security
data voluntarily provided to the FAA. The FAA needs to expeditiously
complete its rulemaking to implement this legislation. Since adequate
legislative protection is key to building the trust necessary for self
disclosure and safety monitoring, the FAA should assess the adequacy of
the new legislative authority and implementing regulations one year
after the regulations take effect. Any necessary regulatory or
legislative modifications identified at that time should be promptly
addressed.
1.9. In cooperation
with airlines and manufacturers, the FAA's Aging Aircraft program should
be expanded to cover non-structural systems.
The average age of
commercial airline fleets is continuing to increase. In 1975, few large
commercial aircraft were in service beyond their original design life,
typically twenty years. But with increased competition and growth in
passenger and cargo traffic brought on by deregulation, service lives of
dependable aircraft models were extended through expanded maintenance
and overhaul programs. By the year 2000, more than 2,500 commercial
aircraft in the United States may be flying beyond their original design
life.
In 1988, a Boeing 737 in
Hawaii suffered severe structural failure of its forward fuselage
sections due to corrosion not visible during normal maintenance
inspections. As a direct result of this accident, the FAA greatly
expanded its structural integrity inspection program and formed the
Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG). Its focus has been almost
exclusively on structural integrity, and the effects of structural
corrosion and fatigue. The programs in existence under the AAWG have
been effective and are considered adequate to deal proactively with the
structural problems associated with aging commercial aircraft.
However, much less is
known about the potential effects of age on non-structural components of
commercial aircraft. Non-structural components include electrical
wiring; connectors, wiring harnesses, and cables; fuel, hydraulic and
pneumatic lines; and electro-mechanical systems such as pumps, sensors,
and actuators. Neither the manufacturers nor the commercial airlines
consider the aging of non-structural components to pose serious safety
problems primarily because they consider their redundancy, replacement
upon failure, and periodic, programmed maintenance to be sufficient to
assure aircraft safety.
The Commission is
concerned that existing procedures, directives, quality assurance, and
inspections may not be sufficient to prevent safety related problems
caused by the corrosive and deteriorating effects of non-structural
components of commercial aircraft as they age. To address this, the
Commission recommends that the FAA work with airlines and manufacturers
to expand the aging aircraft program to include non-structural
components, through steps including: full and complete tear-downs of
selected aircraft scheduled to go out of service; the establishment of a
lead-the-fleet research program; an expansion of the FAA-DoD-NASA
cooperative aging aircraft program; an expansion of programs of the
Airworthiness Assurance Working Group to include non-structural
components; and encouraging the development of modern technical means to
ensure and predict the continued airworthiness of aging non-structural
components and systems.
1.10.
The FAA should develop better quantitative models and analytic
techniques to inform management decision-making.
The FAA is called upon to
evaluate many proposals for safety and security improvements and
capacity enhancements as part of its NAS modernization, and other
programs. The FAA does not have a developed model for the air traffic
control system that permits the systematic evaluation and comparison of
these proposals with respect to their life-cycle cost and their likely
effects on the operation of the air traffic control system. If
available, such analysis would be of great assistance to support
decision-making by the FAA and the DOT leadership.
The Commission urges the
FAA to strengthen its analytic and planning tools, especially through
the development of models that give insight into the system-wide
consequences of alternative courses of action and the development of a
credible cost accounting system, as mandated in the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996.
1.11. The DOT
should work with the Department of Justice to ensure that airline crew
members performing their duties are protected from passenger misconduct.
Passenger behavior that
amounts to criminal conduct is a matter of growing concern to U.S.
airlines. When crew members are called upon to enforce in-flight safety
and security rules and regulations, they are working to ensure that our
aviation system remains safe and secure. Their responsibilities at times
require them to confront passengers who are unwilling to comply with
lawful instructions and become abusive. Such conduct by passengers
threatens the well-being of all those on the plane, and is subject to
federal prosecution. The Commission urges the DOT to work with the
Department of Justice and the United States Attorneys to ensure that
priority is given the prosecution of offending passengers to the fullest
extent of the law for interfering with airline crew members in the
performance of their duties.
1.12. Legislation
should be enacted to protect aviation industry employees who report
safety or security violations.
In a number of important
industries, statutory protection is provided to "whistleblowers" who
report violations of safety procedures. The Commission believes that
aviation safety and security will be enhanced if employees, who are a
critical link in safety and security, are able to report unsafe
conditions to the FAA without fear of retribution from their employers.
Some aviation employees are provided protections through contractual
agreements. However, the Commission believes that statutory protection,
such as that provided to workers under the Occupational Health and
Safety Act, would provide uniformity within the industry and provide
coverage to those not already protected.
1.13. The FAA
should eliminate the exemptions in the Federal Aviation Regulations that
allow passengers under the age of two to travel without the benefit of
FAA-approved restraints.
Current regulations
require that all passengers over the age of two have their own seats,
and that those seats are equipped with FAA-approved restraints. The
Commission believes that it is inappropriate for infants to be afforded
a lesser degree of protection than older passengers. The FAA should
revise its regulations to require that all occupants be restrained
during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions, and that all infants
and small children below the weight of 40 pounds and under the height of
40 inches be restrained in an appropriate child restraint system, such
as child safety seats, appropriate to their height and weight. The
Commission also notes and commends the FAA's ongoing efforts in
collaboration with major airframe and seat manufacturers to develop
standards for integrated child safety seats.
1.14. The
Commission commends the joint government-industry initiative to equip
the cargo holds of all passenger aircraft with smoke detectors, and
urges expeditious implementation of the rules and other steps necessary
to achieve the goal of both detection and suppression in all cargo
holds.
In December 1996, most of
the nation's major airlines announced a voluntary action to install
smoke detection systems in the cargo holds of commercial airplanes and
to study additional measures for fire suppression. This announcement
broke a deadlock that had existed for most of the last decade. The
Commission commends this initiative as an example of the partnership
that will be necessary to enhance safety and security.
Chapter Two:
Making Air Traffic
Control
Safer and More
Efficient
"While the airlines
are posting record traffic figures and profits, the ground-based
air traffic control infrastructure is outdated and unable to keep pace
with expansion."
Barry Krasner,
President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association
It is essential that the
air traffic system of the United States be modernized. Although the
current system remains safe, it is showing signs of aging. System
outages, brownouts, inefficiencies in air traffic control, and capacity
limitations on the ground add costs to the FAA and to users of the
airspace system. The Air Transport Association estimates that
inefficiencies in the system cost airlines in excess of $3 billion in
1995 -- costs ultimately paid by passengers and anyone who purchases
goods shipped by air.
In 1996, a
government-industry task force defined a future operational concept
known as Free Flight. Under this concept, national airspace system (NAS)
operations will transition from ground-based air traffic control
(using analog radios, navigational beacons and radar) to more
collaborative air traffic management based on digital
communication, satellite navigation, and computer-aided decision support
tools for controllers and pilots. This proposed new system offers
significant benefits for users of the NAS, for the safety and
convenience of the traveling public, and for greater FAA operational
efficiency.
The FAA's proposed
technical approach and schedule for NAS modernization are documented in
its recently published National Airspace System Architecture. The
proposed NAS architecture is generally consistent with industry's vision
for the future of air traffic management, but the proposed schedule for
modernization is too slow to meet projected demands and funding issues
are not adequately addressed. Unless the schedule is accelerated, the
United States may lose its position of global leadership in civil
aviation.
The technology needed to
modernize the ATC system by and large exists, and is available
off-the-shelf. The challenge is completing the transition to the new
system in a timely and cost-effective manner, and ensuring that all
users participate in the upgrade. Unfortunately, the FAA has encountered
serious problems in its modernization program. Before major changes were
made in 1994, the centerpiece of the FAA's modernization program had,
according to the General Accounting Office, fallen eight years behind
schedule, and was $5 billion over budget. Cost overruns in five other
key programs ranged from 50 to more than 500%, and delays averaged close
to four years.
These problems have been
traced to inadequate user input, poor management and contractor
performance, and inadequate oversight. Although availability of funds
does not appear to have been a problem in the past, the capital needs of
the future could well outstrip the ability to fund them through the
traditional budget process, particularly as capital improvements are
accelerated, as recommended by the Commission.
Traditionally, the FAA
has seen it necessary to design, own and operate its air traffic control
system, in cooperation with the Department of Defense. Current
off-the-shelf technology allows the FAA to consider its needs
differently, particularly in areas such as the acquisition of
communications systems. In other critical areas of government, including
Defense, the private sector has proved its ability to provide critical
services with increased quality and lower costs. A number of major U.S.
manufacturers are producing new ATC systems for deployment in other
countries. The FAA should seek collaborative opportunities with the
private sector in order to accelerate the transition to a new NAS.
There have been several
important changes that should allow the modernization program to move
forward more effectively. The Commission notes, in particular, the
following factors which should help avoid problems of the past: the
redefinition of the modernization program; the personnel and procurement
reforms granted the FAA, which give it unprecedented ability to hold
managers accountable for results and to streamline procurement
processes; and the creation of the new Management Advisory Committee by
the Congress, which will give users a more effective voice in
decision-making. However, the Commission believes that a new long-term
financing mechanism is also necessary to ensure that modernization
occurs on an acceptable schedule, and that the resulting safety and
efficiency benefits are realized faster.
The FAA must take
advantage of personnel, procurement, and other reforms to ensure that it
is spending existing resources more effectively in order to gain
approval of innovative funding proposals from the Administration and the
Congress. Additionally, the Commission believes that it is critical that
the senior management at the DOT and the FAA take additional steps to
ensure that past problems are being dealt with, and that an accelerated
modernization schedule can proceed.
Recommendations
2.1. The FAA should
develop a revised NAS modernization plan within six months that will set
a goal of the modernized system being fully operational nationwide by
the year 2005; and the Congress, the Administration, and users should
develop innovative means of financing this acceleration.
Modernization of our
aging airspace system is critical to the safety of the traveling public,
to maintaining our world leadership in aviation, and to our economic
interests. The FAA's current plan calls for the modernized system to be
operational after 2012. That is simply too long to postpone the safety
and economic benefits that will derive from the modernized system.
Therefore, the Commission recommends that 2005 be set as the date when
all elements of the communication, navigation, and surveillance and air
traffic management capabilities defined in the NAS architecture should
be fully operational. This accelerated implementation must be
coordinated with the Department of Defense, which is a major user and
provider of air traffic control services. Implementation of the
initiative announced by Vice President Gore on January 15, 1997 to
demonstrate these systems in Hawaii and Alaska is an important step
toward full operational status.
Achieving this goal
depends on the availability of several tools, as discussed in the
following recommendations. Chief among these tools is the need to find
non-traditional means of financing the capital improvements. Innovative
approaches to federal financing of major infrastructure projects have
been proposed in the past, including leveraging the revenues coming into
the FAA, multi-year appropriations and non-traditional budget scoring.
Non-federal financing approaches have also been proposed, such as the
creation of private infrastructure banks. The Commission expects that
the National Civil Aviation Review Commission (NCARC), established in
the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 by Congress to explore
funding options for the FAA, will consider these options. Whatever the
funding mechanism selected, the Commission believes it is critical to
our global leadership in civil aviation to finance an accelerated
modernization of the NAS.
2.2. The FAA should
develop plans to ensure that operational and airport capacity needs are
integrated into the modernization of the NAS.
The FAA's current NAS
modernization program focuses on equipment and infrastructure. However,
there is no clear plan for how the people who operate the system will
make the transition, and what their roles and responsibilities will be
under the new systems. The FAA should develop immediately a NAS
Operational Plan to address these issues.
The FAA should also
develop a National Airport System Modernization Plan that presents a
strategic vision, plan and schedule for modernization of U.S. airports
that is consistent with modernization of the NAS. This plan, produced in
collaboration with local airport officials, should identify critical
system capacity enhancement needs and should address major safety issues
at airports. These plans, when incorporated into the revised NAS
implementation plan called for in recommendation 2.1, would provide a
balanced strategic plan for aviation in the United States.
2.3. The FAA should
explore innovative means to accelerate the installation of advanced
avionics in general aviation aircraft.
The safety and efficiency
benefits of the modernized NAS will not be realized fully until all
users have incorporated its features. Delays in the installation of the
equipment needed to operate in the future NAS will put off the benefits
for all system users. Therefore, it is essential that the FAA, as it
accelerates its modernization, works with users to ensure that they keep
pace.
Savings from more
efficient operations provide significant incentive for commercial
carriers to install the required digital radios, GPS receivers, and
automatic dependent surveillance equipment. But it is essential to find
ways to ensure general aviation users are equipped for future NAS
operations.
2.4. The U.S.
government should ensure the accuracy, availability and reliability of
the GPS system to accelerate its use in NAS modernization and to
encourage its acceptance as an international standard for aviation.
Satellite-based
navigation and positioning is a core element of our NAS modernization
plans, and is critical to achieving a seamless, efficient global
aviation system in the future. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS),
which is a dual civil-military system operated by the U.S. Air Force, is
the current and foreseeable backbone for any global navigation satellite
system. Full acceptance of GPS as an international standard for aviation
is dependent on greater assurance to the user community -- both foreign
and domestic -- of its accuracy, availability and reliability. As part
of its NAS modernization plans, the FAA is currently developing a Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS) that will enhance the basic GPS civil
service to meet the requirements of civil aviation users. Many other
nations, including Europe and Japan, are planning similar augmentations,
but are still somewhat reluctant to base their own airspace management
on a GPS system which they perceive to be controlled by the U.S.
military.
The recent U.S. GPS
policy made considerable progress in addressing these international
concerns by assuring the continued availability of basic civil GPS
services worldwide, free of direct user fees. This new policy also
established a joint civil-military Executive Board to manage GPS and its
augmentations, and initiated formal international discussions aimed at
developing agreements on the provision and use of GPS services. But,
there are still a number of important technical and policy issues that
must be resolved if GPS is to become the system of choice for global
aviation navigation and positioning.
First, the U.S. must
provide stronger strategic leadership for civil users of GPS. The
acceptance of GPS as an international standard is key to continued U.S.
leadership in aviation, and can only be achieved through strong civilian
participation in GPS planning and decision-making. A number of working
groups and advisory committees currently exist throughout the Federal
government and the private sector to coordinate and represent the needs
of civil users of GPS. The Commission recommends that civilian
leadership be strengthened by establishing a Civil GPS Users Advisory
Council, with representatives from both the users and providers of GPS
equipment and services, reporting to the GPS Executive Board. The
Commission also encourages the Administration to work rapidly on the
development of international guidelines on the provision and use of GPS
services called for in the President's recent GPS policy directive.
Second, greater
redundancy is needed to enhance the ability of users to cross-check GPS
accuracy and to verify the system's reliability. The most effective
means of achieving this redundancy is to provide additional civil GPS
precision ranging signals in space. Studies have shown that additional
precision ranging capability can be achieved at relatively little cost
while providing enormous benefits to all civil GPS users. The Commission
recommends that this capability be added to the FAA's WAAS system. This
action will result in a more robust and inherently more reliable system
and will provide a major boost to the international acceptance of GPS as
a standard for aviation navigation and positioning.
Third, the GPS
Executive Board should resolve the remaining issues over funding and
frequency assignment for a second civil frequency as quickly as possible
so that this needed improvement can be included in the next generation
of GPS satellites. The GPS Executive Board is considering
enhancements to future GPS satellites that would include an additional
broadcast frequency. This additional frequency would expand the base of
civil GPS users worldwide and would send a strong message to the
international community that the U.S. intends to maintain a long-term
commitment to providing civil GPS services. Moreover, the FAA's WAAS
system requires two frequencies to meet the accuracy needs of civil
aviation users, and the additional frequency would allow for complete
independence of civil and military GPS services in the future.
Fourth, the GPS system
must be protected from both intentional and unintentional interference.
The GPS system will be a core, safety-critical component of the future
global aviation information system. The security of GPS should be a
major consideration in carrying out Recommendation 3.6 for protecting
all aviation information systems.
2.5. The users of
the NAS should fund its development and operation.
The current system of
funding the ATC system provides little direct connection between the
excise taxes paid and services provided or the amount made available to
the FAA through the budget and appropriations process. Replacing the
traditional system of excise taxes with user fees offers the potential
to correlate revenues and spending more closely.* Importantly, a
financing system would not only help ensure adequate availability of
funding , but would also build incentives for efficiency and safety into
the system -- both for the users and for the FAA. The National Civil
Aviation Review Commission is the proper venue for resolving the details
of a new user fee system, and the Commission expects that it will be
formed and begin its work in the very near future. The Commission urges
the NCARC, in designing a new financing system, to ensure that any
changes in the relative amount of revenues generated from any segment of
the aviation industry do not result in undue economic disruption within
any segment of the industry, and that the fees are not discriminatory or
anti-competitive among carriers. In addition, non-business general
aviation users of the NAS should not be adversely impacted by any new
financing system. This will help ensure that general aviation users will
be full and willing participants in the modernized NAS.
* Commissioner. Coleman
takes no position with respect to the first two sentences of
recommendation 2.5 as he feels this is among the issues NCARC is to
resolve.
2.6.
The FAA should identify and justify by July 1997 the frequency spectrum
necessary for the transition to a modernized air traffic control system.
Expansion of
telecommunications and other industries is creating greater competition
for frequency spectrum. The FAA has indicated a need to retain large
segments of its current spectrum allocation, but has provided
insufficient justification for doing so. To ensure that the FAA's
spectrum needs during modernization are not compromised the Commission
recommends that the FAA complete a full justification, as well as a plan
for freeing up spectrum as older systems are modernized or
decommissioned. This process must be completed not later than July,
1997, and the results included by the DOT in the Federal Radio
Navigation Plan and the RTCA 185 Report: Aeronautical Spectrum Planning
for the Years 1997-2010.
Chapter Three:
Improving Security for
Travelers
"We know we can't make
the world risk-free, but we can reduce the risks we face and we have to
take the fight to the terrorists. If we have the will, we can find the
means."
President Clinton
The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence
sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in
two important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat from
foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States have joined
the list of targets, and Americans have joined the ranks of terrorists.
The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the Federal
Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples of the shift, as is the
conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb twelve American
airliners out of the sky over the Pacific Ocean. The second change is
that in addition to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is
becoming more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc
groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out their
designs.
Although the threat of
terrorism is increasing, the danger of an individual becoming a victim
of a terrorist attack -- let alone an aircraft bombing -- will doubtless
remain very small. But terrorism isn't merely a matter of statistics. We
fear a plane crash far more than we fear something like a car accident.
One might survive a car accident, but there's no chance in a plane at
30,000 feet. This fear is one of the reasons that terrorists see
airplanes as attractive targets. And, they know that airlines are often
seen as national symbols.
When terrorists attack an
American airliner, they are attacking the United States. They have so
little respect for our values -- so little regard for human life or the
principles of justice that are the foundation of American society --
that they would destroy innocent children and devoted mothers and
fathers completely at random. This cannot be tolerated, or allowed to
intimidate free societies. There must be a concerted national will to
fight terrorism. There must be a willingness to apply sustained
economic, political and commercial pressure on countries sponsoring
terrorists. There must be an unwavering commitment to pursuing
terrorists and bringing them to justice. There must be the resolve to
punish those who would violate sanctions imposed against terrorist
states.
Today's aviation security
is based in part on the defenses erected in the 1970s against hijackers
and on recommendations made by the Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism, which was formed in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland. Improvements in aviation security have been
complicated because government and industry often found themselves at
odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness,
technology, and potential impacts on operations and passengers.
Americans should not have
to choose between enhanced security and efficient and affordable air
travel. Both goals are achievable if the federal government, airlines,
airports, aviation employees, local law enforcement agencies, and
passengers work together to achieve them. Accordingly, the Commission
recommends a new partnership that will marshal resources more
effectively, and focus all parties on achieving the ultimate goal:
enhancing the security of air travel for Americans.
The Commission considered
the question of whether or not the FAA is the appropriate government
agency to have the primary responsibility for regulating aviation
security. The Commission believes that, because of its extensive
interactions with airlines and airports, the FAA is the appropriate
agency, with the following qualifications: first, that the FAA must
improve the way it carries out its mission; and second, that the roles
of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA must
be more clearly defined and coordinated. The Commission's
recommendations address those conditions.
The terrorist threat is
changing and growing. Therefore, it is important to improve security not
just against familiar threats, such as explosives in checked baggage,
but also to explore means of assessing and countering emerging threats,
such as the use of biological or chemical agents, or the use of
missiles. While these do not present significant threats at present, it
would be short-sighted not to plan for their possible use and take
prudent steps to counter them.
The Commission believes
that aviation security should be a system of systems, layered,
integrated, and working together to produce the highest possible levels
of protection. Each of the Commission's recommendations should be looked
upon as a part of a whole, and not in isolation. It should be noted that
a number of the Commission's recommendations outlined in the previous
chapter, particularly those relating to certification and regulation,
apply to the FAA's security programs, as well.
Recommendations
3.1. The federal
government should consider aviation security as a national security
issue, and provide substantial funding for capital improvements.
The Commission believes
that terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed at the United
States, and that there should be an ongoing federal commitment to
reducing the threats that they pose. In its initial report, the
Commission called for approximately $160 million in federal funds for
capital costs associated with improving security, and Congress agreed.
As part of its ongoing commitment, the federal government should devote
significant resources, of approximately $100 million annually, to meet
capital requirements identified by airport consortia and the FAA. The
Commission recognizes that more is needed. The Commission expects the
National Civil Aviation Review Commission to consider a variety of
options for additional user fees that could be used to pay for security
measures including, among others, an aviation user security surcharge,
the imposition of local security fees, tax incentives and other means.
3.2. The FAA should
establish federally mandated standards for security enhancements.
These enhancements should
include standards for use of Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines,
training programs for security personnel, use of automated bag match
technology, development of profiling programs (manual and automated),
and deployment of explosive detection canine teams.
3.3. The Postal
Service should advise customers that all packages weighing over 16
ounces will be subject to examination for explosives and other threat
objects in order to move by air.
The Postal Service now
requires that packages weighing over 16 ounces must be brought to a post
office, rather than be placed in a mailbox. To improve security further,
the Postal Service should mandate that all mail weighing over
16 ounces contain a written release that allows it to be examined by
explosive detection systems in order to be shipped by air. The Postal
Service should develop and implement procedures to randomly screen such
packages for explosives and other threat objects. If necessary, the
Postal Service should seek appropriate legislation to accomplish this.
3.4. Current law
should be amended to clarify the U.S. Customs Service's authority to
search outbound international mail.
Currently, the Customs
Service searches for explosives and other threat objects on inbound mail
and cargo. This recommended legislative enhancement parallels the
Customs Service's existing border search authority.
3.5. The FAA should
implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and
other threat objects in cargo and work with industry to develop new
initiatives in this area.
The FAA should place
greater emphasis on the work of teams, such as the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee and the Baseline Cargo Working Group, to address
cargo issues. The Commission believes that the FAA should implement the
Baseline Group's recommendation with regard to profiling by "known" and
"unknown" shippers. In addition, unaccompanied express shipments on
commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to examination by
explosives detection systems; the FAA should work with industry to
develop a computer assisted cargo profiling system that can be
integrated into airlines' and forwarders' reservation and operating
systems; requirements should be implemented requiring that trucks
delivering cargo for loading on planes be sealed and locked; the FAA
should develop and distribute air cargo security training materials; and
enhanced forwarder and shipper employee screening procedures should be
developed.
3.6. The FAA should
establish a security system that will provide a high level of protection
for all aviation information systems.
In addition to improving
the physical security of the traveling public, information systems
critical to aircraft, air traffic control and airports should also be
protected. Although government is responsible for a great number of
aviation related information systems, a partnership must be formed in
order to create integrated protection among these and related private
sector systems. Some protective measures will become the responsibility
of airlines, some that of the airports and others of the aircraft and
air traffic control systems manufacturers and maintenance providers. The
National Security Agency must play a role in coordinating information
security measures, setting standards and providing oversight of system
security to ensure protection against outside interference, disruption
and corruption. Specific legislation should be reviewed that makes
willful interference with information systems a federal crime with
substantial penalties to provide a clear deterrent.
3.7. The FAA should
work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all passengers
are positively identified and subjected to security procedures before
they board aircraft.
Curb-side check-in,
electronic ticketing, advance boarding passes, and other initiatives are
affecting the way passengers enter the air transportation system. As
improved security procedures are put into place, it is essential that
all passengers be accounted for in that system, properly identified and
subject to the same level of scrutiny. The Commission urges the FAA to
work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that necessary
changes are made to accomplish that goal.
3.8.
Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S. Representative, that the
International Civil Aviation Organization begin a program to verify and
improve compliance with international security standards.
Although 185 nations have
ratified the International Civil Aviation Organization convention, and
the security standards contained in it, compliance is not uniform. This
creates the potential for security vulnerabilities on connecting flights
throughout the world. To help raise levels of security throughout the
world, the International Civil Aviation Organization needs greater
authority to determine whether nations are in compliance. Strong U.S.
sponsorship for adding verification and compliance capabilities to the
International Civil Aviation Organization could lead to enhanced
worldwide aviation security.
3.9. Assess the
possible use of chemical and biological weapons as tools of terrorism.
FAA should work with the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy on programs to
anticipate and plan for changing threats, such as chemical and
biological agents.
3.10. The FAA
should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the
professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening
personnel.
The Commission believes
it's critical to ensure that those charged with providing security for
over 500 million passengers a year in the United States are the best
qualified and trained in the industry. One proposal that could
accomplish this goal is the creation of a nationwide non-profit security
corporation, funded by the airlines, to handle airport security. This
concept, under consideration by the major airlines, merits further
review.
The Commission recommends
that the FAA work with the private sector and other federal agencies to
promote the professionalism of security personnel through a program that
could include: licensing and performance standards that reflect best
practices; adequate, common and recurrent training that considers human
factors; emphasis on reducing turnover rates; rewards for performance;
opportunities for advancement; a national rank and grade structure to
permit employees to find opportunities in other areas; regional and
national competitions to identify highly skilled teams; and, an
agreement among users to hire based on performance, not just cost.
3.11 Access to
airport controlled areas must be secured and the physical security of
aircraft must be ensured.
Air carriers and airport
authorities, working with FAA, must develop comprehensive and effective
means by which to secure aircraft and other controlled areas from
unauthorized access and intrusion. Use of radio frequency transponders
to track the location of people and objects in airport controlled areas,
including aircraft, offers significant advantages over the current
security measures commonly used today. Where adequate airport controlled
area and aircraft security are not assured by other means, this
technology should be considered for use at both international and
domestic airports.
The Following
Recommendations Were Presented to President Clinton on September
9, 1996
3.12. Establish
consortia at all commercial airports to implement enhancements to
aviation safety and security.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish consortia
at all commercial airports to implement enhancements to aviation safety
and security. The Commission is convinced that safety, security,
efficiency, and affordability can go hand in hand if all parties work as
partners. The FAA should direct its officials responsible for oversight
of security procedures at the nation's 450 commercial airports to
convene relevant aviation and law enforcement entities for the purpose
of implementing the Commission's recommendations and further improving
aviation safety and security. At each airport, these partners will: (1)
immediately conduct a vulnerability assessment; and (2) based on that
assessment, develop an action plan that includes the deployment of new
technology and processes to enhance aviation safety and security.
The FAA will approve
these action plans on an expedited basis; procure and allocate, based on
availability, new equipment; and test airports to ensure that the plans
are being implemented properly.
Status
Forty-one major
airport consortia have submitted action plans for FAA review.
The Commission's most
important recommendation in its initial report was that local consortia
be convened to identify vulnerabilities and propose action plans. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) called for initial consortia
meetings by September 27, 1996, at 41 major U.S. airports where FAA
personnel are permanently deployed. By December 2, 1996, all consortia
action plans or reports from these airports had been presented to the
FAA for review. The consortia action plans defined local security threat
conditions based on input from FAA and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Consortia also assessed other areas such as personnel
training, passenger screening, access control measures, and equipment
and technology needs.
Augmenting
Recommendation
The FAA should formalize
the establishment of consortia at all Category X through Category III
airports by September 30, 1997, and, after consultation with industry,
issue guidance on the future of consortia.
3.13.
Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Conduct airport
vulnerability assessments and develop action plans.
Using models already
developed by Sandia National Laboratory, periodic vulnerability
assessments of the nation's commercial airports should be conducted.
Based on the results, action plans tailored to each airport will be
developed for expedited approval by the FAA.
Status
Law enforcement
agencies are conducting assessments and addressing problems.
The FAA Authorization Act
of 1996 required the FAA and FBI to conduct joint threat and
vulnerability assessments on security every three years, or more
frequently if necessary, at each airport determined to be high risk.
In November 1996,
officials from the FBI, FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT)
established a working group to define "high risk" airports. Discussions
have been held on the criteria to be used to identify an airport
facility as high risk, methodology to use in conducting joint FAA/FBI
vulnerability assessments, and which airports should be assessed on a
priority basis. The target date for completing the procedures for
conducting vulnerability assessments is April 30, 1997, and initial
assessments are to begin by late June, 1997.
3.14.
Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all
screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access to secure
areas.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Require criminal
background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all
airport and airline employees with access to secure areas.
Currently, employees,
including those with unescorted access to secure areas of airports, are
not subject to such review. Given the risks associated with the
potential introduction of explosives into these areas, the Commission
recommends that screeners and employees with access to secure areas be
subject to criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks.
Status
The FBI has reduced
fingerprint check turnaround time to at most seven days.
The FBI has expedited the
processing of aviation related fingerprint submissions. The FBI will
accelerate its efforts to make software modifications and purchase
additional computer hardware to adapt its Electronic Fingerprinting
Image Print Server (EFIPS) system to accept civil fingerprint cards.
Augmenting
Recommendation
The Commission reiterates
that the overall goal is FBI fingerprint checks of all airport and
airline employees with access to secure areas, no later than mid-1999.
3.15 Deploy
existing technology.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Deploy existing
technology. The Commission has reviewed numerous machines
designed to detect explosives in cargo, checked baggage, carry-on bags,
and on passengers. There is no silver bullet. No single machine offers a
solution to the challenges we face. Each machine has its own advantages
and its own limitations. Even machines that work fairly well in the
laboratory need to be tested in actual use at busy airports. We
recognize that the FAA has certified only one technology for baggage
screening, but we believe we must get a variety of machines, including
some in use in other countries, into the field. There day-to-day
operators can figure out which equipment works best in what situations
and combinations, and what features need to be improved. Finding the
strengths and weakness of existing technology will spur industry's
creativity, leading to the invention of better and better instruments.
Ultimately, the goal should be to deploy equipment that can be certified
by the FAA to detect explosives likely to be used by terrorists.
The Commission recommends
the government purchase significant numbers of computed tomography
detection systems, upgraded x-rays, and other innovative systems. By
deploying equipment widely, passengers throughout the aviation system
will receive the benefits of the enhancements. The Commission strongly
believes it would be improper to discuss the details of such deployment,
as to do so would serve only to compromise the integrity of an enhanced
security system.
The Commission recommends
that this initial equipment purchase be paid for with appropriated
funds. This recommendation does not settle the issue of how security
costs will be financed in the long run. That will be dealt with in our
final report.
Status
Congress funded the
purchase of commercially available advanced security screening
equipment.
The FAA has ordered 54
advanced explosives detection systems.
In November and December
1996, FAA awarded six fixed priced contracts to various manufacturers of
explosives trace detection technologies.
Augmenting
Recommendation
The Commission recognizes
that deployed technology for examining carry-on baggage may be outdated.
New developments such as computerized systems with high resolution
digital displays, innovative use of color to highlight threat objects,
and ability to accommodate technologies such as threat image projection
to maintain screener performance, can provide enhanced security. The FAA
should review available technology for screening carry on items,
regularly update minimum standards for new installations, and develop
programs for upgrading deployed technology.
Cross Reference to
Related Recommendations
This recommendation is
related to recommendation 3.2.
3.16.
Establish a joint government-industry research and development program.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish a joint
government-industry research and development program. The
Commission recommends the establishment of a new joint government -
industry partnership whose mission will be to accelerate research and
development to enhance the security of air travel.
This could be modeled on
the Partnership For A New Generation Vehicle (PNGV), in which the
federal government and auto makers are combining resources to develop
automobiles with significantly enhanced fuel economy, safety, and
reduced emissions. We propose to increase federal funding and to ask the
private sector to contribute.
Status
The FAA is working
with industry to develop agreements and award research grants.
Congress increased the
federal funding of R&D as required.
The FAA is moving in the
direction of interacting more closely with industry, having set up
advisory mechanisms such as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee;
participating in individual Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements with individual firms; giving grants to airlines and airports
to conduct demonstrations and otherwise involve themselves in security
technology development; entering into cost-sharing arrangements with
firms to develop security technology.
Augmenting
Recommendation
The FAA received
additional funding and has aggressively accelerated systems to (1)
improve screener performance, (2) reduce aircraft vulnerability, (3)
screen cargo, and (4) to develop options for dealing with threats other
than explosives. The FAA is encouraged to use the best technology
available to solve security and safety challenges throughout the air
transportation system.
3.17. Establish an
interagency task force to assess the potential use of surface-to-air
missiles against commercial aircraft.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Assess the
viability of anti-missile defense systems.. Whether or
not the explosion of TWA 800 turns out to have been due to a
surface-to-air missile attack, as some eye-witness accounts suggest,
missile attacks have downed passenger planes in other countries, and it
is a risk that should be evaluated. The Commission will continue to
analyze this problem in cooperation with the Department of Defense and
other government agencies.
Status
DoD will convene an
interagency task force to examine the threat to civil aircraft.
Initial analyses of both
the missile threat and electronic systems available to counter it
support a decision to take positive steps. Experts from the Department
of Defense (DoD), the intelligence community, defense contractors and
research scientists contributed to analysis of the viability of
anti-missile defense systems for civil aviation.
Augmenting
Recommendation
Within ninety days, the
Department of Defense should convene an interagency task force including
the DOT, the FAA and the intelligence community to address the potential
threat from surface-to-air missiles against commercial aviation. Working
with airport consortia, this task force should develop plans to provide
increased surveillance, and, if necessary, the deployment of
countermeasures. The task force should make recommendations to the DOT
regarding the testing, evaluation and preparation for deployment of
measures to protect civil aircraft against an increased threat from
surface-to-air missiles.
Appropriate steps should
be taken by the intelligence community and through international
diplomacy to reduce the possibility that terrorists could obtain or use
surface-to-air missiles. The State Department should study the expansion
of conventional arms agreements to include man-portable surface-to-air
missiles, and the U.S. Representative to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) should propose a new convention addressing
these weapons.
3.18.
Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly
expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs. Canines are used to
detect explosives in many important areas, but only sparingly in airport
security. The Commission is convinced that an increase in the number of
well-trained dogs and handlers can make a significant and rapid
improvement in security, and recommends the deployment of 114 additional
teams.
Status
The FAA received
funding for 114 new dog teams and training has begun.
Augmenting
Recommendation
Additionally, the
Commission recommends that ATF continue to work to develop
government-wide standards for canine teams.
3.19.
Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Complement
technology with automated passenger profiling. Profiling can
leverage an investment in technology and trained people. Based on
information that is already in computer databases, passengers could be
separated into a very large majority who present little or no risk, and
a small minority who merit additional attention.
Such systems are employed
successfully by other agencies, including the Customs Service. By
utilizing this process Customs is better able to focus its resources and
attention. As a result, many legitimate travelers never see a customs
agent anymore -- and drug busts are way up.
The FAA and Northwest
Airlines are developing an automated profiling system tailored to
aviation security, and the Commission supports the continued development
and implementation of such a system.
To improve and promote
passenger profiling, the Commission recommends three steps. First, FBI,
CIA, and BATF should evaluate and expand the research into known
terrorists, hijackers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible
profiling system. They should keep in mind that such a profile would be
most useful to the airlines if it could be matched against automated
passenger information which the airlines maintain.
Second, the FBI and CIA
should develop a system that would allow important intelligence
information on known or suspected terrorists to be used in passenger
profiling without compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its
sources. Similar systems have been developed to give environmental
scientists access to sensitive data collected by satellites.
Third, the Commission
will establish an advisory board on civil liberties questions that arise
from the development and use of profiling systems.
Status
Profiling systems
are being developed.
The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and Northwest Airlines are completing final
programming changes to an automated profiling system. A tentative
completion date for programming changes and implementation of Computer
Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) on Northwest flights is April, 1997.
Additional programming will begin for use of CAPS on other airline
reservations systems, with a tentative completion date of August, 1997.
On January 17, 1997, a
Civil Liberties Advisory Board met with Commissioners to discuss civil
liberties concerns pertaining to profiling. The Board submitted
recommendations to the Commission. (Appendix A)
Augmenting
Recommendation
The Commission believes
that profiling is one part of a comprehensive, layered security program.
As with other measures, it becomes less necessary with the introduction
of efficient screening technology. Based on readily-available
information, passengers could be separated into a very large majority
about whom we know enough to conclude that they present little or no
risk, and a small minority about whom we do not know enough and who
merit additional attention. The Customs Service uses this approach
successfully to better focus its resources and attention. As a result,
many legitimate travelers never see a customs agent anymore -- and drug
busts are way up.
The Commission supports
the development and implementation of manual and automated profiling
systems, such as the one under development by the FAA and Northwest
Airlines. The Commission strongly believes the civil liberties that are
so fundamentally American should not, and need not, be compromised by a
profiling system. Consistent with this viewpoint, the Commission sought
the counsel of leading experts in the civil liberties field. Those
experts provided a series of recommendations found in Appendix A. The
Commission recommends the following safeguards:
- No profile
should contain or be based on material of a constitutionally suspect
nature - e.g., race, religion, national origin of U.S. citizens. The
Commission recommends that the elements of a profiling system be
developed in consultation with the Department of Justice and other
appropriate experts to ensure that selection is not impermissibly
based on national origin, racial, ethnic, religious or gender
characteristics.
- Factors to be
considered for elements of the profile should be based on measurable,
verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are reasonable
predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. A relationship
must be demonstrated between the factors chosen and the risk of
illegal activity.
- Passengers
should be informed of airlines security procedures and of their right
to avoid any search of their person or luggage by electing not to
board the aircraft.
- Searches arising
from the use of an automated profiling system should be no more
intrusive than search procedures that could be applied to all
passengers. Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or for
questioning, a person who is selected by the automated profiling
system should be premised on insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing,
and efficient treatment of all passengers.
- Neither the
airlines nor the government should maintain permanent databases on
selectees. Reasonable restrictions on the maintenance of records and
strict limitations on the dissemination of records should be
developed.
- Periodic
independent reviews of profiling procedures should be made. The
Commission considered whether an independent panel be appointed to
monitor implementation and recommends at a minimum that the DOJ, in
consultation with the DOT and FAA, periodically review the profiling
standards and create an outside panel should that, in their judgment,
be necessary.
- The Commission
reiterates that profiling should last only until Explosive Detection
Systems are reliable and fully deployed.
- The Commission
urges that these elements be embodied in FAA standards that must be
strictly observed.
3.20. Certify
screening companies and improve screener performance.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Certify screening
companies and improve screener performance. Better selection,
training, and testing of the people who work at airport x-ray machines
would result in a significant boost in security. The Commission
recommends development of uniform performance standards for the
selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening
companies and their employees. The Commission further recommends that in
developing these standards, the FAA give serious consideration to
implementing the National Research Council recommendations. The
Commission also recommends the purchase and deployment of SPEARS, a
computerized training and testing system.
Status
The FAA has begun
rulemaking procedures to require new certifications.
The Federal Aviation
Administration is developing an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) which will establish the requirement for screening companies to
be certified in order to provide screening services to air carriers. The
rule will include requirements to improve the training and testing of
security screeners through development of uniform performance standards
for providing security screening services. Congress gave FAA authority
to certify screening companies, but did not provide FAA authority to
certify individual screeners. This Commission urges Congress to provide
that additional authority.
Augmenting
Recommendation
The Commission also
recommends that the purchase and deployment of SPEARS, a computerized
training and testing system, be completed at all major airports by the
end of 1997.
3.21.
Aggressively test existing security systems.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Aggressively test
existing security systems. "Red team" (adversary) type testing
should also be increased by the FAA, and incorporated as a regular part
of airport security action plans. Frequent, sophisticated attempts by
these red teams to find ways to dodge security measures are an important
part of finding weaknesses in the system and anticipating what
sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt. An aggressive red
team strategy will require significant increases in the number of FAA
personnel currently assigned to these tasks.
Status
The FAA is hiring
300 new special agents to test airport security.
3.22.
Use the Customs Service to enhance security.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Use the Customs
Service to enhance security. The Customs Service has many
responsibilities that are parallel to the FAA's in dealing with airlines
and contraband. As a law enforcement agency, Customs has authorities and
tools not available to the FAA. Further, it has developed successful
partnership programs with the airlines. By using the Customs Service to
complement the FAA, FBI, and other agencies, the Commission believes
that aviation security would be significantly enhanced.
The Customs Service has
thousands of agents currently stationed at US international airports.
Customs has statutory authority to search people and cargo to stop
contraband from coming in or going out of the country. Customs has
arrangements with most airlines to receive automated passenger and cargo
manifests. These arrangements could be adapted for use in security
procedures. Customs, as a law enforcement agency, has access to
automated law enforcement databases that could be an invaluable tool in
fighting not just drugs but terrorism. The Commission recommends that
Customs upgrade and adapt its computer systems to take on this
additional responsibility.
Status
The Customs Service
is deploying 140 inspectors and investigators to critical airports.
The U.S. Customs Service
is in the process of deploying 140 inspectors, intelligence analysts,
and criminal investigators (special agents) to critical airports, for
aviation security; anti-terrorism efforts, and to perform increased
searches of passengers, baggage, and cargo departing the United States.
Customs is purchasing and deploying additional x-ray vans, tool trucks
and radiation detector pagers at critical airports to assist in these
searches.
The Customs Service and
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are working with an FAA
contractor to study the technical issues associated with converting
Customs' Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is designed for sea
cargo analysis, to air cargo analysis. Although ATS is designed for
contraband analysis and detection in the sea cargo environment, the plan
would be to add anti-terrorism criteria to the system and convert it to
an air cargo environment. The study should be completed in the Spring of
1997.
3.23.
Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to
the classified information they need to know.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Give properly
cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified
information they need to know. The red tape of
classification is getting in the way of security. There are two problems
that must be solved. The first involves intelligence information about
specific terrorist threats. The CIA or FBI pass the threat information
to the FAA, which in turn alerts the airlines. But the information gets
progressively "sanitized" to avoid jeopardizing the source. Often,
airlines are just told what to do but not why they are to do it. If
airlines were provided more information about the threat, they could
help design more effective responses.
Corporate personnel are
often cleared to know the most secret information when national security
is at stake. Defense contractors with access to highly classified
intelligence information are far from rare. For that matter, airline
personnel were cleared to know highly classified information during
Operation Desert Storm, when commercial aircraft transported 80% of our
troops to Saudi Arabia.
The other classified
information problem involves the airport vulnerability assessments in
recommendation number 2. These assessments become classified information
if they conclude that a high degree of vulnerability exists. Some people
responsible for security at the airports are not cleared to receive
classified information.
The Commission recommends
that the FAA arrange for appropriate airline and airport security
personnel to be cleared to address this problem.
Status
The FAA is
arranging for adequate clearance levels at airports and airlines.
The FAA has agreed to
collaborate more closely with airlines and airports in developing
responses to threat information, and has agreed to disseminate
vulnerability assessments to properly cleared officials.
3.24. Begin
implementation of full bag-passenger match.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Begin
implementation of full bag-passenger match. Matching bags
to passengers ensures that the baggage of anyone who does not board the
plane is removed. Full bag match ensures that no unaccompanied bag
remains on board a flight.
Manual and automated
systems to conduct full bag match have been employed in international
aviation for several years, but need additional work to ensure they can
be phased into domestic airline operations. The Commission recommends
implementing full bag match at selected airports, including at least one
hub, within sixty days to determine the best means of implementing the
process system-wide.
Status
The Commission remains
committed to baggage match as a component of a comprehensive, layered
security program aimed at keeping bombs and explosive devices off
airlines. New technologies are available which facilitate positive and
automated identification of the bag as it is tracked through the system.
Automatic bag tracking systems can also facilitate the removal of bags
from aircraft if required by security concerns. The Commission feels
that these technologies can be combined with the development of a
passenger manifest to implement a passenger-bag matching system as one
component of a layered approach to aviation security.
The Commission urges the
industry and the FAA to work together to hasten the development of
sophisticated technology for determining the presence of explosives in
checked baggage. Until such machines are widely available, the
Commission believes that bag match, initially based on profiling, should
be implemented no later than December 31, 1997. The Commission's
recommendation is consistent with that of the Baseline Working Group's
recommendation in this contentious and difficult area.
By that date, the bags of
those selected either at random or through the use of automated
profiling must either be screened or matched to a boarded passenger. No
unaccompanied bag should be transported on a passenger aircraft unless
(1) it has been screened by a screening method that meets the FAA
standard, or (2) it belongs to a passenger who at the time of check in
was neither randomly selected for security review nor selected by the
profile for further review. This approach is the most effective
methodology available now. It would allow the aviation industry to
remove the unaccompanied bag or bags which represent the greatest
threat.
3.25. Provide more
compassionate and effective assistance to families of victims.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Providing more
compassionate and effective assistance to families of victims.
The tragedy of losing a loved one in an aviation disaster can be
unnecessarily and cruelly compounded by disjointed or incomplete
information in the aftermath of the incident. At the Commission's
urging, the President is directing the National Transportation Safety
Board to take the lead in coordinating provision of services to families
of victims. The NTSB will work with the Departments of State, Defense,
Transportation, Health and Human Services, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and private organizations like the Red Cross.
Status
The NTSB was given
responsibility to coordinate response.
On October 9, 1996,
Congress passed the Aviation Family Disaster Act of 1996 giving the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the responsibility for
aiding families of aircraft accident victims and coordinating the
federal response to major domestic aviation accidents.
Since the signing of the
law, NTSB has completed the initial phase of coordinating the federal
response to a major domestic aviation accident. The NTSB is in the
process of finalizing existing interim Memoranda of Understanding with
the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the American Red Cross (ARC).
The NTSB has been vigorously assisting the airline industry to develop a
model plan to address the needs of aviation disaster victims and their
families. Letters from Chairman Jim Hall and DOT Secretary Federico Peña
went out in November, 1996, to airlines informing them of their
responsibility for producing an emergency response plan as specified in
section 703 of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996.
An interim federal
response has been developed by the NTSB that assigns responsibilities to
the airlines and participating federal agencies. The ARC will be
responsible for family care and mental health; the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) will be responsible for identification and
preparation of human remains (with support by the Department of Defense,
as needed); and the Department of State will assist the airlines and
NTSB when foreign passengers are involved in an aviation accident. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency will provide the NTSB with
communications equipment and additional public affairs personnel. If the
aviation disaster is officially determined to be a criminal act, the
Department of Justice will provide information to families on
entitlements and benefits under the Victims of Crime Act. Many elements
of the interim NTSB plan were successfully implemented and tested
following the United Express Flight 5925/5926 accident in Quincy,
Illinois on November 19, 1996.
The Department of
Transportation and the NTSB have formed a task force to provide
recommendations on the issues elaborated in section 704 of the Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996. The task force includes
officials from the NTSB, Federal Emergency Management Agency, American
Red Cross, airlines, family groups, and organizations considered
appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation. Airlines are required by
the Act to submit their plans to the Secretary of Transportation and to
the Chairman of the NTSB by April 9, 1996.
Cross Reference to
Related Recommendations
This recommendation is
related to recommendations 4.2 and 4.3.
3.26.
Improve passenger manifests.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Improve passenger
manifests. The Commission believes that Section 203 of the 1990
Aviation Security Improvement Act, which requires airlines to keep a
comprehensive passenger manifest for international flights, should be
implemented as quickly as possible. While Section 203 does not apply to
domestic flights, the Commission urges the Department of Transportation
to explore immediately the costs and effects of a similar requirement on
the domestic aviation system.
Status
The DOT is
proceeding with rulemaking to require international and domestic
manifests.
The DOT has developed a
draft rule covering domestic flight manifesting, and an Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), should be issued in early 1997. The DOT
anticipates an extensive comment period for the ANPRM, because no data
exist related to domestic flights. The final rule for domestic
manifesting is likely to be published in 1998.
3.27.
Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to
counterterrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to crisis
response.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly
increase the number of FBI agents assigned to counter-terrorism
investigations, to improve intelligence, and to crisis response.
The Commission recognizes the vital role that the FBI plays in
fighting terrorism against Americans, and recommends that the agency's
ability to assess vulnerabilities, gather and analyze intelligence, and
conduct forensic investigations be augmented.
3.28 Provide
anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training to
countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the US.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide
anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training to
countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the US.
The Commission believes that it is important to raise the level of
security at all airports serving Americans. Assisting foreign countries
through training in explosive detection, post-blast investigation, VIP
protection, hostage negotiation, and incident management is an important
means of achieving this goal.
Status
The State
Department and the FAA are sponsoring domestic and foreign courses.
The Department of State
and the FAA continue to jointly sponsor Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Training Programs. In FY 1997, six domestic law enforcement classes and
six international/foreign classes will be held.
3.29. Resolve
outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and require their use.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Resolve outstanding
issues relating to explosive taggants and require their use. The
use of taggants can be a critical aid when investigating explosions on
aircraft and in bringing terrorists to justice. The Commission
recommends that remaining issues relating to the use of these taggants,
including the analysis of black and smokeless powder, be resolved as
quickly as possible, and that requirements for the use of taggants then
be put into place.
Status
Studies by the ATF
have been initiated, with results expected in April, 1997.
ATF has contracted with
the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council to conduct an
independent study. The International Fertilizer Development Center is
under contract with ATF to conduct a study on the economic and agronomic
effects of tagging ammonium nitrate fertilizer. A report is due to
Congress on the study findings late in April, 1997.
3.30. Provide
regular, comprehensive explosives detection training programs for
foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA and
airline personnel.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide regular,
comprehensive explosives detection training programs for foreign,
federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA and airline
personnel. The Commission believes that law enforcement agencies
with expertise in explosives detection can provide valuable training to
those involved in aviation security.
Status
The ATF and FAA are
preparing a training course for airport law enforcement agencies.
The ATF is developing a
curriculum on Improvised Explosive Devices. The pilot program is planned
for Spring, 1997. In addition to ongoing explosives training for ATF
personnel, three states and local Advanced Explosives Investigative
Techniques classes are scheduled at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center in Glynco, Georgia. Finally, post blast and improvised explosive
device recognition training will be conducted by 198 ATF certified
explosive specialists for State and Local law enforcement personnel
throughout the United States.
3.31.
Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide information
on explosives crime.
Recommendation from
Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Create a central
clearinghouse within government to provide information on explosives
crime. The Commission recommends that a central clearinghouse be
established to compile and distribute important information relating to
previously encountered explosive devices, both foreign and domestic.
Status
The Secretary of
the Treasury has established a national repository at the ATF.
The Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to establish a national repository of
information on incidents involving arson and the suspected criminal
misuse of explosives. All Federal agencies having information concerning
such incidents report the information to the Secretary. The ATF National
Repository committee, has established a target date of October 1, 1997,
for the implementation of the pilot project, with full implementation by
the end of FY 1998. The system will be designed and constructed in
incremental stages providing varying levels of service as early as
April, 1997.
Chapter Four:
Responding to Aviation
Disasters
"I am testifying today
to give a sense of purpose to the death of my daughter and the others
who lost their lives on TWA flight 800. I believe that by identifying
areas in need of improvement, we can successfully generate a change in
policy and action for the future. We will create a living memorial to
their death."
Aurlie Becker.
The Commission's
recommendations included setting a goal of reducing the rate of fatal
accidents by a factor of five over the next ten years, and outlined a
course of action that would help achieve that goal. Additionally, the
Commission has recommended specific steps to reduce the threat of
terrorism against commercial aircraft. However, it must be recognized
that, in spite of the strongest efforts of all involved, disasters may
still occur. While government and industry must do everything possible
to prevent them, they must also be prepared to respond quickly and
compassionately when one does take place. The tragedy of losing a loved
one in a plane crash can be cruelly and needlessly compounded by an
uncoordinated, ineffective, or uninformed response to family members.
The infrequency of
commercial aviation accidents has complicated the response to such
disasters. For example, when TWA Flight 800 crashed on July 17, 1996, it
had been over twenty years since that airline's last fatal accident.
Most crashes simply overwhelm state and local response teams, and take a
tremendous toll on airline employees, who must immediately begin
addressing the concerns of family members at the same time that they are
coping with the loss of their own colleagues.
Responding to the
frustrations and complaints of family members over the treatment they
received after accidents, President Clinton signed an executive
memorandum giving the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the
responsibility for coordinating federal services to families after
aviation disasters. Congress subsequently passed legislation further
expanding and clarifying the NTSB's new responsibilities.
Since its creation in
1967, the NTSB is the one entity that has been on the site of every
transportation disaster. The Commission applauds the designation of the
NTSB as the coordinating agency after aviation disasters, and commends
the agency for its diligence in carrying out its new responsibilities.
Recommendations
4.1.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) should finalize by
April, 1997, its coordinated federal response plan to aviation
disasters, and Congress should provide the NTSB with increased funding
to address its new responsibilities.
The NTSB has developed an
interim plan for a coordinated federal response to aviation disasters,
which should be finalized as quickly as possible. That interim plan was
put to the test in two recent disasters involving commuter aircraft, and
resulted in clear improvements in service. The Commission commends the
work of the NTSB and believes that only through a coordinated effort,
and establishment of a standard protocol, can effective support be
provided to local governments and airlines to meet the needs of family
members. The Commission recommends that Congress provide such additional
funds necessary to allow the NTSB to carry out the new responsibilities
described in the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996.
4.2.
The Department of Transportation should coordinate the development of
plans for responding to aviation disasters involving civilians on
government aircraft.
The families of civilians
killed while traveling on government aircraft face the same traumas and
challenges as those whose loved ones were killed on commercial flights.
However, the response to such disasters is covered under different laws
and procedures. Those differences, and a clear statement regarding their
rights and benefits in the event of an aviation disaster, should be
provided to passengers on government aircraft prior to boarding. The
Commission believes that it is essential that those families receive
assistance comparable to that provided after commercial disasters
through the enhanced role of the NTSB. The Commission urges the DOT to
work with the NTSB, DoD, other agencies, and family members to develop
plans to accomplish that goal by September 1997 and to evaluate the need
to revise existing laws and regulations governing the rights and
benefits of civilians on government aircraft.
4.3. The Department
of Transportation and the NTSB should implement key provisions of the
Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31, 1997.
This Act authorized the
formation of a task force to study the need for modifications to laws or
regulations that would result in improvements to the treatment of family
members of victims of aviation disasters. This task force will consider,
among other things, issues relating to treatment of families by the
media and legal community. Additionally, the Commission urges the task
force to consider the development of uniform guidelines for
notification, autopsies and DNA testing and other issues raised by
family members, including rights and treatment of foreign citizens and
non-traditional families, securing crash sites, availability of cockpit
voice recorder transcripts, and the composition of accident
investigation teams. The Commission expects that establishment of the
task force will be one of the first priorities for the new Secretary of
Transportation, and that it will be accomplished without delay.
In November 1996, the
Chairman of the NTSB and the Secretary of Transportation (DOT) sent a
joint letter to airlines to underscore the importance of this Act and to
advise on the responsibilities of airlines to formulate disaster
response plans. Those plans are due to the DOT and the NTSB by early
April 1997.
In addition, the NTSB
should work with the State Department through Memoranda of Understanding
or other mechanisms to provide direct services to the families of U.S.
citizens who are victims of disasters on U.S. carriers abroad.
4.4. The United
States Government should ensure that family members of victims of
international aviation disasters receive just compensation and equitable
treatment through the application of federal laws and international
treaties.
Certain statutes and
international treaties, established over 50 years ago, historically have
not provided equitable treatment for families of passengers involved in
international aviation disasters. Specifically, the Death on the High
Seas Act of 1920 (Act) and the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Convention),
although designed to aid families of victims of maritime and aviation
disasters, have inhibited the ability of family members of international
aviation disasters from obtaining fair compensation. A recent agreement
by U.S. airlines waived the liability of the Warsaw Convention. However,
the Death on the High Seas Act still limits recoveries available after
certain aviation disasters.
Congress passed the
Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996 as a first step to remedy
this situation. The Commission urges the Administration and the Congress
to take additional steps necessary to ensure fairer and more equitable
treatment of families of victims of international aviation disasters,
including the establishment of an advisory board, pursuant to section
211 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, to develop a plan
for equitable compensation of victims of aviation disasters.
4.5 Provisions
should be made to ensure the availability of funding for extraordinary
costs associated with accident response.
The NTSB and other
federal, state, and local government agencies can incur significant
costs in the course of an accident response. Those costs cannot be
anticipated nor budgeted for in advance, and their recovery has been
made on an ad hoc basis, further complicating an already difficult
situation. The Commission urges the Administration and Congress to
address this issue, through the consideration of measures such as
requirements for increased insurance coverage for companies involved in
air transportation.
4.6. Federal
agencies should establish peer support programs to assist rescue,
investigative, law enforcement, counseling and other personnel involved
in aviation disaster response.
The men and women who
respond on the scene of aviation disasters can suffer from considerable
trauma and emotional impact. Specially trained peer support counselors,
who are themselves investigators who have had similar experiences,
should be dispatched to the scene of a disaster to help those involved
in the response effort. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF), because of its frequent investigations of arson and bombings, has
developed such a program for its agents. The NTSB, the FAA, and other
agencies should work with the ATF to develop programs for their
personnel within existing budgets.
Conclusions
The Commission believes
that each of its recommendations is achievable. But, the Commission has
no authority to implement its recommendations. That responsibility lies
with government and industry. Many of the proposals will require
additional funding. Some of them will require legislation. Each of them
requires sustained attention. We now urge the President to make these
recommendations his own. We urge Congress to provide the necessary
legislation and funding. We urge the incoming leadership of the DOT and
the FAA to make fulfillment of these recommendations a cornerstone of
their work. We urge the commercial aviation industry to take up the
technical and organizational challenges. We urge the thousands of
private pilots across the nation to convert their enthusiasm for flying
into a commitment make the changes necessary to enhance safety for
everyone flying. And, we urge the American people to demand that this
country take the steps now to do what is needed.
By virtually any measure,
the aviation system in the United States is the best in the world. But,
every system can be improved; made safer, more secure, and more
efficient. Every crash is a stark reminder of that reality.
The world is changing,
and so, too, must our aviation policies and practices. They should
challenge everyone involved in aviation to improve. They should serve as
the model for the rest of the world, and lead to improvements that will
make passengers safer, regardless of where they board their flight.
There are few areas in
which the public so uniformly believes that government should play a
strong role as in aviation safety and security. Aviation is an area over
which the average person can exert little control; therefore, it becomes
government's responsibility to work with industry to make sure that
Americans enjoy the highest levels of safety and security when flying.
Problems in these areas contribute to an erosion of public faith in
aviation, and in government itself. The Commission has laid out an
aggressive agenda to help address those concerns, and believes that the
implementation of this course of action must be the top priority for all
those involved in aviation.
The Commission expresses
its appreciation to: President Clinton, for his heartfelt interest and
his strong support for this work; to the 104th Congress, for its
decisive action in response to the initial report; to the men and women
in numerous government agencies, for their work in identifying issues
and in implementing recommendations; and to the representatives of
airlines, airports, labor, and general aviation who provided invaluable
input.
Finally, and especially,
the Commission thanks the families of those who have lost loved ones in
crashes, for their commitment and their insights, and for ensuring that
the Commission always kept its focus on the ultimate goals.
APPENDICES
A. Civil Liberties
Advisory Board Recommendations
B. List of FAA
Implementation Responsibilities
C. The White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Membership
D. Executive Order
E. Public Meetings of the
Commission
F. Commission Staff
G. Special
Acknowledgments
H. Commissioner Special
Acknowledgments
- Commissioner Cummock
Dissent Letter
Appendix A
Recommendations of the
Members of the Civil Liberties Advisory Panel to the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
The members of the civil
liberties advisory panel were invited to meet with the Commission on
January 17, 1997, to pose questions and offer their thoughts on the
draft proposal to "implement an automated profiling system for all
passengers on all flights." Draft Proposal II.8. In the absence of any
specific information about the profiling system that is being
considered, our individual comments at the meeting, and our collective
statements set forth below are, of necessity, general in nature. In
addition, those comments and these recommendations are limited to the
general proposal to finalize and deploy an automated profiling system on
a system-wide basis. They do not address the civil liberties
implications of other elements of Draft Proposal II.8 (dealing with
"watch lists," "real time" feedback to airlines, and the creation of a
permanent consortium for sharing strategic aviation intelligence), or
any other proposals considered by the Commission.
In light of the serious
civil liberties issues raised by any profiling system, we urge the
Commission and the President to consider carefully whether any profiling
system is appropriate.
Should the Commission
decide to recommend an automated profiling system, we urge the
Commission to include the following principles among its recommendations
(without suggesting that this exhausts the possible civil liberties
concerns):
1. Any profile should not
contain or be based on material of a constitutionally suspect nature --
e.g., race, religion, national origin of U.S. citizens -- and should be
consistent with the constitutional right of freedom to travel.
2. Factors to be
considered for elements of the profile should be based on measurable,
verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are reasonable
predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. Efforts should
be made to avoid using characteristics that impose a disproportionate
burden of inconvenience, embarrassment, or invasion of privacy of
members of minority racial, religious or ethnic groups. Law enforcement
data should be used with caution and only to the extent that the data
used is a reasonable predictor of risk, because these data may be
incomplete or inaccurate and may not be directly relevant to the goal of
enhancing aviation security.
3. Passengers should be
informed of the airlines' security procedures and of their right to
avoid any search of their person or luggage by electing not to board the
aircraft. When the use of an automated profiling system leads to a
request to open luggage or to submit to a personal search, an explicit
reminder of the option not to board the aircraft should be given.
4. Searches arising from
the use of an automated profiling system should be no more intrusive
than search procedures that could be applied to all passengers. For
example, imaging devices which project an image of a passenger's body
underneath his or her clothing should not be used on a passenger solely
because the passenger fits the profile or has been selected at random.
The procedures applied to those who fit the profile should also be
applied on a random basis to some percentage of passengers who do not
fit the profile.
5. Procedures for
searching the person or luggage of, or for questioning, a person who is
selected by the automated profiling system should be premised on
insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient treatment of all
passengers.
6. The panel is concerned
that the maintenance or dissemination of records compiled in connection
with an automated profiling system may invade the privacy of passengers.
Reasonable restrictions on the maintenance of records and strict
limitations on the dissemination of records should be developed. To the
extent that records are maintained, there should be means for passengers
to challenge the accuracy of personally identifiable information.
7. An independent panel
should be appointed and given appropriate authority to monitor
implementation of airport security procedures to insure that they do not
unduly limit the exercise of civil liberties of the traveling public and
do not unduly require augmented searches of the person or baggage of any
particular group or groups.
8. Any profiling system
should have a sunset provision which requires it to be terminated by a
date certain unless an affirmative decision is made to continue use of
the system. The assessment of the system should take account of its
efficacy and necessity in light of improvements in detection technology
as well as the civil liberties impact of the program.
9. Air carrier security
plans submitted for approval by the Federal Aviation Administration to
implement an automated profiling system should be consistent with these
guidelines.
Floyd Abrams, Esq.,
Cahill Gordon & Reindel
Nihad Awad, Council on
American-Islamic Relations
Kevin T. Baine, Esq.,
Williams & Connolly
David J. Bodney, Esq.,
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Dr. Morton H. Halperin,
Council on Foreign Relations
Professor David A.
Harris, Univ. of Toledo College of Law
Professor Gerard E.
Lynch, Columbia Univ. School of Law
Gregory T. Nojeim,
American Civil Liberties Union
Robert Ellis Smith,
Privacy Journal
- Affiliation of each
member listed for purposes of identification only
Appendix B
Recommendations to be
Implemented by the FAA
1.1 Government and
industry should establish a national goal to reduce the fatal accident
rate of aviation by a factor of five within ten years and conduct safety
research to support that goal.
1.2 The FAA should
develop standards for continuous safety improvement, and target its
regulatory resources based on performance against those standards.
1.3 The DOT and the
FAA should be more vigorous in the application of high standards for
certification of aviation businesses.
1.4 The Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be simplified and, as appropriate,
rewritten as plain English, performance-based regulations.
1.6 Government and
industry aviation safety research should focus on human factors and
training
1.8 The FAA should
work with the aviation community to develop and protect the integrity of
standard safety databases that can be shared in accident prevention
programs.
1.9 In cooperation
with airlines and manufacturers, the FAA's Aging Aircraft program should
be expanded to cover non-structural systems.
1.10 The FAA should
develop better quantitative models and analytic techniques to inform
management decision-making.
2.1 The FAA should
develop a revised NAS modernization plan within six months that will set
a goal of being fully operational nationwide by the year 2005; and the
Congress, the Administration, and users should develop innovative means
of financing this acceleration.
2.2 The FAA should
develop plans to ensure that operational and airport capacity needs are
integrated into the modernization of the NAS.
2.3 The FAA should
explore innovative means to accelerate the installation of advanced
avionics in general aviation aircraft.
2.4 The United States
Government should ensure the accuracy, availability and reliability of
the GPS system to accelerate its use in NAS modernization and to
encourage its acceptance as an international standard for aviation.
2.6 The FAA should
identify and justify the frequency spectrum necessary for the transition
to a modernized air traffic control system.
3.1 The federal
government should consider aviation security as a national security
issue, and provide funding for capital improvements.
3.4 The FAA should
implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and
other threat objects in cargo and work with industry to develop new
initiatives in this area.
3.5 The FAA should
establish a security system that will provide a high level of protection
for all aviation information systems.
3.7 The FAA should
work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all passengers
are positively identified and complete security procedures before they
board aircraft.
3.10 The FAA should
work with industry to develop a national program to increase the
professionalism of the aviation security workforce.
3.11 Establish
consortia at all commercial airports to implement enhancements to
aviation safety and security.
3.14 Deploy existing
technology.
3.15 Establish a joint
government-industry research and development program.
3.16 Establish an
interagency task force to assess the potential use of surface-to-air
missiles against commercial aircraft.
3.18 Complement
technology with automated passenger profiling.
3.19 Certify screening
companies and improve screener performance.
3.21 Use the Customs
Service to enhance security.
3.22 Give properly
cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified
information they need to know.
- Federal agencies
should establish peer support programs to assist rescue,
investigative, law enforcement, counseling and other personnel
involved in aviation disaster response.
Appendix C
White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security Membership
Lieutenant General
James A. Abrahamson, USAF (Ret), is the founder of International Air
Safety, LLC., and Air Safety Consultants, Inc. He has a global
reputation in the fields of technical program management, international
business, and Air Traffic Management. He served as Chairman of the Board
of Oracle Corporation and President of Hughes' Transportation Sector.
Jesse (Jack)
Beauchamp. B.S., California Institute of Technology, 1964; Ph.D.
Harvard University, 1967; Professor of Chemistry, California Institute
of Technology, 1967 - Present; member, National Academy of Sciences. He
has served on numerous scientific advisory committees and panels of the
NRC and the Department of Defense. He has expertise in the
identification of chemical species using a wide range of instrumental
methods. His current research activities include the development of new
methods for the detection of explosives.
In 1973 Dr. Franklin
R. Chang-Diaz became involved in the United States' controlled
fusion program and in the design and operation of fusion reactors. As a
visiting scientist with the M.I.T. Plasma Fusion Center from October
1983 to December 1993, he led the plasma propulsion program there to
develop this technology for future human missions to Mars. In December
1993, he was appointed Director of the Advanced Space Propulsion
Laboratory at the NASA Johnson Space Center. Dr. Chang-Diaz became an
astronaut in August 1981 and is a veteran of five space flights. He has
logged over 1,033 hours in space. Dr. Chang-Diaz received a bachelor of
science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
Connecticut in 1973 and a doctorate in applied plasma physics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1977.
Antonia Handler Chayes
is a Senior Advisor and Board Member of Conflict Management Group
(CMG), a non-profit conflict resolution consulting firm, and a Senior
Consultant to JAMS/Endispute, a firm that provides cost-effective
alternatives to traditional litigation. Ms. Chayes is also an Adjunct
Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard Law School.
Previously she served as Assistant Secretary and as Under Secretary of
the United States Air Force. Ms. Chayes served as a Commissioner with
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the United States Armed Forces
and the DOD-CIA Joint Security Commission. She has been a director of
United Technologies since 1981, and is a member of the American Law
Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations. Ms. Chayes serves on
Advisory Boards of Columbia University School for International and
Public Affairs and the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
William T. Coleman,
Jr. - Senior Partner, O'Melveny & Myers; former U.S. Secretary of
Transportation in the Ford Administration; Chairman, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.; Officer of the French Legion of Honor;
Recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom conferred by President
Clinton in September, 1995.
M. Victoria Cummock
is President of Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie and a member of the FAA
Security Baseline Work Group. Her husband, John Binning Cummock was
killed aboard Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21,
1988. As a disaster victims advocate, she has worked with hundreds of
victims families including Oklahoma City, Valujet 592 and TWA 800. Her
work in Disaster Crisis Management, Aviation Security and
Counter-terrorism, has brought about many legislative changes including
the "1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act", the "1996 Iran-Libyan
Sanctions Act", the "1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act" and the "Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996."
John M. Deutch,
professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); government
assignments include former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology, Director of Energy Research and Acting Assistant
Secretary for Energy Technology at the Department of Energy. Born in
Brussels, Belgium, Mr. Deutch became a US citizen in 1945; B.A. in
history and economics from Amherst College, a B.S. in chemical
engineering and a Ph.D. in physical chemistry from MIT; married, three
sons.
Kathleen Flynn is
the mother of four children and is an educator by profession. She is
currently the Director of Development at the Academy of Saint Elizabeth,
Convent Station NJ. Mrs. Flynn graduated from Marymount College in
Tarrytown, NY with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and
has done graduate studies at the University of Rochester. An
anti-terrorism/airport security and safety advocate, Mrs. Flynn's
activism was triggered by the murder of her oldest child on Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988. Mrs. Flynn is
committed to the fight for justice and truth in the bombing of Flight
103 and is dedicated to: increased safety/security for all airline
passengers and the obliteration of terrorism throughout the world.
Louis J. Freeh
served as an FBI Special Agent from 1975 to 1981 in the New York City
Field Office and at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC. In 1981, he
joined the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
as an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Subsequently, he held positions there as
Chief of the Organized Crime Unit, Deputy U.S. Attorney, and Associate
U.S. Attorney. In July 1991, former President George Bush appointed
Director Freeh a United States District Court Judge for the Southern
District of New York. He was serving in this position when nominated to
be Director of the FBI by President Bill Clinton on July 20, 1993. He
was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on August 6, 1993, and was sworn in as
Director of the FBI on September 1, 1993.
James Evan Hall
has been Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board since June
1994. In June 1996, he was presented an Aviation Laurel by Aviation Week
and Space Technology magazine for his efforts to resolve what happened
to USAir flight 427. Mr. Hall chaired the Board's hearings into the
flight 427 disaster, the 1994 runway collision in St. Louis, and air
safety in Alaska.
Brian Jenkins is
Deputy Chairman of Kroll Associates, an international investigative and
consulting firm, and one of the world's leading authorities on
international terrorism. From 1972 to 1989 he directed RAND
Corporation's research on political violence and international crime and
was also Chairman of RAND's Political Science Department for four years.
As Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Enforcement, Raymond W. Kelly supervises Treasury's
law enforcement bureaus, including the Customs Service, the Secret
Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, FinCEN, and the IRS Criminal Investigation
Division. Mr. Kelly has over 30 years of law enforcement experience,
including serving as New York City Police Commissioner during the World
Trade Center bombing investigation. As the Director of the International
Police Monitors of the Multinational Force, Mr. Kelly helped establish
an interim security force in Haiti. Additionally, Mr. Kelly is the
United States' representative on the Executive Committee of Interpol.
General John Michael
Loh, USAF (retired) concluded his thirty five year Air Force career
in 1995 as the first commander of Air Combat Command, the command
responsible for providing all U.S. based Air Force combat and support
forces for action worldwide. He has extensive experience leading large
organizations toward greater levels of quality and productivity
improvement and his organization was cited by the Vice- President as the
model for reinventing government and understanding the principles of
quality improvement. General Loh is a consultant for defense companies
and specializes in strategic requirements planning, business
development, proposal preparation and evaluation, program management
support, quality improvement, and congressional relations. General Loh
is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and holds a Master's degree
in aero engineering from M.I.T.
Bradford Parkinson
of Stanford University, the original Department of Defense (DoD) Global
Positioning System (GPS) Program Director, has a broad background in
management, modern control, astrodynamics, simulation, avionics, and
navigation. He manages the NASA/Stanford Relativity Mission, Gravity
Probe B (GPB) and also directs Stanford research on innovative uses of
GPS. He is Chair of the NASA Advisory Council and a member of the
Presidential Commission on Air Safety and Security. Dr. Parkinson is a
member of the AIAA, AAS, IEEE, ION, and Royal Institute of Navigation
(RION). He has received many distinguished awards and authored more than
80 papers on Guidance, Navigation and Control. He is a fellow of the
AIAA and the RION, and a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Federico Peña is
currently the 12th US Secretary of Transportation. From 1983-91,
Secretary Peña was Mayor of Denver leading an urban and economic
renaissance. He also has served as a Colorado legislator and a civil
rights lawyer. Mr. Peña did his undergraduate work at the University of
Texas where he also received his law degree. Born in Laredo, Texas, in
1947, Secretary Peña is the third of six children of a cotton broker. He
and his wife, world-class marathon runner and attorney Ellen Hart-Peña,
live with their two children in Northern Virginia.
Franklin D. Raines
is the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Patrick A. Shea is
President of Patrick A. Shea, PC. He currently practices law in Utah and
Washington, DC and is an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the
University of Utah. He serves as President of the Franklin Quest
Championship and is a member of the Board of Advisors, Huntsman Center
for Global Competition and Innovation, Wharton School of Business,
University of Pennsylvania. He served as Counsel to the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and as Assistant Staff Director to the U.S.
Senate Intelligence Committee. He is past President of the Stanford
Alumni Association. He is past Chair of the Utah Democratic Party and
Chair of the Credential Committee to the Democratic National Committee.
Laura D'Andrea Tyson
is the former Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors.
Carl W. Vogt -
Senior partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.; Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board (1992-94); member, FAA Aviation System
Capacity Advisory Committee (1990) and Ninety Day Safety Review
Committee (1996); Governor, Flight Safety Foundation; Fellow, Royal
Aeronautical Society; former Marine, carrier based, jet fighter pilot;
licensed commercial pilot.
Born in Baltimore,
Maryland, George H. Williams, a retired real estate broker,
served in the Korean War from 1951-52 as a Scout-sniper in the US Marine
Corps. Mr. Williams' son and only child, George Watterson Williams was
killed on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec 21, 1988.
Since that day, Mr. Williams has dedicated his life to the cause of
justice for all victims of terrorism. He has served on the Board and is
now President of The Victims of Pan Am 103, Inc., a proactive group
instrumental in the passage of the Airline Safety and Security
Improvement Act of 1990 and several subsequent anti-terrorist
legislative initiatives.
Appendix D
Executive Order 13015
of August 22, 1996
White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security
By the authority vested
in me as President by the constitution and the laws of the United
States, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Establishment.
There is established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (the "Commission"). The Commission shall be of not more than 25
members, to be appointed by the President from the public and private
sectors, each of whom shall have experience or expertise in some aspect
of safety or security. The Vice President shall serve as Chair of the
Commission.
Section 2. Functions.
(a) The Commission shall
advise the President on matters involving aviation safety and security,
including air traffic control.
(b) The Commission shall
develop and recommend to the President a strategy designed to improve
aviation safety and security, both domestically and internationally.
(c) The Chair may, from
time to time, invite experts to submit information to the Commission;
hold hearings on relevant issues; and form committees and teams to
assist the Commission in accomplishing its objectives and duties, which
may include individuals other than members of the Commission.
Sec. 3. Administration.
(a) The heads of
executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by
law, provide the Commission such information with respect to aviation
safety and security as the Commission requires to fulfill its functions.
(b) The Commission shall
be supported, both administratively and financially, by the Department
of Transportation and such other sources (including other Federal
agencies) as may lawfully contribute to Commission activities.
Sec. 4. General.
(a) I have determined
that the Commission shall be established in compliance with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5.U.S.C. App.2). Notwithstanding any
other Executive Order, the functions of the President under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, as amended, shall be performed by the Secretary
of Transportation in accordance with the guidelines and procedures
established by the Administrator of General Services, except that of
reporting to the Congress.
(b) The Commission shall
exist for a period of 6 months from the date of this order, unless
extended by the President.
William Jefferson Clinton
The White House August 22, 1996
(FR Doc. 96-21996)
Appendix E
List of White House
Commission Hearings with Agendas
White House Commission
Hearing on Aviation Security
Department of
Commerce/Auditorium
(enter on 14th
Street-NW, between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues)
September 5, 1996
12:00 pm - 12:15 pm
Opening Remarks by Vice President Al Gore
12:15 pm - 12:25 pm
Commissioner Remarks
12:25 pm - 12:55 pm
Presentations by Public Witnesses
12:55 pm - 1:00 pm
Closing Remarks by Vice President Gore
White House Commission
Hearing on Families of Victims from Past Air Disasters
Department of
Commerce/Auditorium
(enter on 14th
Street-NW, between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues)
November 20, 1997
1:00 pm - 1:10 pm
Opening Remarks, James E. Hall (Acting Chairman)
1:10 pm - 2:50 pm
2:50 pm - 3:00 pm
Closing Remarks, Acting Chairman Hall
3:00 pm - 4:00 pm
Closed meeting (room TBD). Closed to the public for reasons of national
security. FBI and CIA will present briefings onprofiling and the
National Intelligence Estimate.
White House Commission
Hearing on Aviation System Modernization
Department of
Commerce/Auditorium
(enter on 14th
Street-NW, between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues)
December 5, 1996
8:00 am - 9:00 am
Technology Demonstrations
9:00 am - 12:00 pm
Executive Session I
12:00 pm - 1:00 pm
Lunch/Technology Demonstrations
1:00 pm - 2:15 pm
Executive Session II -- Government Perspectives (15 minute oral/AV
testimony)
2:15 pm Vice President
Arrives
2:15 pm - 2:30 pm Vice
President's Comments
2:30 pm - 3:30 pm Open
Session I - Aviation System Technologies (10 minute oral/AV testimony)
3:30 pm - 4:00 pm
Break/Technology Demonstrations
4:00 pm - 5:00 pm Open
Session II -- User/Provider Perspectives, (5 to 7 minute oral testimony)
5:00 pm - 5:15 pm Vice
President's Closing Comments
5:15 pm Vice President
Departs
5:15 pm Adjourn
White House Commission
Hearing on Aviation Safety
Department of
Commerce/Auditorium
January 16, 1997
8:30am-12:30pm
Executive Session I
This session will be
conducted at the Department of Commerce/Conference Room #1859 (enter on
14th Street-NW, between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues).
2:00 pm - 2:15 pm Vice
President's Opening Remarks
2:15 pm - 2:35 pm Open
Session I -- Aviation Safety Overview
2:35 pm - 3:35 pm Open
Session II -- Aviation Safety Regulation and Certification
3:35 pm - 3:45 pm
BREAK
3:45 pm - 4:45 pm Open
Session III -- Aviation Safety Management
4:45 pm - 5:00 pm Vice
President's Closing Remarks
5:00 pm Vice President
Departs
5:00 pm Adjourn
Appendix F
White House Commission
Staff
Gerald B. Kauvar, Staff
Director
Audrey Adams, U.S.
Customs Service
Nancy Best, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
William R. Boesch,
Consultant (ret. American Airlines)
Patricia R. Burgess,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
James Chapek, Sandia
Laboratories
Mary Ellen Cole, Central
Intelligence Agency, DCI Counterterrorism Center
Lt Col Rick Dugan, USAF
Gerald L. Epstein, U.S.
Department of Energy/White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Doug Farbrother, National
Performance Review
Carolina E. Forrester,
Federal Aviation Administration
D. Lynn Gordon, U.S.
Customs Service
Eric Johnson, U.S.
Department of Transportation
Lisa A. Jung, Office of
the Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Keegan,
Federal Aviation Administration
John F. Hennigan Jr.,
Federal Aviation Administration
Charles H. Huettner,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Doug Lambert, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
John F. Lenihan, U.S.
Customs Service
Howard W. Luker II,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Laurie Lyons, National
Performance Review
Major Diana R. Malone,
United States Air Force
Jeff Morales, National
Performance Review
Stephen G. Moran, Office
of Science Technology and Policy
Major Steve Moss, USAF;
National Performance Review
Max D. Payne, Federal
Aviation Administration
Richard K. Pemberton, U.
S. Department of Transportation
Michael Perron, U.S.
Customs Service
Christina Quash, Office
of the Secretary of Defense
Armen A. Sahagian,
Federal Aviation Administration
Daniel P. Salvano,
Federal Aviation Administration
Herb Schlickenmaier,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dr. Russell D. Shaver,
The MITRE Corporation
Lisa T. Simmons, U.S.
Department of Transportation
Bob Stone, National
Performance Review
H. Lee Tucker, Federal
Aviation Administration
Greg Woods, National
Performance Review
Edwin L. Worthington,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appendix G
We wish to extend our
thanks to the following people who provided extraordinary assistance to
the Commission.
Ms. Carol Carmody, U.S.
Representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization
Mr. Michael Diech, Office
of Management and Budget
RADM Cathal Flynn, USN
(Ret) Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. Richard Haver,
Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. Elaine Kamarck,
Senior Policy Advisor to the Vice President
Ms. Nancy McFadden,
General Counsel, Department of Transportation
RADM Paul J. Pluta,
Office of Intelligence & Security, Dept. of Transportation
Ms. Dorothy Robyn,
Council of Economic Advisors
Ms. Karen Wehner, Senior
Advisor to the Under Secretary of the Treasury
We wish to to extend
our thanks to the following people who provided technical advice and
special support to the Commission.
Mr. Alan Agor, Federal
Aviation Administration, Civil Aviation Liaison Office, Tokyo
Mr. James J. Aldo, Vivid
Technologies
Ms. Sharon Barcaloo,
Office of Management and Budget
Mr. Israel Boim, Air
Security International
Ms. Leeann Brackett,
Office of the Vice President
Mr. Guy Broadhurst,
Northrop Grumman
Ms. Evie Burch,
Department of Transportation, Directorate of Security
Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth
Dobert, Family Advocates
Mr. John Doty, National
Imagery and Mapping Agency
Ms. Cindy Dominik,
Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. Hans Ephraimson-Abt,
Family Advocate
Mr. Jack Fearnsides, The
MITRE Corporation
Mr. Jamie Finch, National
Transportation and Safety Board
Mr. Peter Goeltz,
National Transportation and Safety Board
Ms. Linda Hess,
Department of Commerce
Mr. Douglas J. Hills, The
ADI Group
Dr. Robert Hyde, Georgia
Technical Research Institute
Ms. Lou Kleppinger,
George Washington University
Mr. John Klinkenberg,
Northwest Airlines
Ms. Heidi Kukus, Office
of the Vice President
Dr. Darrell Lamm, Georgia
Technical Research Institute
Mr. James Lytle, General
Services Administration, Office of the Chief Information Officer
Mr. Kevin Maher,
Department of Transportation
Ms. Stephanie Mayo,
General Services Administration
Mr. Larry McGid, Office
of Management and Budget
Mr. Douglas L. McMakin,
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Ms. Kathy Montgomery,
General Services Administration Security Office
Ms. Wendy New, Office of
the Vice President
Mr. Steve Okun,
Department of Transportation
Mr. James F. Padgett,
Federal Aviation Administration
Lt Col Jim Pennock,Office
of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
Mr. Paul Pillar, Central
Intelligence Agency Counterterrorism Center
Dr. Jerrold Post, George
Washington University
Mr. John Rendon, The
Rendon Group
Mr. Allan Rivlin,
Department of Health and Human Services
Mr. Robert Ross,
Department of Transportation
Mr. Wendell Sims, Federal
Aviation Administration, Civil Aviation Security Liaison Office, Bangkok
LTCOL Deb Smith, USA,
Office of the Vice President
Mr. Ron Smith, Georgia
Tech Research, Inc.
Mr. Roy Sutherland,
International Civil Aviation Organization
Dr. Stephen Trachtenberg,
George Washington University
Dr. George Vogel, Wright
Laboratory
Mr. Rodney Wallis, Rodney
Wallis Associates, Ltd.
Mr. Jim Washington,
Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. David Watrous, RTCA,
Inc.
Mr. Ron Willis, George
Washington University
Mr. Mark Wunderlich,
Wright Laboratory
Appendix H
Special
Acknowledgments from the Commissioners
Each of the Commissioners
wish to express our thanks to President Clinton for giving us the
opportunity to serve on the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security and thereby to contribute to these important issues.
We wish to especially
thank Vice President Gore, our chairman, for his strong personal
leadership and in-depth involvement with us throughout our effort.
Finally, we wish to
salute Dr Gerry Kauvar and all of the members of the Commission staff.
They worked tirelessly and made extraordinary efforts to ensure that
every issue was fully researched and that individual Commissioners had
every opportunity to personally talk to many experts with opinions on
all sides of the issues before us. We are grateful to the staff members
for their dedication and wish to acknowledge that the success of the
Commissioners efforts rest in a large part on the quality and
effectiveness of this superb staff.
Appendix I
Commissioner Cummock
Dissent Letter
February 19, 1997
Vice President Albert
Gore, Chairman
White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
Re: Dissent with the
Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security
Dear Mr. Vice President:
It is after much
thoughtful consideration and with a very heavy heart that I register my
dissent with the final report of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security. Sadly, the overall emphasis of the recommendations
reflects a clear commitment to the enhancement of aviation
at the expense of the Commission's mandate of enhancing aviation
safety and security. Clearly, as a nation we have the capability
to do all three, but sadly as a Commission have not had the moral
courage nor will to do so.
History has proven the
aviation industry's lack of sincerity and willingness to address safety
and security on behalf of their customers by continually citing
misleading safety statistics as their rationale for inaction. Valid
statistics compare apples to apples, yet repeatedly we are inundated
with apple to orange comparisons by the industry.
Specifically, we must
compare injuries and deaths of PASSENGERS ABOARD MASS
TRANSPORTATION, not invalid comparisons to automotive injuries
and deaths. Even more far fetched was the comparison made to the
Commission by Charles Higgins, a Boeing VP citing aviation safety
statistics versus household related injuries and death. Yes living is
risky, but clearly flying is riskier than traveling on a bus or a train.
Last year alone hundreds of passengers died aboard scheduled flights, a
far cry from the number of passenger deaths onboard public busses or
trains.
Detailed below are
specific objections to the various passengers and/or air disaster
victims issues pertaining to aviation safety and security. Most were
raised by family members of the victims of numerous air disasters,
ranging from TWA 800, Valujet 592, Sec. Ron Brown's plane, KAL007 and
Pan Am 103. Some previous recommendations were omitted entirely, others
were included but reduced to a nebulous inactionable mention, while a
large number contained language that was either unnecessarily misleading
or non-specific in order to give the perception of recommended change.
These are the standards
that I have applied in evaluating the Commissions' recommendations:
(a) Specificity (b)
Responsibility (c) Substance (d) Accountability (e) Applicability (f)
Timetables/Deadline
I. IMPROVING
AVIATION SAFETY
1.14 "The commission
commends the joint government-industry initiative to equip
the cargo holds of all passenger aircraft with smoke detectors, and
urges expeditious implementation of the rules and other steps necessary
to achieve the goal of both detection and suppression in all cargo
holds."
1.14 Is a statement
not a recommendation since it lacks:
(a) Specificity (c)
Substance (d) Accountability (f) Timetable-Deadline
-Require the
immediate installation of smoke detectors and fire suppressants in all
passenger planes' cargo holds.
Rationale:
There are approximately 2,900 airplanes without smoker detectors
and fire suppressants that regularly fly passengers with hazardous
materials and dangerous cargo in the class D cargo holds. The current
partial, voluntary deployment of smoke detectors is limited to a
handful of airlines, with no time table for completion of installation.
Installation of FAA certified fire suppression systems (currently
in use on class C cargo holds, new 777 and other planes) must also be
mandated. Both systems must be mandated immediately since each are
essential for survivability of passengers; detectors warn the cockpit of
a problem, while suppressants buys time to land the plane. Estimated
cost 30 cents per ticketed passenger.
- Mandate
installation of passenger protective breathing apparatus effective
against smoke, toxic fumes and oxygen deprivation.
Rationale:
Existing breathing apparatus technology is over 20 yr. old and limited
only to oxygen deprivation, but does not protect passengers from
smoke or toxic fumes in the cabin. Enhanced breathing apparatus
technology is available and FAA certified. The FAA certified technology
is on military planes, used by crews on passenger planes, used on Air
Force One and Two and numerous corporate/ private planes. Commercial
passenger planes should provide equal standard of protection for
passengers by providing FAA certified protective breathing apparatus
currently used by crews. Estimated cost 4 cents per ticketed passenger.
- Ship hazardous
materials and dangerous cargo on "cargo carriers" until smoke detector,
fire suppressant and protective breathing apparatus technology are
installed on "passenger carriers" for passenger use.
Rationale:
Until passengers can adequately be protected and increase their
survivability from smoke and toxic fumes in the cabin, remove all
unnecessary dangerous cargo and hazards materials from passenger
carriers.
1.13 "The FAA should
eliminate the exemptions in the Federal Aviation Regulations that allow
passengers under the age of two to travel without the benefit of FAA
approved restraints."
1.13 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (f) Timetable/deadline
-Require immediate
use of FAA certified babyseats for all children under two yrs.
1.5 "Cost alone should
not become dispositive in deciding aviation safety and security
rulemaking issues."
1.5 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (b) Responsibility (c) Substance (d)
Accountability (f) timetable/Deadline
- Waive FAA/DOT
cost/benefit requirement criteria in deciding safety and security
rulemaking issues.
- Eliminate FAA's
authority to issue private or secret exceptions/waivers to safety and
security rules, except in very limited and controlled circumstances..
Rationale:
Airlines and airports regularly obtain indefinite waivers to safety
and/or security rules without knowledge or oversight creating an
ineffective regulatory system. Require exceptions or waivers to include
a statement of necessity, signed by the air carriers' president, the
Assoc. Administrator of FAA for Rulemaking, and reviewed by the FAA
Administrator and Chairman of the relevant advisory committee. Any
approved waivers or exceptions shall be sent to all members of the FAA's
Advisory Committee on Rulemaking (ARAC) and the chairmen of the Senate
and House Aviation Subcommittees.
- Limit
safety/security exceptions/waivers to no more than 6 months.
Rationale:
The use of indefinite waivers or private exceptions to air safety and
security regulations must be limited in time to temporary emergency
situations. The current indefinite secret waiver system compromises
safety and security, and provides certain carriers with unfair
competitive advantages over other carriers that are in compliance with a
safety or security regulations. Furthermore, such a system amounts to
fraud on the public who is led to believe that safety and security
standards and regulations are being complied with and enforced. Time
limits of 6 months or less will ensure that remedial actions are
undertaken promptly by out of compliance carriers, rather than rewarding
out of compliance carriers with indefinite waivers.
Pan Am alleged that it
had received prior to the Lockerbie bombing a verbal FAA waiver of the
security rule requiring hand searching of unaccompanied luggage for Pan
Am European locations. Pan Am claimed this waiver allowed it merle to
X-ray unaccompanied luggage. It is quite possible that the bomb which
destroyed Pan Am 103 could have been discovered if a then excising FAA
security regulation had been strictly followed and enforced. The
criminal investigation determined that an unaccompanied bag containing a
Toshiba cassette played packed with explosives destroyed the jumbo jet
over Lockerbie resulting in the worst terrorist attack against U.S.
civilians in history.
III. IMPROVING
SECURITY FOR TRAVELERS
With the current day
realities of domestic terrorism such as the bombings of the World Trade
Center in New York and the Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City,
combined with the numerous successful airmail bombs sent
by a variety of disgruntled criminals, the Unibomber, and the recent
Egyptian letter bombs, domestically the flying public is now flying
less secure than when my husband John and his fellow passengers
died aboard Pan Am 103! To-date, both the FAA and Dept. of
Transportation have required only minimal changes in aviation
security for international flights and have maintained the
status-quo
for domestic flights, not only leaving aviation's back door unlocked,
but wide open.
The security preamble on
p.25 effectively ignores the significant measures taken
unilaterally by the FAA in the mid- 1985 to protect U.S. International
Aviation from bombs in unaccompanied checked baggage (FAA Aircarrier
Standard Security Program (ACSSP), Section XV,C,1,(a) July 7, 1985). It
also ignores the joint actions, or is ignorant of, the joint actions by
the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and her Canadian counterpart, the
Minister of Transport, to get the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to adopt ICAO Annex 17 Security Standards to protect
international aviation against bombs in 1985. This ICAO Security
Standard 4.3.1 states:
"Each Contracting
State shall establish measures to ensure that operators when providing
service from that State do not transport the baggage of passengers who
are not on board the aircraft unless the baggage separated from the
passengers is subject to other security measures.
Note- This Standard
has been applicable since 19 December 1987 with respect to the baggage
of passengers at the point of origin and on-line transfer passengers.
With respect to the baggage of other categories of passengers, the
Standard became applicable on 1 April 1989."
This specific ICAO
Security Standard was not only significant from the protection it
provided against unaccompanied baggage but also because it has the
distinction of being ratified by a majority of ICAO Contracting States
in a record time of a few months. These actions sometimes take years to
win adoption. These are still mandatory ICAO requirements and the U.S.
is a ICAO Contracting State and thus is to comply with these procedures
internationally.
These ICAO Security
Standards, set in the mid to late 1980's, internationally recognized
that the primary threat to civil aviation had shifted from hijacking to
sabotage requiring specific security measures that both the U.S. and
ICAO would undertake to protect air passengers against bombs.
This FAA ACSSP
requirements stated than a U.S. airline could not carry an unaccompanied
bag from a designated high-threat international airport unless the bag
had been physically searched. This FAA unaccompanied bag requirement
preceded the subsequent ICAO Accompanied Bag Standard by 2 ½ years. Pan
American World Airways failure to comply with this FAA security
requirement resulted in the PAA-103 tragedy on December 21, 1988 and the
airline's conviction of "Willful Misconduct" in U.S. Federal Court on
July 10, 1992.
Needless to say, if the
public was aware of the test results of the "Red Team" aviation security
forces domestically to regularly and successfully breach the so
called "Aviation Security" systems, in combination with the
aforementioned domestic terrorist acts and threats, they would be
shocked and terrified at how much they are currently at risk.
Even of greater concern
are that the recommendations in this report will do nothing more than
give the flying public the perception of security. They do not provide
any tangible or immediate improvement in our security measures. Once
again, we will enable the tombstone mentality that is pervasive of the
FAA, DOT and the U.S. airlines to continue.
This report contains no
specific call to action, no commitments to address aviation security
system-wide by mandating the deployment of current technology and
training, with actionable timetables and budgets. As the previous
commission on aviation security and terrorism noted eight years
ago, "The U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed
and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the
traveling public. This system needs major reform. Rhetoric is no
substitute for strong, effective action."
3.1 "The federal
government should consider aviation security as a national security
issue, and provide substantial funding for capitol improvements."
3.1 Recommendation
lacks (c) Substance (d) Accountability (e) Applicability (f)
Timetables/Deadlines
- Mandate the
establishment of a federal passenger "User Security Surcharge"
- Sequester funds
solely to be allocated for the purchase/development:
- EDS (Explosive
Detection Systems) equipment grant money
- R & D grant money for
EDS development for cargo, mail, carry on and checked baggage.
- Standardized Training
Programs for Security Personnel
- FBI
Fingerprinting/National NCIC Criminal Background Checks
- Deploy hardened baggage
containers through attrition
- Interim purchase of
automated bag match technology
- Development of
Profiling Programs - Manual/Automated
- Fund Explosive
Detection Canine Teams
The initial $160 million
in federal funds provided by Congress in 1996 was woefully inadequate to
address the scope of the problems in U.S. aviation security. There are
450 commercial airports that have obsolete security systems, most of
which is 20 yrs. old and designed for anti-hijacking system. This
technology provides basic metal detection X-ray technology with no
explosive detection capabilities for carry on baggage.
Outside of the limited deployment of CTX 5000 SP, this is also true for
checked baggage. Additionally, this funding does not address inadequate
security personnel selection/training).
Likewise, "$100 million
annual recommendation by the Gore Commission.....to meet capitol
requirements identified by local airport consortia and FAA" is woefully
inadequate to meet anti-sabotage aviation security needs. A "passenger
user security surcharge" of ($4-5) would raise in excess of $2 Billion a
year, swiftly and adequately funding the actual cost to upgrade aviation
security to an effective level. A "passenger user surcharge,"
sequestered only for security is the most viable method to raise the
large amount of capitol needed to adequately address the changes system
wide, due to the inaccessibility/deficit of general revenue funds and/or
aviation trust funds. Security related expenses should not be considered
a part of the airlines cost of doing business, but a part of our
National responsibility to protect our citizens. "Security"
threats typically are not targeted against a specific airline but after
the American Flag on the tail of passenger carriers. There must
be a clear, consistent source of revenue and commitment in order to
adequately protect our citizens.
Rationale:
Since the bombing of Pan Am 103 there have been numerous but
unsuccessful attempts at "aviation security enhancements" by the former
President Bush's Commission on Aviation Security & Terrorism, Congress
and two Administrations. For 8+ yr. without an adequate and
consistent funding mechanism in place to implement recommendations,
legislation's (i.e. "1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act") or
regulations, the obsolete security status-quo has prevailed.
Note: Section 107(9) "1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act" -
entitled "Authorization of Appropriations." There are authorized to be
appropriated from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund,.............such
sums of money necessary for the purpose of caring out the technology
grant program." In 7 yr. no security funds were made available due to
budget constraints in the Trust Fund.
3.3 " The Postal
Service should advise customers that all packages weighing over 16
ounces will be subject to examination for explosives and other threat
objects in order to move by air."
3.3 Recommendation
lacks: (c) Substance (e) Applicability (f) Timetable/Deadline
-Mandate immediate
examination of all packages weighing over 8 ounces or move them on
"cargo" carriers.
-Required the
research and development of (EDS) explosive detection systems for mail.
Rationale:
Forensic scientists who investigated the bombing of Pan Am 103 estimated
that the bomb used contained as little as 9.6 ounces of explosives.
While I commend the Commissions' recommendation a more effective and
realistic solution is required by changing the recommendation to 8
versus 16 ounces. Additionally, Section 112(b,1)of the "1990
Aviation Security Improvement Act" entitled, "Screening Mail and
Cargo" stated " require for mail and cargo the same screening procedures
as are required for checked baggage."
3.5 "The FAA should
implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and
other threat objects in cargo and work with industry to develop new
initiatives in this area."
3.5 Recommendation
lacks (a) Specificity (c) Substance (d) Accountability (f)
Timetables/Deadlines
-Mandate immediate
examination of all cargo or move cargo on "cargo" carriers.
-Required the
research and development of (EDS) explosive detection systems for cargo.
Rationale:
Profiling relies on the honesty of the shipper and is not an effective
security tool in itself since many shippers and freight forwarders
regularly combine questionable cargo together that are manifested as
"known" shipments. Currently, all express packages shipped by express
mail companies are considered as "known" shipments and don not require
further scrutiny. Additionally, EDS for cargo has not
been developed yet ! Additionally, Section 112(b,1)of the "1990
Aviation Security Improvement Act" entitled, "Screening Mail and
Cargo" stated " require for mail and cargo the same screening procedures
as are required for checked baggage."
3.7 " The FAA should
work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all passengers
are positively identified and subject to security procedures before they
board aircraft."
3.7 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance (e) Applicability (f)
Timetable/Deadline
- Eliminate the
issuance of advanced boarding passes and require that all passengers,
including electronically ticketed passengers, check-in with a airline
employee prior to boarding a flight until EDS is utilized systemwide.
Rationale:
Current airline ticketing procedure allows passenger to be issued
advanced boarding passes with seat assignments. Passengers with advance
issued boarding passes can walk directly to the jet bridge entrance at
the boarding gate, present the boarding pass to an airline employee, and
have a cursory security and identification take place. While this
procedure provides a convenience to the passenger, it takes away from
airline security procedures. The FAA should implement a regulatory
change requiring that all air carriers stop issuing advanced boarding
passes and ticketless travel. Require all passengers including those
participating in electronic ticketing to check-in at an airline counter
or gate check-in desk prior to boarding, until explosive detection
technology is in place for passenger carry on bags and checked baggage.
3.10 "The FAA should
work with industry to develop a national program to increase the
professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening
personnel."
3.10 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (b) Responsibility(c) Substance (d)
Accountability (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
Rationale:
This recommendation contains a number of admirable objectives but it,
like its predecessor recommendation in President Bush's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism lacks teeth. Following President Bush's
Commission of Aviation Security and Terrorism and the follow-on Aviation
Security Improvement Act in 1990, the FAA established standards for the
selection and training of aviation security personnel. Those standards
were, and still are, totally inadequate. There is nothing to prevent the
same inadequate actions by the FAA to this recommendation. The
Commission should specifically recommend that the FAA mandate 80 hours
of intensive classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of On-the-Job training
before performance certification for all airline security screening
personnel.
3.11 "Establish
consortia at all commercial airports to implement enhancements to
aviation safety and security."
3.11 Recommendation
lacks (b) Responsibility (d) Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadline
- Require all 450
Commercial Airports to immediately establish a local consortia to
implement safety and security FAA and DOT mandates
Rationale:
Only about 10% or 41 out of 450 commercial airports have established
consortia. Since effective security is as good as its weakest link, a
system wide approach to implement federal standards must be required.
The local consortia role should be limited to executing minimal federal
safety and security standards not to determining the federal
standards. For example, the consortia can determine the best placement
for deployment of EDS but not if, how many or when to install
explosive detection systems.
3.13 "Conduct airport
vulnerability assessments and develop action plans."
3.13 Recommendation
lacks (a) Specificity (d) Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadline
Rationale:
This recommendation does not contain criteria to ensure that follow-up
actions are taken to problems identified during vulnerability
assessments. The recommendation for FAA "Red Teams" test of airport
security systems outlined in 3.21 should be tied to this recommendation
to ensure that these assessments do not continue the incestuous process
where security problems are rationalized away and no corrective actions
are taken within a specified period of time. Additionally, a
dis-interested third party should be contracted to work with the FAA to
conduct airport and/or airline tests in order to avoid a conflict of
interest.
3.14 "Require criminal
background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all
airport and airline employees with access to secure areas . ..... The
Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI fingerprint check of
all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas, no later
than mid-1999"
3.14 Recommendation
lacks (a) Specificity (b) Substance (f) Timetable/Deadline
- Require immediate
and direct access to NCIC III for comprehensive evaluations of screeners
and all individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of airports.
NCIC will be used as a "trigger" for a FBI criminal record prior to
granting unescorted access to secure areas. Use NCIC as an interim
measure pending IAFIS for conducting fingerprint generated FBI criminal
history checks by mid - 1999.
Rationale:
The aviation industry must be required to provide the same degree of
employment security review that is currently required of employees hired
by banks and security exchange companies. Double standards must be
eliminated to adequately protect peoples lives equal to protecting
peoples money. The" FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996" section 304
entitled "Requirement for criminal history checks" did not
require security checks equal to that of the banking or securities
industries. The legislation allows for ineffective "local" criminal
background checks on the basis of an array of triggering criteria such
as "(I) an employment investigation leaves a gap in employment of 12
months or more.."etc. The "1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act"
section 105 (2 a-c) required national criminal history checks as did the
Bush Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. We can not expect to
have any meaningful security measures implemented if the background of
thousands of airport personnel is potentially questionable
3.15 "Deploy existing
technology."
3.15 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance (f) Timetable/Deadlines
Rationale:
This recommendation is far too nebulous and vague. It like many other
recommendations contain no deadlines and is quite non-specific in
addressing several needed technology additions to the U.S. aviation
security system. The statement recognizing " . . . that deployed
technology for examining carry-on baggage may be outdated" was a
major understatement. The facts are that the technology currently in use
for examining carry-on baggage is not capable of automatically
detecting explosives, and in many instances is not even capable of
imaging explosives compounds. I believe that an unequivocal
recommendation should be made to change out all technology that is
currently used to screen carry-on luggage. Moreover, I believe that
on-going research that is funded by the FAA should be accelerated to
complete the development and deployment of walk-through trace explosives
detectors that can be used to examine passengers for explosives
residues. Additionally, the deployment of 54 advanced explosive
detection systems for checked bag to cover 450
commercial airports does very little to catch up with 20 yr. of
technology advancements in a meaningful way to protect the flying public
.
3.16 " Establish a
joint government-industry research and development program."
3.16 Recommendation
lacks: (c) Substance (d) Accountability(f) Timetable/Deadline
Rationale:
The current $3 million FAA R&D budget is totally inadequate to
research & develop technology for screening cargo, mail, checked bag,
carry on bags and passengers. Adoption of a "Passenger Security
Surcharge" of ($4-5) could generate substantial revenue to adequately
accelerate the aviation R&D process, deploy existing technology and
provide adequate security personnel training programs.
3.19 "Compliment
technology with automated passenger profiling."
3.19 Recommendation
lacks: (c) Substance (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
Rationale:
I agree that profiles can be most useful as an overall part of a
multi-layered security system. This recommendation has placed an
over-reliance, and therefore unrealistic expectations on an early
development and the widespread application of an automated profile
system. The historical review of attempts to automate profiles within
airline's computer system takes us back to the mid-l980's when a
fledging attempt was made to do so by TWA. I believe that a realistic
implementation date for a fully automated profile system that interfaces
with law enforcement and intelligence agencies will take several years
to accomplish. I state this mindful of the substantial amount of work
that must be done by the FBI, CIA, and BATF (and others) in building
terrorist databases on which detailed profile elements can be built. In
addition, interfacing any such data base with airline computer systems
will, in itself; be a major undertaking.
Nonetheless, I
recognize that a limited automated profile system such as Northwest
Airlines' CAPS can be developed and implemented more quickly. While I
applaud and support the effort to automate the CAPS system I doubt that
the additional programming for CAPS use outside of the Northwest
Airlines system can be completed by August 1997. In the interim I urge
the FAA mandate the use of manual profiles to identify the small
minority of passengers that may merit additional attention.
Another serious
concern regarding the recommended use of profiles to trigger the use of
a passenger/baggage match. This process is actually less effective than
the procedures Pan Am was using (illegally) that led to the destruction
of Pan Am 103 on December 21, 1988. If profiles are a necessary part of
a good layered security system then full baggage/passenger match is as
well. The recommendation to base passenger/baggage match on profile and
random selectees is unacceptable. I believe that both security
efficiency techniques, i.e., profiles and full bag/passenger match,
should be equally applied throughout the U.S. aviation security system.
In fact full automated baggage/passenger match procedures can be
implemented immediately and provide an immediate substantive increase in
our aviation security system. As noted above, this is not so for
the recommended automated profile system in 3.19.
3.20 "Certify
screening companies and improve screener performance."
3.20 Recommendation
lacks (a) Specificity (d) Accountability (e) Applicability (f)
Timetables/Deadlines
- FAA mandate 80
hours of intensive classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of On-the-Job
training, before performance certification, for all airline security
screening personnel.
Rationale:
Currently, screeners typically receive 8 hr. of combined class room and
on-the-job training. Most security screeners are minimum wage employees
required to buy their uniforms and pay for parking daily. Airlines
typically pay airplane cleaners more that security screeners, hence a
200-400 % employment turnover rate exists for security screeners.
Security screeners are an integral part of a effective security system.
Security screeners must be selected and trained adequately, paid fairly
and given the appropriate technology tools to do their job
3.23 "Give properly
cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified
information they need to know."
3.23 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance
Rationale:
It is my understanding that the problem of distribution of classified
intelligence information extends to FAA Regional and Field facilities.
Here the primary problem is no one without clearance is to see
classified data (the persons needing access are FAA employees). In this
instance it is a problem of a failure of the FAA to establish a
requirement for their employees to see the data and to establish a means
of rapid distribution of the information to its own field employees.
3.24 "Begin
implementation of full bag-passenger match....the Commission believes
that bag match, initially based on profiling, should be implemented no
later than December 31, 1997...........By that date, the bags of those
selected either at random or through the use of automated profiling must
either be screened or matched to a boarded passenger...."
3.24 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (b) Responsibility(c) Substance (d)
Accountability (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
Rationale: The
recommendation states that " the Commission remains committed to baggage
match as a component of a comprehensive, layered security program aimed
at keeping bombs and explosive devices off airlines" but subsequent
comments tie bag-match to profiles and random selections. I do not take
issue that bag-match should be specifically applied to "profile
selectees" and/or random selection of passengers as both these measures
are a welcome addition to our aviation security system. I do however,
adamantly object to a failure to endorse the immediate application of a
full-baggage/passenger match.
The enclosed detection
matrix in Figure 1 (see p.___) illustrates that the terrorist bomb that
downed Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 would only have been
caught by either a full-baggage/passenger match or through
and examination of the suitcase carrying the bomb using the new
CTX-5000SP EDS. Applying a profile in this instance would not have
worked because there was never a passenger ever associated with the
bag containing the bomb. Since you can only profile passengers
(not bags) the bag with the bomb would not have been detected.
As there are no
current plans to screen all baggage using a CTX-5000SP EDS then
the only reliable security counter measure (see Figure 1 detection
matrix) available to serve as an alert to a Pan Am-103 type of attack is
the full-bag/passenger match. Therefore the recommended application of a
bag-match to a "profile selectee", i.e., a passenger, will not catch a
Pan Am-103 type of attack. The second approach is to applying a
bag-match was to randomly select passengers. (see Figures 2-3 p. ) As no
passenger was ever associated with the Pan Am-103 bomb then this part of
the recommendation to apply a bag-passenger match to randomly selected
passengers would also not stop a Pan Am-103 type of attack. I cannot
accept this recommendation as Pan American World Airways was illegally
using an originating passenger bag-match (partial passenger-bag match)
procedure that resulted in the death of my husband and 269 other people.
To do so would be unconscionable.
IV. RESPONDING TO
AVIATION DISASTERS
4.3 " The Department
of Transportation and the NTSB should implement key provisions of the
Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31,
1997.......The Commission urges the task force to consider the
development of uniform guidelines.."
4.3 Recommendation
lacks (a) Specificity (c) Substance (e) Applicability and actionable
timetable.
4.3 "Air Disaster
Family Assistance Act" Title VII, section 705 of the "FAA
Reauthorization Act of 1996" requires the establishment of a joint task
force, including "families which have been involved in aircraft
accidents."
Task force should
address and develop uniform federal standards for:
- Civilians killed on
government planes
- American passengers
on U.S. carriers that crash internationally.
-Notification
procedures of families of air disasters
-Autopsy procedures
-DNA testing
-Care and disposition
of unidentified remains (i.e. knowledge and consent by next-of-kin
prior
to burial or disposition)
-Personal possession
decontamination, return and/or disposition (i.e. knowledge and
consent by next-of-kin prior to disposition)
-Media access to
survivors and victims families
-Legal
solicitation/Access to survivors and victims families
-Develop and
distribute a "Disaster Response Information Pamphlet" to air disaster
victims and their families.
Rationale:
"Implementation of key provisions of the act by March 31, 1997" can only
be accomplished with the input of all parties as cited by the law
(including the victims families). Family representatives have not been
named or included in a task force nor provided equal access to work
group meetings or received underlying documents to allow them to assist
in the work in progress. Additionally, representation of both the legal
and media are a necessary part of the process to develop guidelines and
negotiate the MOU (memoranda of understanding) between all organizations
responding to air disasters.
4.4 " The U.S.
Government should ensure that family members of victims of international
aviation disasters receive just compensation and equitable treatment
through the application of federal laws and international treaties."
4.4 Recommendation
lacks: (a) Specificity (e) Applicability (f) Timetable/Deadline
4.4 Restore
passenger rights whether crashes occur over land, territorial waters or
over the high seas. Equality in awardable damages can be restored by
amendment to 49 U.S.C. 40120.
Rationale:
Currently the application of law for aircraft that crash over water
(three miles or more off shore) is based on a 1920's treaty "Death on
the High Seas Act," limiting liability of air carrier or manufacturer up
to $2,300. Ironically, DOHSA was adopted prior to start of commercial
passenger air transportation, yet it still applies to air disasters such
as recently as TWA 800, Aeroperu, KAL007 and others. Since all
international flights and most domestic landing approaches on our coasts
are over water this unjust and inequitable system must be abolished.
Airlines and manufacturers have hidden behind DOHSA indefinitely
avoiding swift and adequate compensation of victims families requiring
prolonged trial lasting over a decade.
- Provide the same
venue (U.S. Courts jurisdiction) for U.S. citizens regardless of
where their tickets were bought , changed or if they live abroad. U.S.
jurisdiction can be obtained by amendment to 49 U.S.C. 40105.
Rationale:
Presently, U.S. citizens are afforded U.S. court jurisdiction only if
their ticket was purchased in the U.S. Over 5 million Americans live,
work and travel outside the U.S. depriving them and their families of
swift and adequate damages in case of air disasters. Airlines and
manufacturers have hidden behind jurisdictional issues to indefinitely
avoiding swift and adequate compensation of victims families requiring
prolonged international trials lasting over a decade and compensatory
damages or awards paid in foreign currency.
-Require uniform
certification standards and mandate adequate levels of liability
insurance on all non-scheduled commercial passenger air travel (i.e.
charters)
Rationale:
Privatization and deregulation has created a sizable market of non
scheduled air entities that regularly transport private citizens,
government employees and military. Many private charters temporarily
lease aircraft and crews with questionable certification, maintenance
and recurrent training, putting unwitting passengers at great
unnecessary risk. Mandate equal requirement levels of certification for
scheduled and non-scheduled passenger flights. Note: Most
personal life and travel insurance policies exclude payment of
charter related claims since charters do not afford passengers the
established scheduled commercial passengers air travel safety standards.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the final
report contains no specific call to action, no commitments to address
aviation safety and security system-wide by mandating the deployment of
current technology and training, with actionable timetables and budgets.
Later attempts to track these recommendations will result in problems
with differing agency interpretations, misunderstandings, and outright
opposition to implementation by individuals and/or organizations who
oppose the specific recommendations.
I recommend that time
limits for completion be added to all recommendations that have no
deadlines and that all recommendations be re-written for specific
actions by specific agencies with an accountability matrix added for
follow-on actions to ensure that the recommendations are implemented.
Without specifics, once again we will allow the airlines to lead and the
government follow as to what is necessary to secure the flying public.
Sadly we remain, as noted
eight years ago, by our predecessor commission, President Bush's
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism which concluded that, "The
U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed
to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public. This
system needs major reform. Rhetoric is no substitute for strong,
effective action."
At best, these
recommendations allow and encourage more research, more pilot programs
and more analysis. Once again, it leaves in place domestically and
internationally, highly limited anti-hijacking machines that provide
basic metal detection X-ray technology with no explosive detection
capabilities for carry on baggage. Outside of the limited
deployment (54 units ) of CTX 5000SP, this is also true for checked in
baggage.
Until Explosive detection
technology is ordered in sufficient quantities and deployed system wide,
specific efficiency measures must be implemented to identify which bags
out of the millions transported annually need further scrutiny. Matching
bags to passengers does this. Sadly, the commissions recommendation
matches bags only to "Selectees" after profiling.
Partial bag match does not allow for the identification of an
unaccompanied "rouge" bag since it requires a "passenger Selectee" to
trigger matching passengers to their bags and further scrutiny.
The automated profiling
system developed by Northwest Airlines and the FAA will rely on the
ability of a skycab or a counter check in agent to successfully verify a
passengers identity as the same individual the computer profiled.
Currently the airlines are not required to collect complete
passenger manifest data on either domestic or international flights. We
have seen the short comings of incomplete fight manifest information, as
evident every time a plane crashes. It often takes the airlines days to
notify victims families since without complete names, the airlines don't
accurately know who boarded the plane. Profiling will now rely on the
incomplete passenger data to produce a "Selectee" in order to identify
the bags that need further scrutiny.
While I greatly support
the upgrade in training and certification of security screeners and
personnel, we can not expect them to adequately perform their jobs in
detecting explosives inside carry on bags with minimal training and
obsolete 8-20 yr. old anti-hijacking technology designed to detect metal
and not explosives. We must deploy state of the art screening technology
with at least limited EDS (Explosive Detection) capabilities.
In terms of mail and
cargo transported on passengers planes, the recommendations do not
provide any meaningful degree of protection for the flying public nor
require and fund Research & Development of EDS (Explosion Detection
Systems). Based on the threat of letter bombs/packages and the
systemwide vulnerability that exist in the belly of every passenger
plane the recommendations do not provide either a short or long term
fix.
Mr. Vice President, we
are all aware that any comprehensive security system is as good as its
weakest link. Criminals and terrorist will continue to identify and
exploit the weakest link in our defenses. Nationally, there are over 450
commercial airports with scheduled passenger flights. It is up to the
Federal government that regulates the airlines to provide national
security standards, adequate funding and actionable timetables. Anything
short of that does not fulfill the Commissions mandate of enhancing
aviation security in a meaningful way.
The Boeing chart on p.6
projects an aviation accident a week by the year 2015 based on the
projected increases in air traffic. That acknowledges 250-300 people
will die onboard passenger airplanes a week; 1,000-1,200 a month or
projected total deaths of 12,000-15,000 annually ! Statistically, that
compares weekly commercial aviation deaths to the weekly death toll in
the Vietnam War. This is totally unacceptable and an outrage !
Commercial air travel need not bear the same risk as going to war.
In closing, Mr. Vice
President, I feel that the flying public should be able to put their
family members aboard a plane with a great degree of confidence that
they will walk off at the point of their destination and not come home
in a body bag like my husband did. It is for all the aforementioned
safety and security reasons that I can not sign a report that blatantly
allows the American flying public to be placed regularly at "unnecessary
risk" while we as a nation have the capability, but not
the will to reasonably protect them.
For the record, I take
objection to the inclusion of any "Classified Annex" to the Final Report
of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. If a
classified annex was issued in the name of the Commissioners, it has
been included without privying all the Commissioners to the
contents, issues, or providing applicable background data or
conclusions, with our knowledge or consent.
Sincerely,
M. Victoria Cummock
Commissioner, White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
Member, FAA Security
Baseline Work Group
President, Families of
Pan Am 103/Lockerbie
Widow of John Binning
Cummock
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