|
THE ATTACK
LOOMS
7.1 FIRST ARRIVALS IN
CALIFORNIA
In chapter 5 we described
the Southeast Asia travels of Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, and
others in January 2000 on the first part of the "planes opera- tion." In
that chapter we also described how Mihdhar was spotted in Kuala Lumpur
early in January 2000, along with associates who were not identified,
and then was lost to sight when the group passed through Bangkok. On
Jan- uary 15, Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in Los Angeles. They spent about
two weeks there before moving on to San Diego.1
Two Weeks in Los Angeles
Why Hazmi and Mihdhar came to California, we do not know for certain.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the organizer of the planes operation,
explains that California was a convenient point of entry from Asia and
had the
added benefit of being far away from the intended target area.2
Hazmi and Mihdhar were ill-prepared for a mission in the United States.
Their only qualifications for this plot were their devotion to Usama Bin
Ladin, their veteran service, and their ability to get valid U.S. visas.
Neither had spent
any substantial time in the West, and neither spoke much, if any,
English.3
It would therefore be plausible that they or KSM would have tried to
iden- tify, in advance, a friendly contact for them in the United
States. In detention, KSM denies that al Qaeda had any agents in
Southern California.We do not credit this denial.4 We believe it is
unlikely that Hazmi and Mihdhar-neither of whom, in contrast to the
Hamburg group, had any prior exposure to life in theWest-would have come
to the United States without arranging to receive assistance from one or
more individuals informed in advance of their arrival.5
KSM says that though he told others involved in the conspiracy to stay
away from mosques and to avoid establishing personal contacts, he made
an excep- tion in this case and instructed Hazmi and Mihdhar to pose as
newly arrived
215
216 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
Saudi students and seek
assistance at local mosques. He counted on their break- ing off any such
relationships once they moved to the East Coast.6 Our inabil- ity to
ascertain the activities of Hazmi and Mihdhar during their first two
weeks in the United States may reflect al Qaeda tradecraft designed to
protect the identity of anyone who may have assisted them during that
period.
Hazmi and Mihdhar were directed to enroll in English-language classes
upon arriving in Southern California, so that they could begin pilot
training as soon as possible. KSM claims to have steered the two to San
Diego on the basis of his own research,which supposedly included
thumbing through a San Diego phone book acquired at a Karachi flea
market. Contradicting himself, he also says that, as instructed, they
attempted to enroll in three language schools in Los Angeles.7
After the pair cleared Immigration and Customs at Los Angeles
International Airport, we do not know where they went.8They appear to
have obtained assis- tance from the Muslim community,specifically the
community surrounding the King Fahd mosque in Culver City, one of the
most prominent mosques in Southern California.
It is fairly certain that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd
mosque and made some acquaintances there. One witness interviewed by the
FBI after the September 11 attacks has said he first met the hijackers
at the mosque in early 2000. Furthermore, one of the people who would
befriend them-a man named Mohdar Abdullah-recalled a trip with Hazmi and
Mihdhar to Los Angeles in June when, on their arrival, the three went to
the King Fahd mosque. There Hazmi and Mihdhar greeted various
individuals whom they appeared to have met previously, including a man
named "Khal- lam." In Abdullah's telling, when Khallam visited the al
Qaeda operatives at their motel that evening,Abdullah was asked to leave
the room so that Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Khallam could meet in private.The
identity of Khallam and his
purpose in meeting with Hazmi and Mihdhar remain unknown.9
To understand what Hazmi and Mihdhar did in their first weeks in the
United States, evidently staying in Los Angeles, we have investigated
whether anyone associated with the King Fahd mosque assisted them.This
subject has received substantial attention in the media. Some have
speculated that Fahad al Thumairy-an imam at the mosque and an
accredited diplomat at the Saudi Arabian consulate from 1996 until
2003-may have played a role in helping the hijackers establish
themselves on their arrival in Los Angeles.This specula- tion is based,
at least in part, on Thumairy's reported leadership of an extrem-
ist faction at the mosque.10
A well-known figure at the King Fahd mosque and within the Los Ange- les
Muslim community,Thumairy was reputed to be an Islamic fundamental- ist
and a strict adherent to orthodox Wahhabi doctrine. Some Muslims
concerned about his preaching have said he "injected non-Islamic themes
into his guidance/prayers at the [King Fahd] Mosque" and had followers
"support- ive of the events of September 11, 2001."11 Thumairy appears
to have associ-
THE ATTACK LOOMS 217
ated with a particularly
radical faction within the community of local worship- pers, and had a
network of contacts in other cities in the United States. After
9/11,Thumairy's conduct was a subject of internal debate among some
Saudi officials. He apparently lost his position at the King Fahd
mosque, possibly because of his immoderate reputation. On May 6,
2003,Thumairy attempted to reenter the United States from Saudi Arabia
but was refused entry, based on a determination by the State Department
that he might be connected with ter-
rorist activity.12
When interviewed by both the FBI and the Commission staff, Thumairy has
denied preaching anti-Western sermons, much less promoting violent
jihad. More to the point, he claimed not to recognize either Hazmi or
Mihdhar. Both denials are somewhat suspect. (He likewise denied knowing
Omar al Bay- oumi-a man from San Diego we will discuss shortly-even
though witnesses and telephone records establish that the two men had
contact with each other. Similarly,Thumairy's claim not to know Mohdar
Abdullah is belied by Abdul- lah's contrary assertion.) On the other
hand,Thumairy undoubtedly met with and provided religious counseling to
countless individuals during his tenure at the King Fahd mosque, so he
might not remember two transients like Hazmi
and Mihdhar several years later.13
The circumstantial evidence makes Thumairy a logical person to consider
as a possible contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar.Yet, after exploring the
available leads, we have not found evidence that Thumairy provided
assistance to the
two operatives.14
We do not pick up their trail until February 1, 2000, when they encoun-
tered Omar al Bayoumi and Caysan Bin Don at a halal food restaurant on
Venice Boulevard in Culver City, a few blocks away from the King Fahd
mosque. Bayoumi and Bin Don have both told us that they had driven up
from San Diego earlier that day so that Bayoumi could address a visa
issue and col- lect some papers from the Saudi consulate. Bayoumi heard
Hazmi and Mih- dhar speaking in what he recognized to be Gulf Arabic and
struck up a conversation. Since Bin Don knew only a little Arabic, he
had to rely heavily
on Bayoumi to translate for him.15
Mihdhar and Hazmi said they were students from Saudi Arabia who had just
arrived in the United States to study English.They said they were living
in an apartment near the restaurant but did not specify the address.They
did not like Los Angeles and were having a hard time, especially because
they did not know anyone. Bayoumi told them how pleasant San Diego was
and offered to help them settle there.The two pairs then left the
restaurant and went their
separate ways.16
Bayoumi and Bin Don have been interviewed many times about the Feb-
ruary 1, 2000, lunch. For the most part, their respective accounts
corroborate each other. However, Bayoumi has said that he and Bin Don
attempted to visit the King Fahd mosque after lunch but could not find
it. Bin Don, on the other
218 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
hand, recalls visiting
the mosque twice that day for prayers, both before and after the meal.
Bin Don's recollection is spotty and inconsistent. Bayoumi's ver- sion
can be challenged as well, since the mosque is close to the restaurant
and Bayoumi had visited it, and the surrounding area, on multiple
occasions, includ- ing twice within six weeks of February 1.We do not
know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design.We know
about it because Bayoumi
told law enforcement that it happened.17
Bayoumi, then 42 years old, was in the United States as a business
student, supported by a private contractor for the Saudi Civil Aviation
Authority, where Bayoumi had worked for over 20 years.18 The object of
considerable media speculation following 9/11, he lives now in Saudi
Arabia, well aware of his notoriety. Both we and the FBI have
interviewed him and investigated evi- dence about him.
Bayoumi is a devout Muslim, obliging and gregarious. He spent much of
his spare time involved in religious study and helping run a mosque in
El Cajon, about 15 miles from San Diego. It is certainly possible that
he has dis- sembled about some aspects of his story, perhaps to counter
suspicion. On the other hand, we have seen no credible evidence that he
believed in violent extremism or knowingly aided extremist groups.19 Our
investigators who have dealt directly with him and studied his
background find him to be an unlikely candidate for clandestine
involvement with Islamist extremists.
The Move to San Diego
By February 4, Hazmi and Mihdhar had come to San Diego from Los Ange-
les, possibly driven by Mohdar Abdullah.Abdullah, aYemeni university
student in his early 20s, is fluent in both Arabic and English, and was
perfectly suited to
assist the hijackers in pursuing their mission.20
After 9/11,Abdullah was interviewed many times by the FBI. He admitted
knowing of Hazmi and Mihdhar's extremist leanings and Mihdhar's involve-
ment with the Islamic Army of Aden (a group with ties to al Qaeda) back
in Yemen. Abdullah clearly was sympathetic to those extremist views.
During a post-9/11 search of his possessions, the FBI found a notebook
(belonging to someone else) with references to planes falling from the
sky, mass killing, and hijacking. Further, when detained as a material
witness following the 9/11 attacks,Abdullah expressed hatred for the
U.S. government and "stated that the
U.S. brought 'this' on themselves."21
When interviewed by the FBI after 9/11,Abdullah denied having advance
knowledge of attacks. In May 2004, however, we learned of reports about
Abdullah bragging to fellow inmates at a California prison in September-
October 2003 that he had known Hazmi and Mihdhar were planning a ter-
rorist attack.The stories attributed to Abdullah are not entirely
consistent with each other. Specifically, according to one inmate,
Abdullah claimed an unnamed individual had notified him that Hazmi and
Mihdhar would be arriv-
THE ATTACK LOOMS 219
ing in Los Angeles with
plans to carry out an attack. Abdullah allegedly told the same inmate
that he had driven the two al Qaeda operatives from Los Ange- les to San
Diego, but did not say when this occurred.We have been unable to
corroborate this account.22
Another inmate has recalled Abdullah claiming he first heard about the
hijackers' terrorist plans after they arrived in San Diego, when they
told him they planned to fly an airplane into a building and invited him
to join them on the plane. According to this inmate, Abdullah also
claimed to have found out about the 9/11 attacks three weeks in advance,
a claim that appears to dove- tail with evidence that Abdullah may have
received a phone call from Hazmi around that time, that he stopped
making calls from his telephone after August
25, 2001, and that, according to his friends, he started acting
strangely.23
Although boasts among prison inmates often tend to be unreliable, this
evi- dence is obviously important.To date, neither we nor the FBI have
been able
to verify Abdullah's alleged jailhouse statements, despite investigative
efforts.
We thus do not know when or how Hazmi and Mihdhar first came to San
Diego. We do know that on February 4, they went to the Islamic Center of
San Diego to find Omar al Bayoumi and take him up on his offer of help.
Bay- oumi obliged by not only locating an apartment but also helping
them fill out the lease application, co-signing the lease and, when the
real estate agent refused to take cash for a deposit, helping them open
a bank account (which they did with a $9,900 deposit); he then provided
a certified check from his own account for which the al Qaeda operatives
reimbursed him on the spot for the deposit. Neither then nor later did
Bayoumi give money to either Hazmi or
Mihdhar, who had received money from KSM.24
Hazmi and Mihdhar moved in with no furniture and practically no posses-
sions. Soon after the move, Bayoumi used their apartment for a party
attended by some 20 male members of the Muslim community. At Bayoumi's
request, Bin Don videotaped the gathering with Bayoumi's video camera.
Hazmi and Mihdhar did not mingle with the other guests and reportedly
spent most of
the party by themselves off camera, in a back room.25
Hazmi and Mihdhar immediately started looking for a different place to
stay. Based on their comment to Bayoumi about the first apartment being
expen- sive, one might infer that they wanted to save money.They may
also have been reconsidering the wisdom of living so close to the video
camera-wielding Bay- oumi, who Hazmi seemed to think was some sort of
Saudi spy. Just over a week after moving in, Hazmi and Mihdhar filed a
30-day notice of intention to vacate. Bayoumi apparently loaned them his
cell phone to help them check out
possibilities for new accommodations.26
Their initial effort to move turned out poorly. An acquaintance arranged
with his landlord to have Mihdhar take over his apartment. Mihdhar put
down a $650 deposit and signed a lease for the apartment effective March
1. Several weeks later, Mihdhar sought a refund of his deposit, claiming
he no longer
220 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
intended to move in
because the apartment was too messy.When the landlord refused to refund
the deposit, Mihdhar became belligerent. The landlord
remembers him "ranting and raving" as if he were "psychotic."27
Hazmi and Mihdhar finally found a room to rent in the home of an indi-
vidual they had met at a mosque in San Diego.According to the homeowner,
the future hijackers moved in on May 10, 2000. Mihdhar moved out after
only about a month. On June 9, he left San Diego to return to Yemen.
Hazmi, on the other hand, stayed at this house for the rest of his time
in California, until mid-December; he would then leave for Arizona with
a newly arrived 9/11
hijacker-pilot, Hani Hanjour.28
While in San Diego, Hazmi and Mihdhar played the part of recently
arrived foreign students.They continued to reach out to members of the
Muslim com- munity for help.At least initially, they found well-meaning
new acquaintances at the Islamic Center of San Diego, which was only a
stone's throw from the apartment where they first lived. For example,
when they purchased a used car (with cash), they bought it from a man
who lived across the street from the Islamic Center and who let them use
his address in registering the vehicle, an accommodation "to help a
fellow Muslim brother." Similarly, in April, when their cash supply may
have been dwindling, Hazmi persuaded the administra- tor of the Islamic
Center to let him use the administrator's bank account to receive a
$5,000 wire transfer from someone in Dubai, in the United Arab Emi-
rates (this was KSM's nephew,Ali Abdul Aziz Ali).29
Hazmi and Mihdhar visited other mosques as well, mixing comfortably as
devout worshippers. During the operatives' critical first weeks in San
Diego, Mohdar Abdullah helped them. Translating between English and
Arabic, he assisted them in obtaining California driver's licenses and
with applying to lan- guage and flight schools.Abdullah also introduced
them to his circle of friends; he shared an apartment with some of those
friends near the Rabat mosque in
La Mesa, a few miles from the hijackers' residence.30
Abdullah has emerged as a key associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar in San
Diego. Detained after 9/11 (first as a material witness, then on
immigration charges), he was deported to Yemen on May 21, 2004, after
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California declined to
prosecute him on charges arising out of his alleged jailhouse admissions
concerning the 9/11 operatives. The Department of Justice declined to
delay his removal pending further inves-
tigation of this new information.31
Other friends of Abdullah also translated for Hazmi and Mihdhar and
helped them adjust to life in San Diego. Some held extremist beliefs or
were well acquainted with known extremists. For example, immediately
after 9/11, Osama Awadallah, a Yemeni whose telephone number was found
in Hazmi's Toyota at Washington Dulles International Airport, was found
to possess pho- tos, videos, and articles relating to Bin
Ladin.Awadallah also had lived in a house where copies of Bin Ladin's
fatwas and other similar materials were distributed
THE ATTACK LOOMS 221
to the residents. Omar
Bakarbashat, a Saudi, also met Hazmi and Mihdhar at the Rabat mosque. He
admitted helping Hazmi to learn English and taking over the operatives'
first apartment in San Diego after they moved out. Bakar- bashat
apparently had downloaded stridently anti-American Web pages to his
computer's hard drive.32
Another potentially significant San Diego contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar
was Anwar Aulaqi, an imam at the Rabat mosque. Born in New Mexico and
thus a U.S. citizen, Aulaqi grew up in Yemen and studied in the United
States on a Yemeni government scholarship.We do not know how or when
Hazmi and Mihdhar first met Aulaqi. The operatives may even have met or
at least talked to him the same day they first moved to San Diego. Hazmi
and Mih- dhar reportedly respected Aulaqi as a religious figure and
developed a close rela-
tionship with him.33
When interviewed after 9/11, Aulaqi said he did not recognize Hazmi's
name but did identify his picture. Although Aulaqi admitted meeting with
Hazmi several times, he claimed not to remember any specifics of what
they discussed. He described Hazmi as a soft-spoken Saudi student who
used to appear at the mosque with a companion but who did not have a
large circle
of friends.34
Aulaqi left San Diego in mid-2000, and by early 2001 had relocated
toVir- ginia.As we will discuss later, Hazmi eventually showed up at
Aulaqi's mosque inVirginia, an appearance that may not have been
coincidental.We have been unable to learn enough about Aulaqi's
relationship with Hazmi and Mihdhar
to reach a conclusion.35
In sum, although the evidence is thin as to specific motivations, our
overall impression is that soon after arriving in California, Hazmi and
Mihdhar sought out and found a group of young and ideologically
like-minded Muslims with roots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, individuals
mainly associated with Mohdar Abdullah and the Rabat mosque.The al Qaeda
operatives lived openly in San Diego under their true names, listing
Hazmi in the telephone directory.They managed to avoid attracting much
attention.
Flight Training Fails;
Mihdhar Bails Out
Hazmi and Mihdhar came to the United States to learn English, take
flying lessons, and become pilots as quickly as possible.They turned
out, however, to have no aptitude for English. Even with help and
tutoring from Mohdar Abdul- lah and other bilingual friends, Hazmi and
Mihdhar's efforts to learn proved futile.This lack of language skills in
turn became an insurmountable barrier to
learning how to fly.36
A pilot they consulted at one school, the Sorbi Flying Club in San
Diego, spoke Arabic. He explained to them that their flight instruction
would begin with small planes. Hazmi and Mihdhar emphasized their
interest in learning to fly jets, Boeing aircraft in particular, and
asked where they might enroll to train
222 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
on jets right away.
Convinced that the two were either joking or dreaming, the pilot
responded that no such school existed. Other instructors who worked with
Hazmi and Mihdhar remember them as poor students who focused on learning
to control the aircraft in flight but took no interest in takeoffs or
land- ings. By the end of May 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar had given up on
learning
how to fly.37
Mihdhar's mind seems to have been with his family back in Yemen, as evi-
denced by calls he made from the apartment telephone.When news of the
birth of his first child arrived, he could stand life in California no
longer. In late May and early June of 2000, he closed his bank account,
transferred the car regis- tration to Hazmi, and arranged his return
toYemen.According to KSM, Mih- dhar was bored in San Diego and foresaw
no problem in coming back to the United States since he had not
overstayed his visa. Hazmi and Mohdar Abdul- lah accompanied him to Los
Angeles on June 9. After visiting the King Fahd mosque one last time
with his friends, Mihdhar left the country the follow-
ing day.38
KSM kept in fairly close touch with his operatives, using a variety of
meth- ods. When Bin Ladin called KSM back from Pakistan to Afghanistan
in the spring of 2000, KSM asked Khallad (whom we introduced in chapter
5) to maintain email contact with Hazmi in the United States. Mihdhar's
decision to strand Hazmi in San Diego enraged KSM, who had not
authorized the departure and feared it would compromise the plan. KSM
attempted to drop Mihdhar from the planes operation and would have done
so, he says, had he
not been overruled by Bin Ladin.39
Following Mihdhar's departure, Hazmi grew lonely and worried that he
would have trouble managing by himself. He prayed with his housemate
each morning at 5:00 A.M. and attended services at the Islamic Center.
He borrowed his housemate's computer for Internet access, following news
coverage of fight- ing in Chechnya and Bosnia.With his housemate's help,
Hazmi also used the Internet to search for a wife (after obtaining KSM's
approval to marry).This search did not succeed. Although he developed a
close relationship with his housemate, Hazmi preferred not to use the
house telephone, continuing the practice he and Mihdhar had adopted of
going outside to make phone calls.40
After Mihdhar left, other students moved into the house. One of these,
Yazeed al Salmi, stands out. In July 2000, Salmi purchased $4,000 in
traveler's checks at a bank in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On September 5,
Hazmi deposited $1,900 of the traveler's checks into his bank account,
after withdrawing the same amount in cash. It is possible that Hazmi was
simply cashing the traveler's checks for a friend.We do not know; Salmi
claims not to remember the trans- action.After 9/11, Salmi reportedly
confided to Mohdar Abdullah that he had previously known terrorist pilot
Hani Hanjour.After living in the same house with Hazmi for about a
month, Salmi moved to the La Mesa apartment shared
by Abdullah and others.41
THE ATTACK LOOMS 223
By the fall of 2000,
Hazmi no longer even pretended to study English or take flying lessons.
Aware that his co-conspirators in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be
sending him a new colleague shortly, he bided his time and worked for a
few weeks at a gas station in La Mesa where some of his friends, includ-
ing Abdullah, were employed. On one occasion, Hazmi told a fellow
employee that he was planning to find a better job, and let slip a
prediction that he would
become famous.42
On December 8, 2000, Hani Hanjour arrived in San Diego, having traveled
from Dubai via Paris and Cincinnati. Hazmi likely picked up Hanjour at
the airport.We do not know where Hanjour stayed; a few days later, both
men left San Diego. Before departing, they visited the gas station in La
Mesa, where Hazmi reportedly introduced Hanjour as a "long time friend
from Saudi Ara- bia." Hazmi told his housemate that he and his friend
"Hani" were headed for San Jose to take flying lessons and told his
friends that he would stay in touch. Hazmi promised to return to San
Diego soon, and he and Hanjour drove off.43
Hazmi did not sever all contact with his friends in San Diego.According
to Abdullah, after Hazmi left San Diego in December 2000, he telephoned
Abdul- lah twice: in December 2000 or January 2001, Hazmi said he was in
San Fran- cisco and would be attending flight school there; about two
weeks later, he said he was attending flight school in Arizona. Some
evidence, which we will dis- cuss later, indicates that Hazmi contacted
Abdullah again, in August 2001. In addition, during the month following
Hazmi's departure from San Diego, he emailed his housemate three times,
including a January 2001 email that Hazmi signed "Smer," an apparent
attempt to conceal his identity that struck the housemate as strange at
the time. Hazmi also telephoned his housemate that he and his friend had
decided to take flight lessons in Arizona, and that Mih- dhar was now
back inYemen.That was their last contact.When the housemate emailed
Hazmi in February and March of 2001 to find out how he was far-
ing, Hazmi did not reply. 44
The housemate who rented the room to Hazmi and Mihdhar during 2000 is an
apparently law-abiding citizen with long-standing, friendly contacts
among local police and FBI personnel. He did not see anything unusual
enough in the behavior of Hazmi or Mihdhar to prompt him to report to
his law enforcement contacts. Nor did those contacts ask him for
information about his tenants/housemates.
7.2 THE 9/11 PILOTS IN
THE UNITED STATES
The Hamburg Pilots Arrive
in the United States
In the early summer of 2000, the Hamburg group arrived in the United
States to begin flight training. Marwan al Shehhi came on May 29,
arriving in Newark on a flight from Brussels. He went to New York City
and waited there for
224 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
Mohamed Atta to join him.
On June 2, Atta traveled to the Czech Republic by bus from Germany and
then flew from Prague to Newark the next day. According to Ramzi
Binalshibh,Atta did not meet with anyone in Prague; he simply believed
it would contribute to operational security to fly out of Prague rather
than Hamburg, the departure point for much of his previous interna-
tional travel.45
Atta and Shehhi had not settled on where they would obtain their flight
training. In contrast, Ziad Jarrah had already arranged to attend the
Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) inVenice, Florida. Jarrah arrived
in Newark on June 27 and then flew toVenice. He immediately began the
private pilot pro- gram at FFTC, intending to get a multi-engine
license. Jarrah moved in with
some of the flight instructors affiliated with his school and bought a
car.46
While Jarrah quickly settled into training in Florida, Atta and Shehhi
kept searching for a flight school. After visiting the Airman Flight
School in Nor- man, Oklahoma (where Zacarias Moussaoui would enroll
several months later and where another al Qaeda operative, Ihab Ali, had
taken lessons in the mid- 1990s), Atta started flight instruction at
Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, and both Atta and Shehhi
subsequently enrolled in the Accelerated Pilot Pro- gram at that school.
By the end of July, both of them took solo flights, and by mid-August
they passed the private pilot airman test.They trained through the
summer at Huffman, while Jarrah continued his training at FFTC.47
The Hamburg operatives paid for their flight training primarily with
funds wired from Dubai by KSM's nephew,Ali Abdul Aziz Ali. Between June
29 and September 17, 2000,Ali sent Shehhi and Atta a total of $114,500
in five trans- fers ranging from $5,000 to $70,000.Ali relied on the
unremarkable nature of his transactions, which were essentially
invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing daily across the globe.48
Ali was not required to provide identification
in sending this money and the aliases he used were not questioned.49
In mid-September,Atta and Shehhi applied to change their immigration
sta- tus from tourist to student, stating their intention to study at
Huffman until September 1, 2001. In late September, they decided to
enroll at Jones Aviation in Sarasota, Florida, about 20 miles north of
Venice. According to the instruc- tor at Jones, the two were aggressive,
rude, and sometimes even fought with him to take over the controls
during their training flights. In early October, they took the Stage I
exam for instruments rating at Jones Aviation and failed. Very upset,
they said they were in a hurry because jobs awaited them at home.
Atta and Shehhi then returned to Huffman.50
In the meantime, Jarrah obtained a single-engine private pilot
certificate in early August. Having reached that milestone, he departed
on the first of five foreign trips he would take after first entering
the United States. In October, he flew back to Germany to visit his
girlfriend, Aysel Senguen.The two trav- eled to Paris before Jarrah
returned to Florida on October 29. His relationship with her remained
close throughout his time in the United States. In addition
THE ATTACK LOOMS 225
to his trips, Jarrah made
hundreds of phone calls to her and communicated fre-
quently by email.51
Jarrah was supposed to be joined at FFTC by Ramzi Binalshibh, who even
sent the school a deposit. But Binalshibh could not obtain a U.S. visa.
His first applications in May and June 2000 were denied because he
lacked established ties in Germany ensuring his return from a trip to
the United States. In Sep- tember, he went home toYemen to apply for a
visa from there, but was denied on grounds that he also lacked
sufficient ties to Yemen. In October, he tried one last time, in Berlin,
applying for a student visa to attend "aviation language school," but
the prior denials were noted and this application was denied as
well, as incomplete.52
Unable to participate directly in the operation, Binalshibh instead took
on the role of coordinating between KSM and the operatives in the United
States. Apart from sending a total of about $10,000 in wire transfers to
Atta and Sheh- hi during the summer of 2000, one of Binalshibh's first
tasks in his new role as
plot coordinator was to assist another possible pilot, Zacarias
Moussaoui.53
In the fall of 2000, KSM had sent Moussaoui to Malaysia for flight
training, but Moussaoui did not find a school he liked. He worked
instead on other ter- rorist schemes, such as buying four tons of
ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on cargo planes flying to the
United States.When KSM found out, he recalled Moussaoui back to Pakistan
and directed him to go to the United States for flight training. In
early October, Moussaoui went to London.When Binalshibh visited London
in December, he stayed at the same 16-room dor- mitory where Moussaoui
was still residing. From London, Moussaoui sent
inquiries to the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma.54
Confronting training or travel problems with Hazmi, Mihdhar, Binalshibh,
and Moussaoui, al Qaeda was looking for another possible pilot
candidate. A new recruit with just the right background conveniently
presented himself in Afghanistan.
The Fourth Pilot: Hani
Hanjour
Hani Hanjour, from Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, first came to the United States
in 1991 to study at the Center for English as a Second Language at the
University of Arizona. He seems to have been a rigorously observant
Muslim.According to his older brother, Hani Hanjour went to Afghanistan
for the first time in the late 1980s, as a teenager, to participate in
the jihad and, because the Soviets had
already withdrawn, worked for a relief agency there.55
In 1996, Hanjour returned to the United States to pursue flight
training, after being rejected by a Saudi flight school. He checked out
flight schools in Florida, California, and Arizona; and he briefly
started at a couple of them before returning to Saudi Arabia. In 1997,
he returned to Florida and then, along with two friends, went back to
Arizona and began his flight training there in earnest. After about
three months, Hanjour was able to obtain his private
226 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
pilot's license. Several
more months of training yielded him a commercial pilot certificate,
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in April 1999.
He then returned to Saudi Arabia.56
Hanjour reportedly applied to the civil aviation school in Jeddah after
returning home, but was rejected. He stayed home for a while and then
told his family he was going to the United Arab Emirates to work for an
airline. Where Hanjour actually traveled during this time period is
unknown. It is pos-
sible he went to the training camps in Afghanistan.57
The fact that Hanjour spent so much time in Arizona may be significant.A
number of important al Qaeda figures attended the University of Arizona
in Tucson or lived in Tucson in the 1980s and early 1990s.58 Some of
Hanjour's known Arizona associates from the time of his flight training
in the late 1990s have also raised suspicion.59 FBI investigators have
speculated that al Qaeda may have directed other extremist Muslims in
the Phoenix area to enroll in avia- tion training. It is clear that when
Hanjour lived in Arizona in the 1990s, he associated with several
individuals holding extremist beliefs who have been the subject of
counterterrorism investigations. Some of them trained with Han- jour to
be pilots. Others had apparent connections to al Qaeda, including train-
ing in Afghanistan.60
By the spring of 2000, Hanjour was back in Afghanistan.According to KSM,
Hanjour was sent to him in Karachi for inclusion in the plot after
Hanjour was identified in al Qaeda's al Faruq camp as a trained pilot,
on the basis of back- ground information he had provided. Hanjour had
been at a camp in Afghanistan for a few weeks when Bin Ladin or Atef
apparently realized that he was a trained pilot; he was told to report
to KSM, who then trained Han-
jour for a few days in the use of code words.61
On June 20, Hanjour returned home to Saudi Arabia. He obtained a U.S.
student visa on September 25 and told his family he was returning to his
job in the UAE. Hanjour did go to the UAE, but to meet facilitator Ali
Abdul
Aziz Ali.62
Ali opened a bank account in Dubai for Hanjour and providing the initial
funds for his trip. On December 8, Hanjour traveled to San Diego. His
supposed destination was an English as a second language program in
Oakland, Califor- nia, which he had scheduled before leaving Saudi
Arabia but never attended.
Instead, as mentioned earlier, he joined Nawaf al Hazmi in San Diego.63
Hazmi and Hanjour left San Diego almost immediately and drove to Ari-
zona. Settling in Mesa, Hanjour began refresher training at his old
school,Ari- zona Aviation. He wanted to train on multi-engine planes,
but had difficulties because his English was not good enough.The
instructor advised him to dis- continue but Hanjour said he could not go
home without completing the training. In early 2001, he started training
on a Boeing 737 simulator at Pan Am International Flight Academy in
Mesa.An instructor there found his work well below standard and
discouraged him from continuing.Again, Hanjour per-
THE ATTACK LOOMS 227
severed; he completed the
initial training by the end of March 2001. At that point, Hanjour and
Hazmi vacated their apartment and started driving east, anticipating the
arrival of the "muscle hijackers"-the operatives who would storm the
cockpits and control the passengers. By as early as April 4, Hanjour
and Hazmi had arrived in Falls Church,Virginia.64
The three pilots in Florida continued with their training. Atta and
Shehhi finished up at Huffman and earned their instrument certificates
from the FAA in November. In mid-December 2000, they passed their
commercial pilot tests and received their licenses.They then began
training to fly large jets on a flight simulator. At about the same
time, Jarrah began simulator training, also in Florida but at a
different center. By the end of 2000, less than six months after their
arrival, the three pilots on the East Coast were simulating flights on
large
jets.65
Travels in Early 2001
Jarrah, Atta, and Shehhi, having progressed in their training, all took
foreign trips during the holiday period of 2000-2001. Jarrah flew
through Germany to get home to Beirut.A few weeks later, he returned to
Florida via Germany, with Aysel Senguen. She stayed with him in Florida
for ten days, even accom- panying him to a flight training session.We do
not know whether Atta or al Qaeda leaders knew about Jarrah's trips and
Senguen's visit.The other opera- tives had broken off regular contact
with their families. At the end of January 2001, Jarrah again flew to
Beirut, to visit his sick father.After staying there for several weeks,
Jarrah visited Senguen in Germany for a few days before return-
ing to the United States at the end of February.66
While Jarrah took his personal trips,Atta traveled to Germany in early
Jan- uary 2001 for a progress meeting with Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh
says Atta told him to report to the al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan
that the three Hamburg pilots had completed their flight training and
were awaiting orders. Atta also disclosed that a fourth pilot, Hanjour,
had joined Hazmi. Upon returning to Florida,Atta wired Binalshibh travel
money. Binalshibh proceeded to Afghanistan, made his report, and spent
the next several months there and
in Pakistan.67
When Atta returned to Florida, Shehhi left for Morocco, traveling to
Casablanca in mid-January. Shehhi's family, concerned about not having
heard from him, reported him missing to the UAE government.The UAE
embassy in turn contacted the Hamburg police and a UAE representative
tried to find him in Germany, visiting mosques and Shehhi's last address
in Hamburg.After learning that his family was looking for him, Shehhi
telephoned them on Jan- uary 20 and said he was still living and
studying in Hamburg.The UAE gov-
ernment then told the Hamburg police they could call off the search.68
Atta and Shehhi both encountered some difficulty reentering the United
States, on January 10 and January 18, respectively. Because neither
presented a
228 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
Atta's Alleged Trip to
Prague
Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in
December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June
2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occa-
sion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for
Newark the following day.69
The allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in
Prague in April 2001 originates from the reporting of a single source of
the Czech intelligence service. Shortly after 9/11, the source reported
having seen Atta meet with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, an Iraqi
diplomat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at 11:00 A.M.
This information was passed to CIA headquarters.
The U.S. legal attaché ("Legat") in Prague, the representative of the
FBI, met with the Czech service's source. After the meeting, the assess-
ment of the Legat and the Czech officers present was that they were 70
percent sure that the source was sincere and believed his own story of
the meeting. Subsequently, the Czech intelligence service publicly
stated that there was a 70 percent probability that the meeting between
Atta and Ani had taken place.The Czech Interior Minister also made
several statements to the press about his belief that the meeting had
occurred, and the story was widely reported.
The FBI has gathered evidence indicating that Atta was in Virginia Beach
on April 4 (as evidenced by a bank surveillance camera photo), and in
Coral Springs, Florida on April 11, where he and Shehhi leased an
apartment. On April 6, 9, 10, and 11,Atta's cellular telephone was used
numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from
cell sites within Florida.We cannot confirm that he placed those calls.
But there are no U.S. records indicating that Atta departed the country
during this period. Czech officials have reviewed their flight and bor-
der records as well for any indication that Atta was in the Czech Repub-
lic in April 2001, including records of anyone crossing the border who
even looked Arab.They have also reviewed pictures from the area near the
Iraqi embassy and have not discovered photos of anyone who looked like
Atta. No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in
April 2001.
According to the Czech government,Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have
met with Atta, was about 70 miles away from Prague on April 8-9 and did
not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was firm
that the sighting occurred at 11:00 A.M. When questioned about the
reported April 2001 meeting,Ani-now in custody-has denied ever
THE ATTACK LOOMS 229
meeting or having any
contact with Atta.Ani says that shortly after 9/11, he became concerned
that press stories about the alleged meeting might hurt his career.
Hoping to clear his name, Ani asked his superiors to approach the Czech
government about refuting the allegation. He also
denies knowing of any other Iraqi official having contact with Atta.
These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was
in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a
passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his
practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January
and would in July when he took his next overseas trip). The FBI and CIA
have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports.
KSM and Binalshibh both deny that an Atta-Ani meeting occurred. There
was no reason for such a meeting, especially considering the risk it
would pose to the operation. By April 2001, all four pilots had com-
pleted most of their training,and the muscle hijackers were about to
begin entering the United States.
The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of
an Atta-Ani meeting.70
student visa, both of
them had to persuade INS inspectors that they should be admitted so that
they could continue their flight training. Neither operative
had any problem clearing Customs.71
After returning to Florida from their trips,Atta and Shehhi visited
Georgia, staying briefly in Norcross and Decatur, and renting a
single-engine plane to fly with an instructor in Lawrenceville. By
February 19,Atta and Shehhi were inVirginia.They rented a mailbox
inVirginia Beach, cashed a check, and then promptly returned to Georgia,
staying in Stone Mountain.We have found no explanation for these
travels. In mid-March, Jarrah was in Georgia as well, stay- ing in
Decatur.There is no evidence that the three pilots met, although Jarrah
and Atta apparently spoke on the phone. At the end of the month, Jarrah
left the United States again and visited Senguen in Germany for two
weeks. In early April, Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach and
closed the mail-
box they had opened in February.72
By the time Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach from their
travels in Georgia, Hazmi and Hanjour had also arrived in Virginia, in
Falls Church. They made their way to a large mosque there, the Dar al
Hijra mosque, some-
time in early April.73
As we mentioned earlier, one of the imams at this mosque was the same
Anwar Aulaqi with whom Hazmi had spent time at the Rabat mosque in San
Diego. Aulaqi had moved to Virginia in January 2001. He remembers Hazmi
230 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
from San Diego but has
denied having any contact with Hazmi or Hanjour in
Virginia.74
At the Dar al Hijra mosque, Hazmi and Hanjour met a Jordanian named Eyad
al Rababah. Rababah says he had gone to the mosque to speak to the imam,
Aulaqi, about finding work. At the conclusion of services, which nor-
mally had 400 to 500 attendees, Rababah says he happened to meet Hazmi
and Hanjour.They were looking for an apartment; Rababah referred them to
a friend who had one to rent. Hazmi and Hanjour moved into the
apartment,
which was in Alexandria.75
Some FBI investigators doubt Rababah's story. Some agents suspect that
Aulaqi may have tasked Rababah to help Hazmi and Hanjour.We share that
suspicion, given the remarkable coincidence of Aulaqi's prior
relationship with Hazmi. As noted above, the Commission was unable to
locate and interview Aulaqi. Rababah has been deported to Jordan, having
been convicted after 9/11
in a fraudulent driver's license scheme.76
Rababah, who had lived in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, told
investigators that he had recommended Paterson, New Jersey, as a place
with an Arabic-speaking community where Hazmi and Hanjour might want to
set- tle.They asked for his help in getting them an apartment in
Paterson. Rababah tried without success. He says he then suggested that
Hazmi and Hanjour travel
with him to Connecticut where they could look for a place to live.77
On May 8, Rababah went to Hazmi and Hanjour's apartment to pick them up
for the trip to Connecticut.There he says he found them with new room-
mates-Ahmed al Ghamdi and Majed Moqed.These two men had been sent to
America to serve as muscle hijackers and had arrived at Dulles Airport
on May 2. Rababah drove Hanjour to Fairfield, Connecticut, followed by
Hazmi, who had Moqed and Ghamdi in his car. After a short stay in
Connecticut, where they apparently called area flight schools and real
estate agents, Rababah drove the four to Paterson to have dinner and
show them around. He says that they returned with him to Fairfield that
night, and that he never
saw them again.78
Within a few weeks, Hanjour, Hazmi, and several other operatives moved
to Paterson and rented a one-room apartment. When their landlord later
paid a visit, he found six men living there-Nawaf al Hazmi, now joined
by his younger brother Salem, Hanjour, Moqed, probably Ahmed al Ghamdi,
and Abdul Aziz al Omari; Hazmi's old friend Khalid al Mihdhar would soon
join them.79
Atta and Shehhi had already returned to Florida. On April 11, they moved
into an apartment in Coral Springs.Atta stayed in Florida, awaiting the
arrival
of the first muscle hijackers.80
Shehhi, on the other hand, bought a ticket to Cairo and flew there from
Miami on April 18. We do not know much more about Shehhi's reason for
traveling to Egypt in April than we know about his January trip to
Morocco.
THE ATTACK LOOMS 231
Shehhi did meet with
Atta's father, who stated in a post-9/11 interview that Shehhi just
wanted to pick up Atta's international driver's license and some
money.This story is not credible.Atta already had the license with him
and pre- sented it during a traffic stop on April 26 while Shehhi was
still abroad. Sheh- hi spent about two weeks in Egypt, obviously more
time than would have been needed just to meet with Atta's father. Shehhi
could have traveled elsewhere during this time, but no records
indicating additional travel have been discov-
ered.81
Shehhi returned to Miami on May 2. That day, Atta and Jarrah were
together, about 30 miles to the north, visiting a Department of
MotorVehicles office in Lauderdale Lakes, Florida, to get Florida
driver's licenses. Back inVir- ginia, Hazmi and Hanjour were about to
leave for Connecticut and New Jer- sey.As the summer approached, the
lead operatives were settled in Florida and
New Jersey, waiting for the rest of their contingent to join them.82
7.3 ASSEMBLING THE TEAMS
During the summer and
early autumn of 2000, Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leaders in
Afghanistan started selecting the muscle hijackers-the operatives who
would storm the cockpits and control the passengers. Despite the phrase
widely used to describe them, the so-called muscle hijackers were not at
all
physically imposing; most were between 5' 5" and 5' 7" in height.83
Recruitment and Selection
for 9/11
Twelve of the 13 muscle hijackers (excluding Nawaf al Hazmi and Mihdhar)
came from Saudi Arabia: Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al
Shehri, Abdul Aziz al Omari, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al
Shehri, Majed Moqed, Salem al Hazmi, Saeed al Ghamdi,Ahmad al Haznawi,
and Ahmed al Nami.The remaining recruit, Fayez Banihammad, came from the
UAE. He appears to have played a unique role among the muscle hijack-
ers because of his work with one of the plot's financial facilitators,
Mustafa al
Hawsawi.84
Saudi authorities interviewed the relatives of these men and have
briefed us on what they found.The muscle hijackers came from a variety
of educational and societal backgrounds. All were between 20 and 28
years old; most were unemployed with no more than a high school
education and were unmarried.85
Four of them-Ahmed al Ghamdi, Saeed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and
Ahmad al Haznawi-came from a cluster of three towns in the al Bahah
region, an isolated and underdeveloped area of Saudi Arabia, and shared
the same tribal affiliation. None had a university degree.Their travel
patterns and information from family members suggest that the four may
have been in con-
tact with each other as early as the fall of 1999.86
232 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
Five more-Wail al
Shehri,Waleed al Shehri,Abdul Aziz al Omari, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed
al Nami-came from Asir Province, a poor region in southwestern Saudi
Arabia that borders Yemen; this weakly policed area is sometimes called
"the wild frontier."Wail and Waleed al Shehri were brothers. All five in
this group had begun university studies. Omari had graduated with honors
from high school, had attained a degree from the Imam Muhammad
Ibn Saud Islamic University, was married, and had a daughter.87
The three remaining muscle hijackers from Saudi Arabia were Satam al
Suqami, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi. Suqami came from Riyadh. Moqed
hailed from a small town called Annakhil, west of Medina. Suqami had
very little education, and Moqed had dropped out of university. Neither
Suqami nor Moqed appears to have had ties to the other, or to any of the
other
operatives, before getting involved with extremists, probably by 1999.88
Salem al Hazmi, a younger brother of Nawaf, was born in Mecca. Salem's
family recalled him as a quarrelsome teenager. His brother Nawaf
probably rec- ommended him for recruitment into al Qaeda. One al Qaeda
member who knew them says that Nawaf pleaded with Bin Ladin to allow
Salem to partic-
ipate in the 9/11 operation.89
Detainees have offered varying reasons for the use of so many Saudi
oper- atives. Binalshibh argues that al Qaeda wanted to send a message
to the gov- ernment of Saudi Arabia about its relationship with the
United States. Several other al Qaeda figures, however, have stated that
ethnicity generally was not a factor in the selection of operatives
unless it was important for security or oper-
ational reasons.90
KSM, for instance, denies that Saudis were chosen for the 9/11 plot to
drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and stresses
practical rea- sons for considering ethnic background when selecting
operatives. He says that so many were Saudi because Saudis comprised the
largest portion of the pool of recruits in the al Qaeda training camps.
KSM estimates that in any given camp, 70 percent of the mujahideen were
Saudi, 20 percent wereYemeni, and 10 percent were from elsewhere.
Although Saudi and Yemeni trainees were most often willing to volunteer
for suicide operations, prior to 9/11 it was eas-
ier for Saudi operatives to get into the United States.91
Most of the Saudi muscle hijackers developed their ties to extremists
two or three years before the attacks. Their families often did not
consider these young men religious zealots. Some were perceived as
devout, others as lacking in faith. For instance, although Ahmed al
Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Saeed al Ghamdi attended prayer services
regularly and Omari often served as an imam at his mosque in Saudi
Arabia, Suqami and Salem al Hazmi appeared unconcerned with religion
and, contrary to Islamic law, were known to drink
alcohol.92
Like many other al Qaeda operatives, the Saudis who eventually became
the muscle hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside Afghanistan-
probably in Saudi Arabia itself. Al Qaeda recruiters, certain clerics,
and-in a
THE ATTACK LOOMS 233
few cases-family members
probably all played a role in spotting potential candidates. Several of
the muscle hijackers seem to have been recruited
through contacts at local universities and mosques.93
According to the head of one of the training camps in Afghanistan, some
were chosen by unnamed Saudi sheikhs who had contacts with al Qaeda.
Omari, for example, is believed to have been a student of a radical
Saudi cleric named Sulayman al Alwan. His mosque, which is located in al
Qassim Province, is known among more moderate clerics as a "terrorist
factory."The province is at the very heart of the strict Wahhabi
movement in Saudi Arabia. Saeed al Ghamdi and Mohand al Shehri also
spent time in al Qassim, both breaking with their families. According to
his father, Mohand al Shehri's fre- quent visits to this area resulted
in his failing exams at his university in Riyadh. Saeed al Ghamdi
transferred to a university in al Qassim, but he soon stopped
talking to his family and dropped out of school without informing
them.94
The majority of these Saudi recruits began to break with their families
in late 1999 and early 2000. According to relatives, some recruits began
to make arrangements for extended absences. Others exhibited marked
changes in behavior before disappearing. Salem al Hazmi's father
recounted that Salem- who had had problems with alcohol and petty
theft-stopped drinking and
started attending mosque regularly three months before he disappeared.95
Several family members remembered that their relatives had expressed a
desire to participate in jihad, particularly in Chechnya. None had
mentioned going to Afghanistan.These statements might be true or cover
stories.The four recruits from the al Ghamdi tribe, for example, all
told their families that they were going to Chechnya. Only two-Ahmed al
Ghamdi and Saeed al
Ghamdi-had documentation suggesting travel to a Russian republic.96
Some aspiring Saudi mujahideen, intending to go to Chechnya, encoun-
tered difficulties along the way and diverted to Afghanistan. In 1999,
Ibn al Khattab-the primary commander of Arab nationals in
Chechnya-reportedly had started turning away most foreign mujahideen
because of their inexperi- ence and inability to adjust to the local
conditions. KSM states that several of the 9/11 muscle hijackers faced
problems traveling to Chechnya and so went
to Afghanistan, where they were drawn into al Qaeda.97
Khallad has offered a more detailed story of how such diversions
occurred. According to him, a number of Saudi mujahideen who tried to go
to Chech- nya in 1999 to fight the Russians were stopped at the
Turkish-Georgian bor- der. Upon arriving in Turkey, they received phone
calls at guesthouses in places such as Istanbul and Ankara, informing
them that the route to Chechnya via Georgia had been closed.These Saudis
then decided to travel to Afghanistan, where they could train and wait
to make another attempt to enter Chechnya during the summer of
2000.While training at al Qaeda camps, a dozen of them heard Bin Ladin's
speeches, volunteered to become suicide operatives, and eventually were
selected as muscle hijackers for the planes operation. Khallad says he
met a number of them at the Kandahar airport, where they were help-
234 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
ing to provide extra
security. He encouraged Bin Ladin to use them. Khallad claims to have
been closest with Saeed al Ghamdi, whom he convinced to become a martyr
and whom he asked to recruit a friend, Ahmed al Ghamdi, to the same
cause. Although Khallad claims not to recall everyone from this group
who was later chosen for the 9/11 operation, he says they also included
Suqami,Waleed and Wail al Shehri, Omari, Nami, Hamza al Ghamdi, Salem al
Hazmi, and Moqed.98
According to KSM, operatives volunteered for suicide operations and, for
the most part, were not pressured to martyr themselves. Upon arriving in
Afghanistan, a recruit would fill out an application with standard
questions, such as,What brought you to Afghanistan? How did you travel
here? How did you hear about us?What attracted you to the cause?What is
your educational back- ground?Where have you worked before? Applications
were valuable for deter- mining the potential of new arrivals, for
filtering out potential spies from among them, and for identifying
recruits with special skills. For instance, as pointed out earlier, Hani
Hanjour noted his pilot training. Prospective opera- tives also were
asked whether they were prepared to serve as suicide operatives; those
who answered in the affirmative were interviewed by senior al Qaeda
lieutenant Muhammad Atef.99
KSM claims that the most important quality for any al Qaeda operative
was willingness to martyr himself. Khallad agrees, and claims that this
criterion had preeminence in selecting the planes operation
participants. The second most important criterion was demonstrable
patience, Khallad says, because the
planning for such attacks could take years.100
Khallad claims it did not matter whether the hijackers had fought in
jihad previously, since he believes that U.S. authorities were not
looking for such operatives before 9/11. But KSM asserts that young
mujahideen with clean records were chosen to avoid raising alerts during
travel.The al Qaeda train- ing camp head mentioned above adds that
operatives with no prior involve- ment in activities likely to be known
to international security agencies were
purposefully selected for the 9/11 attacks.101
Most of the muscle hijackers first underwent basic training similar to
that given other al Qaeda recruits. This included training in firearms,
heavy weapons, explosives, and topography. Recruits learned discipline
and military life.They were subjected to artificial stresses to measure
their psychological fit- ness and commitment to jihad.At least seven of
the Saudi muscle hijackers took this basic training regime at the al
Faruq camp near Kandahar.This particular camp appears to have been the
preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle
hijackers because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda
leadership.Two others-Suqami and Moqed-trained at Khal- dan, another
large basic training facility located near Kabul, where Mihdhar had
trained in the mid-1990s.102
By the time operatives for the planes operation were picked in mid-2000,
some of them had been training in Afghanistan for months, others were
just
THE ATTACK LOOMS 235
arriving for the first
time, and still others may have been returning after prior visits to the
camps. According to KSM, Bin Ladin would travel to the camps to deliver
lectures and meet the trainees personally. If Bin Ladin believed a
trainee held promise for a special operation, that trainee would be
invited to
the al Qaeda leader's compound at Tarnak Farms for further meetings.103
KSM claims that Bin Ladin could assess new trainees very quickly, in
about ten minutes, and that many of the 9/11 hijackers were selected in
this manner. Bin Ladin, assisted by Atef, personally chose all the
future muscle hijackers for the planes operation, primarily between the
summer of 2000 and April 2001. Upon choosing a trainee, Bin Ladin would
ask him to swear loyalty for a sui- cide operation. After the selection
and oath-swearing, the operative would be sent to KSM for training and
the filming of a martyrdom video, a function
KSM supervised as head of al Qaeda's media committee.104
KSM sent the muscle hijacker recruits on to Saudi Arabia to obtain U.S.
visas. He gave them money (about $2,000 each) and instructed them to
return to Afghanistan for more training after obtaining the visas. At
this early stage, the operatives were not told details about the
operation.The majority of the Saudi muscle hijackers obtained U.S. visas
in Jeddah or Riyadh between Sep-
tember and November of 2000.105
KSM told potential hijackers to acquire new "clean" passports in their
home countries before applying for a U.S. visa.This was to avoid raising
suspicion about previous travel to countries where al Qaeda operated.
Fourteen of the 19 hijackers, including nine Saudi muscle hijackers,
obtained new passports. Some of these passports were then likely
doctored by the al Qaeda passport division in Kandahar, which would add
or erase entry and exit stamps to cre-
ate "false trails" in the passports.106
In addition to the operatives who eventually participated in the 9/11
attacks as muscle hijackers, Bin Ladin apparently selected at least nine
other Saudis who, for various reasons, did not end up taking part in the
operation: Mohamed Mani Ahmad al Kahtani, Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani,
Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi, Saeed al Baluchi, Qutaybah al
Najdi, Zuhair al Thubaiti, Saeed Abdullah Saeed al Ghamdi, Saud al
Rashid, and Mushabib al Hamlan. A tenth individual, a Tunisian with
Canadian citizenship named Abderraouf Jdey, may have been a candidate to
participate in 9/11, or he may have been a candidate for a later
attack.These candidate hijackers either backed out, had trouble
obtaining needed travel documents, or were removed from the operation by
the al Qaeda leadership. Khallad believes KSM wanted between four and
six operatives per plane. KSM states that al Qaeda had originally
planned to use 25 or 26 hijackers but ended up with only the 19.107
Final Training and
Deployment to the United States
Having acquired U.S. visas in Saudi Arabia, the muscle hijackers
returned to Afghanistan for special training in late 2000 to early
2001.The training report- edly was conducted at the al Matar complex by
Abu Turab al Jordani, one of
236 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
only a handful of al
Qaeda operatives who, according to KSM, was aware of the full details of
the planned planes operation. Abu Turab taught the opera- tives how to
conduct hijackings, disarm air marshals, and handle explosives. He also
trained them in bodybuilding and provided them with a few basic Eng-
lish words and phrases.108
According to KSM,Abu Turab even had the trainees butcher a sheep and a
camel with a knife to prepare to use knives during the hijackings.The
recruits learned to focus on storming the cockpit at the earliest
opportunity when the doors first opened, and to worry about seizing
control over the rest of the plane later. The operatives were taught
about other kinds of attack as well, such as truck bombing, so that they
would not be able to disclose the exact nature of their operation if
they were caught. According to KSM, the muscle did not learn the full
details-including the plan to hijack planes and fly them into
buildings-before reaching the United States.109
After training in Afghanistan, the operatives went to a safehouse
maintained by KSM in Karachi and stayed there temporarily before being
deployed to the United States via the UAE.The safehouse was run by al
Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim Ghulum Rabbani, also known as Abu Rahmah, a
close associate of KSM who assisted him for three years by finding
apartments and lending logis- tical support to operatives KSM would
send.
According to an al Qaeda facilitator, operatives were brought to the
safe- house by a trusted Pakistani al Qaeda courier named Abdullah
Sindhi, who also worked for KSM. The future hijackers usually arrived in
groups of two or three, staying at the safe house for as long as two
weeks.The facilitator has identified each operative whom he assisted at
KSM's direction in the spring of 2001. Before the operatives left
Pakistan, each of them received $10,000
from KSM for future expenses.110
From Pakistan, the operatives transited through the UAE en route to the
United States. In the Emirates they were assisted primarily by al Qaeda
oper- atives Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa al Hawsawi. Ali apparently
assisted nine future hijackers between April and June 2001 as they came
through Dubai. He helped them with plane tickets, traveler's checks, and
hotel reservations; he also taught them about everyday aspects of life
in the West, such as purchasing clothes and ordering food. Dubai, a
modern city with easy access to a major airport, travel agencies,
hotels, and Western commercial establishments, was an
ideal transit point.111
Ali reportedly assumed the operatives he was helping were involved in a
big operation in the United States, he did not know the details.112 When
he asked KSM to send him an assistant, KSM dispatched Hawsawi, who had
worked on al Qaeda's media committee in Kandahar. Hawsawi helped send
the last four operatives (other than Mihdhar) to the United States from
the UAE. Hawsawi would consult with Atta about the hijackers' travel
schedules to the United States and later check with Atta to confirm that
each had arrived. Hawsawi told
THE ATTACK LOOMS 237
the muscle hijackers that
they would be met by Atta at the airport. Hawsawi
also facilitated some of the operation's financing.113
The muscle hijackers began arriving in the United States in late April
2001. In most cases, they traveled in pairs on tourist visas and entered
the United States in Orlando or Miami, Florida; Washington, D.C.; or New
York. Those arriving in Florida were assisted by Atta and Shehhi, while
Hazmi and Han- jour took care of the rest. By the end of June, 14 of the
15 muscle hijackers
had crossed the Atlantic.114
The muscle hijackers supplied an infusion of funds, which they carried
as a mixture of cash and traveler's checks purchased in the UAE and
Saudi Arabia. Seven muscle hijackers are known to have purchased a total
of nearly $50,000 in traveler's checks that were used in the United
States. Moreover, substantial deposits into operatives' U.S. bank
accounts immediately followed the entry of other muscle hijackers,
indicating that those newcomers brought money with them as well. In
addition, muscle hijacker Banihammad came to the United States after
opening bank accounts in the UAE into which were deposited the
equivalent of approximately $30,000 on June 25, 2001.After his June 27
arrival in the United States, Banihammad made Visa and ATM withdrawals
from his
UAE accounts.115
The hijackers made extensive use of banks in the United States, choosing
both branches of major international banks and smaller regional banks.
All of the hijackers opened accounts in their own name, and used
passports and other identification documents that appeared valid on
their face. Contrary to numer- ous published reports, there is no
evidence the hijackers ever used false Social Security numbers to open
any bank accounts. While the hijackers were not experts on the use of
the U.S. financial system, nothing they did would have led the banks to
suspect criminal behavior, let alone a terrorist plot to commit
mass murder.116
The last muscle hijacker to arrive was Khalid al Mihdhar.As mentioned
ear- lier, he had abandoned Hazmi in San Diego in June 2000 and returned
to his family inYemen. Mihdhar reportedly stayed inYemen for about a
month before Khallad persuaded him to return to Afghanistan. Mihdhar
complained about life in the United States. He met with KSM, who
remained annoyed at his deci- sion to go AWOL. But KSM's desire to drop
him from the operation yielded
to Bin Ladin's insistence to keep him.117
By late 2000, Mihdhar was in Mecca, staying with a cousin until February
2001, when he went home to visit his family before returning to
Afghanistan. In June 2001, Mihdhar returned once more to Mecca to stay
with his cousin for another month. Mihdhar said that Bin Ladin was
planning five attacks on the United States. Before leaving, Mihdhar
asked his cousin to watch over his
home and family because of a job he had to do.118
On July 4, 2001, Mihdhar left Saudi Arabia to return to the United
States, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport in NewYork.
Mihdhar gave
240 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
his intended address as the
Marriott Hotel, New York City, but instead spent one night at another New
York hotel. He then joined the group of hijackers in Paterson, reuniting
with Nawaf al Hazmi after more than a year.With two months remaining, all
19 hijackers were in the United States and ready to take
the final steps toward carrying out the attacks.119
Assistance from Hezbollah
and Iran to al Qaeda
As we mentioned in chapter 2, while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda
maintained contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide
terrorist organization Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern
Lebanon and Beirut.Al Qaeda members received advice and training from
Hezbollah.
Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian
security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Ladin's return to
Afghanistan. Khallad has said that Iran made a concerted effort to
strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the
USS Cole, but was rebuffed because Bin Ladin did not want to alienate his
supporters in Saudi Arabia. Khal- lad and other detainees have described
the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda
members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan. For example,
Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in
the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were par-
ticularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda.120
Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives
selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evi-
dence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle" operatives traveled
into
or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001.121
In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to
coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in
Saudi Ara- bia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah
commander and
Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved.122
Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and
Hamza al Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi
apparently flew to Beirut, traveling-perhaps by coincidence-on the same
flight as a senior Hezbollah operative.Also in November, Salem al Hazmi
appar-
ently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.123
In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers,Wail al
Shehri,Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had obtained their
U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to
Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah
operative was on the same flight that took the future hijackers to Iran.
Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a
group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important
enough to merit the attention of sen-
ior figures in Hezbollah.124
Later in November, two future muscle hijackers, Satam al Suqami and Majed
THE ATTACK LOOMS 241
Moqed, flew into Iran from
Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar may have taken a flight from
Syria to Iran, and then traveled further within Iran to
a point near the Afghan border.125
KSM and Binalshibh have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at
least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or
from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping
Saudi passports.They deny any other reason for the hijackers' travel to
Iran.They also
deny any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah.126
In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al
Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of
these were future 9/11 hijackers.There also is circumstantial evidence
that senior Hezbol- lah operatives were closely tracking the travel of
some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000. However,
we cannot rule out the pos- sibility of a remarkable coincidence-that is,
that Hezbollah was actually focus- ing on some other group of individuals
traveling from Saudi Arabia during this
same time frame, rather than the future hijackers.127
We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the plan-
ning for what later became the 9/11 attack.At the time of their travel
through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably not aware
of the spe- cific details of their future operation.
After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of
cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior
Hezbol-
lah official disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11.128
We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S.
government.
7.4 FINAL STRATEGIES AND
TACTICS
Final Preparations in the
United States
During the early summer of 2001, Atta, assisted by Shehhi, was busy
coordi- nating the arrival of most of the muscle hijackers in southern
Florida-pick- ing them up at the airport, finding them places to stay, and
helping them settle
in the United States.129
The majority settled in Florida. Some opened bank accounts, acquired mail-
boxes, and rented cars. Several also joined local gyms, presumably to stay
fit for the operation. Upon first arriving, most stayed in hotels and
motels; but by mid- June, they settled in shared apartments relatively
close to one another and Atta.130 Though these muscle hijackers did not
travel much after arriving in the United States, two of them,Waleed al
Shehri and Satam al Suqami, took unusual trips.
On May 19, Shehri and Suqami flew from Fort Lauderdale to Freeport, the
Bahamas, where they had reservations at the Bahamas Princess Resort.The
two were turned away by Bahamian officials on arrival, however, because
they
242 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
lacked visas; they returned
to Florida that same day. They likely took this trip to renew Suqami's
immigration status, as Suqami's legal stay in the United States
ended May 21.131
On July 30, Shehri traveled alone from Fort Lauderdale to Boston. He flew
to San Francisco the next day, where he stayed one night before returning
via Las Vegas.While this travel may have been a casing flight-Shehri
traveled in first class on the same type of aircraft he would help hijack
on September 11 (a Boeing 767) and the trip included a layover in Las
Vegas-Shehri was nei- ther a pilot nor a plot leader, as were the other
hijackers who took surveillance
flights.132
The three Hamburg pilots-Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah-took the first of their
cross-country surveillance flights early in the summer. Shehhi flew from
New York to LasVegas via San Francisco in late May. Jarrah flew from
Baltimore to LasVegas via Los Angeles in early June.Atta flew from Boston
to LasVegas via San Francisco at the end of June. Each traveled in first
class, on United Airlines. For the east-west transcontinental leg, each
operative flew on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on September 11
(Atta and Shehhi, a Boeing 767; Jar- rah, a Boeing 757).133 Hanjour and
Hazmi, as noted below, took similar cross- country surveillance flights in
August.
Jarrah and Hanjour also received additional training and practice flights
in the early summer.A few days before departing on his cross-country test
flight, Jarrah flew from Fort Lauderdale to Philadelphia, where he trained
at Hort- man Aviation and asked to fly the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude
"hallway" along the Hudson River that passes NewYork landmarks like the
World Trade Center. Heavy traffic in the area can make the corridor a
dangerous route for an inexperienced pilot. Because Hortman deemed Jarrah
unfit to fly solo, he
could fly this route only with an instructor.134
Hanjour, too, requested to fly the Hudson Corridor about this same time,
at Air Fleet Training Systems in Teterboro, New Jersey, where he started
receiv- ing ground instruction soon after settling in the area with Hazmi.
Hanjour flew the Hudson Corridor, but his instructor declined a second
request because of what he considered Hanjour's poor piloting skills.
Shortly thereafter, Hanjour switched to Caldwell Flight Academy in
Fairfield, New Jersey, where he rented small aircraft on several occasions
during June and July. In one such instance on July 20, Hanjour-likely
accompanied by Hazmi-rented a plane from Caldwell and took a practice
flight from Fairfield to Gaithersburg, Maryland, a route that would have
allowed them to fly near Washington, D.C. Other evi- dence suggests that
Hanjour may even have returned to Arizona for flight sim-
ulator training earlier in June.135
There is no indication that Atta or Shehhi received any additional flight
training in June. Both were likely too busy organizing the newly arrived
mus- cle hijackers and taking their cross-country surveillance
flights.Atta, moreover,
needed to coordinate with his second-in-command, Nawaf al Hazmi.136
THE ATTACK LOOMS 243
Although Atta and Hazmi
appear to have been inVirginia at about the same time in early April, they
probably did not meet then.Analysis of late April com- munications
associated with KSM indicates that they had wanted to get together in
April but could not coordinate the meeting.137 Atta and Hazmi probably
first met in the United States only when Hazmi traveled round-trip from
Newark to Miami between June 19 and June 25.
After he returned to New Jersey, Hazmi's behavior began to closely paral-
lel that of the other hijackers. He and Hanjour, for instance, soon
established new bank accounts, acquired a mailbox, rented cars, and
started visiting a gym. So did the four other hijackers who evidently were
staying with them in New Jersey. Several also obtained new photo
identification, first in New Jersey and then at theVirginia Department of
MotorVehicles, where Hazmi and Hanjour had obtained such documents months
earlier, likely with help from their Jor-
danian friend, Rababah.138
Atta probably met again with Hazmi in early July. Returning from his ini-
tial cross-country surveillance flight, Atta flew into New York. Rather
than return immediately to Florida, he checked into a New Jersey hotel. He
picked up tickets to travel to Spain at a travel agency in Paterson on
July 4 before departing for Fort Lauderdale. Now that the muscle hijackers
had arrived, he
was ready to meet with Ramzi Binalshibh for the last time.139
The Meeting in Spain
After meeting with Atta in Berlin in January 2001, Binalshibh had spent
much of the spring of 2001 in Afghanistan and Pakistan, helping move the
muscle hijackers as they passed through Karachi. During the Berlin
meeting, the two had agreed to meet later in the year in Kuala Lumpur to
discuss the operation in person again. In late May, Binalshibh reported
directly to Bin Ladin at an
al Qaeda facility known as "Compound Six" near Kandahar.140
Bin Ladin told Binalshibh to instruct Atta and the others to focus on
their security and that of the operation, and to advise Atta to proceed as
planned with the targets discussed before Atta left Afghanistan in early
2000-the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White House, and the
Capitol. According to Binalshibh, Bin Ladin said he preferred the White
House over the Capitol, asking Binalshibh to confirm that Atta understood
this preference. Binalshibh says Bin Ladin had given the same message to
Waleed al Shehri for conveyance to Atta earlier that spring. Binalshibh
also received permission to meet Atta in Malaysia.Atef provided money for
the trip, which KSM would help Binalshibh
arrange in Karachi.141
In early June, Binalshibh traveled by taxi from Kandahar to Quetta,
Pakistan, where al Qaeda courier Abu Rahmah took him to KSM.According to
Binal- shibh, KSM provided a plane ticket to Malaysia and a fraudulent
Saudi pass- port to use for the trip. KSM told him to ask Atta to select a
date for the attacks. Binalshibh was to return to Germany and then inform
KSM of the date. KSM
244 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
also gave Binalshibh the
email address of Zacarias Moussaoui for future con-
tact. Binalshibh then left for Kuala Lumpur.142
Binalshibh contacted Atta upon arriving in Malaysia and found a change in
plan. Atta could not travel because he was too busy helping the new
arrivals settle in the United States.After remaining in Malaysia for
approximately three weeks, Binalshibh went to Bangkok for a few days
before returning to Ger-
many. He and Atta agreed to meet later at a location to be determined.143
In early July, Atta called Binalshibh to suggest meeting in Madrid, for
rea- sons Binalshibh claims not to know. He says he preferred Berlin, but
that he and Atta knew too many people in Germany and feared being spotted
together. Unable to buy a ticket to Madrid at the height of the tourist
season, Binalshibh booked a seat on a flight to Reus, near Barcelona, the
next day.Atta was already en route to Madrid, so Binalshibh phoned Shehhi
in the United
States to inform him of the change in itinerary.144
Atta arrived in Madrid on July 8. He spent the night in a hotel and made
three calls from his room, most likely to coordinate with Binalshibh.The
next day, Atta rented a car and drove to Reus to pick up Binalshibh; the
two then drove to the nearby town of Cambrils. Hotel records show Atta
renting rooms in the same area until July 19, when he returned his rental
car in Madrid and flew back to Fort Lauderdale. On July 16, Binalshibh
returned to Hamburg, using a ticket Atta had purchased for him earlier
that day.According to Binal-
shibh, they did not meet with anyone else while in Spain.145
Binalshibh says he told Atta that Bin Ladin wanted the attacks carried out
as soon as possible. Bin Ladin, Binalshibh conveyed, was worried about
hav- ing so many operatives in the United States.Atta replied that he
could not yet provide a date because he was too busy organizing the
arriving hijackers and still needed to coordinate the timing of the
flights so that the crashes would occur simultaneously. Atta said he
required about five to six weeks before he could provide an attack date.
Binalshibh advised Atta that Bin Ladin had directed that the other
operatives not be informed of the date until the last minute.Atta was to
provide Binalshibh with advance notice of at least a week or two so that
Binalshibh could travel to Afghanistan and report the date per-
sonally to Bin Ladin.146
As to targets, Atta understood Bin Ladin's interest in striking the White
House.Atta said he thought this target too difficult, but had tasked Hazmi
and Hanjour to evaluate its feasibility and was awaiting their answer.Atta
said that those two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown
reconnaissance flights near the Pentagon.Atta explained that Hanjour was
assigned to attack the Pen- tagon, Jarrah the Capitol, and that both Atta
and Shehhi would hit the World Trade Center. If any pilot could not reach
his intended target, he was to crash the plane. If Atta could not strike
the World Trade Center, he planned to crash his aircraft directly into the
streets of NewYork.Atta told Binalshibh that each pilot had volunteered
for his assigned target, and that the assignments were sub-
ject to change.147
THE ATTACK LOOMS 245
During the Spain
meeting,Atta also mentioned that he had considered tar- geting a nuclear
facility he had seen during familiarization flights near New York-a target
they referred to as "electrical engineering."According to Binal- shibh,
the other pilots did not like the idea.They thought a nuclear target would
be difficult because the airspace around it was restricted, making
reconnaissance flights impossible and increasing the likelihood that any
plane would be shot down before impact. Moreover, unlike the approved
targets, this alternative had not been discussed with senior al Qaeda
leaders and therefore did not have the requisite blessing. Nor would a
nuclear facility have particular symbolic value. Atta did not ask
Binalshibh to pass this idea on to Bin Ladin, Atef, or KSM, and Binalshibh
says he did not mention it to them until after September 11.148
Binalshibh claims that during their time in Spain, he and Atta also
discussed how the hijackings would be executed. Atta said he, Shehhi, and
Jarrah had encountered no problems carrying box cutters on cross-country
surveillance flights.The best time to storm the cockpit would be about
10-15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit doors typically were opened
for the first time. Atta did not believe they would need any other
weapons. He had no firm contin- gency plan in case the cockpit door was
locked.While he mentioned general ideas such as using a hostage or
claiming to have a bomb, he was confident the cockpit doors would be
opened and did not consider breaking them down a viable idea. Atta told
Binalshibh he wanted to select planes departing on long flights because
they would be full of fuel, and that he wanted to hijack Boeing aircraft
because he believed them easier to fly than Airbus aircraft, which he
understood had an autopilot feature that did not allow them to be crashed
into
the ground.149
Finally, Atta confirmed that the muscle hijackers had arrived in the
United States without incident.They would be divided into teams according
to their English-speaking ability.That way they could assist each other
before the oper- ation and each team would be able to command the
passengers in English. According to Binalshibh,Atta complained that some
of the hijackers wanted to contact their families to say goodbye,
something he had forbidden.Atta, more- over, was nervous about his future
communications with Binalshibh, whom he instructed to obtain new
telephones upon returning to Germany. Before Binal- shibh left Spain, he
gave Atta eight necklaces and eight bracelets that Atta had asked him to
buy when he was recently in Bangkok, believing that if the hijack- ers
were clean shaven and well dressed, others would think them wealthy Saudis
and give them less notice.150
As directed, upon returning from Spain, Binalshibh obtained two new
phones, one to communicate with Atta and another to communicate with KSM
and others, such as Zacarias Moussaoui. Binalshibh soon contacted KSM and,
using code words, reported the results of his meeting with Atta. This
important exchange occurred in mid-July.151
The conversation covered various topics. For example, Jarrah was to send
Binalshibh certain personal materials from the hijackers,including copies
of their
246 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
passports, which Binalshibh
in turn would pass along to KSM,probably for sub-
sequent use in al Qaeda propaganda.152
The most significant part of the mid-July conversation concerned Jarrah's
troubled relationship with Atta. KSM and Binalshibh both acknowledge that
Jarrah chafed under Atta's authority over him. Binalshibh believes the
disagree- ment arose in part from Jarrah's family visits. Moreover, Jarrah
had been on his own for most of his time in the United States because
Binalshibh's visa diffi- culty had prevented the two of them from training
together. Jarrah thus felt excluded from the decisionmaking. Binalshibh
had to act as a broker between
Jarrah and Atta.153
Concerned that Jarrah might withdraw from the operation at this late
stage, KSM emphasized the importance of Atta and Jarrah's resolving their
differ- ences. Binalshibh claims that such concern was unwarranted, and in
their mid- July discussion reassured KSM that Atta and Jarrah would
reconcile and be ready to move forward in about a month, after Jarrah
visited his family. Not- ing his concern and the potential for delay, KSM
at one point instructed Binal- shibh to send "the skirts" to "Sally"-a
coded instruction to Binalshibh to send funds to Zacarias Moussaoui.While
Binalshibh admits KSM did direct him to send Moussaoui money during the
mid-July conversation, he denies knowing exactly why he received this
instruction-though he thought the money was
being provided "within the framework" of the 9/11 operation.154
KSM may have instructed Binalshibh to send money to Moussaoui in order to
help prepare Moussaoui as a potential substitute pilot for Jarrah. On July
20, 2001, Aysel Senguen, Jarrah's girlfriend, purchased a one-way ticket
for Jarrah from Miami to Dusseldorf. On Jarrah's previous four trips from
the United States to see Senguen and his family in Lebanon, he had always
traveled with a round-trip ticket.When Jarrah departed Miami on July 25,
Atta appears to
have driven him to the airport, another unique circumstance.155
Binalshibh picked up Jarrah at the airport in Dusseldorf on July 25.
Jarrah wanted to see Senguen as soon as possible, so he and Binalshibh
arranged to meet a few days later.When they did, they had an emotional
conversation dur-
ing which Binalshibh encouraged Jarrah to see the plan through.156
While Jarrah was in Germany, Binalshibh and Moussaoui were in contact to
arrange for the transfer of funds. Binalshibh received two wire transfers
from Hawsawi in the UAE totaling $15,000 and, within days, relayed almost
all of
this money to Moussaoui in two installments.157
Moussaoui had been taking flight lessons at the Airman Flight School in
Norman, Oklahoma, since February but stopped in late May.Although at that
point he had only about 50 hours of flight time and no solo flights to his
credit, Moussaoui began making inquiries about flight materials and
simulator train- ing for Boeing 747s. On July 10, he put down a $1,500
deposit for flight sim- ulator training at Pan Am International Flight
Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, and by the end of the month, he had received
a simulator schedule to train from
THE ATTACK LOOMS 247
August 13 through August
20. Moussaoui also purchased two knives and inquired of two manufacturers
of GPS equipment whether their products could be converted for
aeronautical use-activities that closely resembled those
of the 9/11 hijackers during their final preparations for the attacks.158
On August 10, shortly after getting the money from Binalshibh, Moussaoui
left Oklahoma with a friend and drove to Minnesota.Three days later, Mous-
saoui paid the $6,800 balance owed for his flight simulator training at
Pan Am in cash and began his training. His conduct, however, raised the
suspicions of his flight instructor. It was unusual for a student with so
little training to be learning to fly large jets without any intention of
obtaining a pilot's license or other goal. On August 16, once the
instructor reported his suspicion to the
authorities, Moussaoui was arrested by the INS on immigration charges.159
KSM denies ever considering Moussaoui for the planes operation. Instead he
claims that Moussaoui was slated to participate in a "second wave" of
attacks. KSM also states that Moussaoui had no contact with Atta, and we
are unaware
of evidence contradicting this assertion.160
Yet KSM has also stated that by the summer of 2001, he was too busy with
the planes operation to continue planning for any second-wave attacks.
More- over, he admits that only three potential pilots were ever recruited
for the alleged second wave, Moussaoui plus two others who, by midsummer
of 2001, had backed out of the plot.161 We therefore believe that the
effort to push Moussaoui forward in August 2001 lends credence to the
suspicion that he was being primed as a possible pilot in the immediate
planes operation.
Binalshibh says he assumed Moussaoui was to take his place as another
pilot in the 9/11 operation. Recounting a post-9/11 discussion with KSM in
Kan- dahar, Binalshibh claims KSM mentioned Moussaoui as being part of the
9/11 operation. Although KSM never referred to Moussaoui by name,
Binalshibh understood he was speaking of the operative to whom Binalshibh
had wired money. Binalshibh says KSM did not approve of Moussaoui but
believes KSM did not remove him from the operation only because Moussaoui
had been
selected and assigned by Bin Ladin himself.162
KSM did not hear about Moussaoui's arrest until after September 11.
According to Binalshibh, had Bin Ladin and KSM learned prior to 9/11 that
Moussaoui had been detained, they might have canceled the operation.When
Binalshibh discussed Moussaoui's arrest with KSM after September 11, KSM
congratulated himself on not having Moussaoui contact the other
operatives, which would have compromised the operation. Moussaoui had been
in con- tact with Binalshibh, of course, but this was not discovered until
after 9/11.163
As it turned out, Moussaoui was not needed to replace Jarrah. By the time
Moussaoui was arrested in mid-August, Jarrah had returned to the United
States from his final trip to Germany, his disagreement with Atta
apparently
resolved.The operatives began their final preparations for the attacks.164
248 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
Readying the Attacks
A week after he returned from meeting Binalshibh in Spain, Atta traveled
to Newark, probably to coordinate with Hazmi and give him additional
funds. Atta spent a few days in the area before returning to Florida on
July 30.The month of August was busy, as revealed by a set of
contemporaneous Atta-
Binalshibh communications that were recovered after September 11.165
On August 3, for example, Atta and Binalshibh discussed several matters,
such as the best way for the operatives to purchase plane tickets and the
assign- ment of muscle hijackers to individual teams. Atta and Binalshibh
also revis- ited the question of whether to target the White House.They
discussed targets in coded language, pretending to be students discussing
various fields of study: "architecture" referred to the World Trade
Center, "arts" the Pentagon, "law"
the Capitol, and "politics" the White House.166
Binalshibh reminded Atta that Bin Ladin wanted to target theWhite House.
Atta again cautioned that this would be difficult.When Binalshibh
persisted, Atta agreed to include the White House but suggested they keep
the Capitol as an alternate target in case the White House proved too
difficult. Atta also suggested that the attacks would not happen until
after the first week in Sep-
tember, when Congress reconvened.167
Atta and Binalshibh also discussed "the friend who is coming as a
tourist"- a cryptic reference to candidate hijacker Mohamed al Kahtani
(mentioned above), whom Hawsawi was sending the next day as "the last one"
to "com- plete the group." On August 4,Atta drove to the Orlando airport
to meet Kah- tani. Upon arrival, however, Kahtani was denied entry by
immigration officials because he had a one-way ticket and little money,
could not speak English, and could not adequately explain what he intended
to do in the United States. He was sent back to Dubai. Hawsawi contacted
KSM, who told him to help Kah-
tani return to Pakistan.168
On August 7,Atta flew from Fort Lauderdale to Newark, probably to coor-
dinate with Hazmi.Two days later,Ahmed al Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz al Omari,
who had been living in New Jersey with Hazmi and Hanjour, flew to
Miami-probably signifying that the four hijacking teams had finally been
assigned.While Atta was in New Jersey, he, Hazmi, and Hanjour all
purchased tickets for another set of surveillance flights. Like Shehhi,
Jarrah, Atta, and Waleed al Shehri before them, Hazmi and Hanjour each
flew in first class on the same type of aircraft they would hijack on 9/11
(a Boeing 757), and on transcontinental flights that connected to Las
Vegas. This time, however, Atta himself also flew directly to LasVegas,
where all three stayed on August 13-14. Beyond Las Vegas's reputation for
welcoming tourists, we have seen no credi- ble evidence explaining why, on
this occasion and others, the operatives flew
to or met in Las Vegas.169
Through August, the hijackers kept busy with their gym training and the
pilots took frequent practice flights on small rented aircraft.The
operatives also
THE ATTACK LOOMS 249
began to make purchases
suggesting that the planning was coming to an end. In mid-August, for
example, they bought small knives that may actually have been used in the
attacks. On August 22, moreover, Jarrah attempted to pur- chase four GPS
units from a pilot shop in Miami. He was able to buy only one unit, which
he picked up a few days later when he also purchased three aero-
nautical charts.170
Perhaps most significant, however, was the purchase of plane tickets for
Sep- tember 11. On August 23, Atta again flew to Newark, probably to meet
with Hazmi and select flights. All 19 tickets were booked and purchased
between
August 25 and September 5.171
It therefore appears that the attack date was selected by the third week
of August. This timing is confirmed by Binalshibh, who claims Atta called
him with the date in mid-August. According to Binalshibh, Atta used a
riddle to convey the date in code-a message of two branches, a slash, and
a lollipop (to non-Americans, 11/9 would be interpreted as September 11).
Binalshibh says
he called Atta back to confirm the date before passing it to KSM.172
KSM apparently received the date from Binalshibh in a message sent through
Binalshibh's old Hamburg associate, Zakariya Essabar. Both Binalshibh and
KSM claim that Essabar was not privy to the meaning of the message and had
no foreknowledge of the attacks.According to Binalshibh, shortly after the
date was chosen, he advised Essabar and another Hamburg associate, Said
Bahaji, that if they wanted to go to Afghanistan, now was the time because
it would soon become more difficult. Essabar made reservations on August
22 and departed Hamburg for Karachi on August 30; Bahaji purchased his
tickets
on August 20 and departed Hamburg for Karachi on September 3.173
Binalshibh also made arrangements to leave for Pakistan during early Sep-
tember, before the attacks, as did Ali and Hawsawi, the plot facilitators
in the UAE. During these final days, Binalshibh and Atta kept in contact
by phone, email, and instant messaging.Although Atta had forbidden the
hijackers to con- tact their families, he apparently placed one last call
to his own father on Sep- tember 9. Atta also asked Binalshibh to contact
the family of one hijacker, pass along goodbyes from others, and give
regards to KSM. Jarrah alone appears to
have left a written farewell-a sentimental letter to Aysel Senguen.174
Hazmi, however, may not have been so discreet. He may have telephoned his
former San Diego companion, Mohdar Abdullah, in late August. Several bits
of evidence indicate that others in Abdullah's circle may have received
word that something big would soon happen. As noted earlier, Abdullah's
behavior reportedly changed noticeably. Prior to September 11, both he and
Yazeed al Salmi suddenly became intent on proceeding with their planned
marriages. One witness quotes Salmi as commenting after the 9/11
attacks,"I knew they were going to do something, that is why I got
married." Moreover, as of August 2001, Iyad Kreiwesh and other employees
at the Texaco station where Hazmi had worked suddenly were anticipating
attention from law enforcement
250 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
authorities in the near
future. Finally, according to an uncorroborated witness account, early on
the morning of September 10, Abdullah, Osama Awadallah, Omar Bakarbashat,
and others behaved suspiciously at the gas station.Accord- ing to the
witness, after the group met, Awadallah said "it is finally going to
happen" as the others celebrated by giving each other high fives.175
Dissent within the al Qaeda
Leadership
While tactical preparations for the attack were nearing completion, the
entire operation was being questioned at the top, as al Qaeda and the
Taliban argued over strategy for 2001. Our focus has naturally been on the
specifics of the planes operation. But from the perspective of Bin Ladin
and Atef, this opera- tion was only one, admittedly key, element of their
unfolding plans for the year. Living in Afghanistan, interacting
constantly with the Taliban, the al Qaeda leaders would never lose sight
of the situation in that country.
Bin Ladin's consistent priority was to launch a major attack directly
against the United States. He wanted the planes operation to proceed as
soon as pos- sible. Mihdhar reportedly told his cousin during the summer
of 2001 that Bin Ladin was reputed to have remarked,"I will make it happen
even if I do it by
myself."176
According to KSM, Bin Ladin had been urging him to advance the date of the
attacks. In 2000, for instance, KSM remembers Bin Ladin pushing him to
launch the attacks amid the controversy after then-Israeli opposition
party leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. KSM
claims Bin Ladin told him it would be enough for the hijackers simply to
down planes rather than crash them into specific targets. KSM says he
resisted the pressure.177
KSM claims to have faced similar pressure twice more in 2001. According to
him, Bin Ladin wanted the operation carried out on May 12, 2001, seven
months to the day after the Cole bombing. KSM adds that the 9/11 attacks
had originally been envisioned for May 2001. The second time he was urged
to launch the attacks early was in June or July 2001, supposedly after Bin
Ladin learned from the media that Sharon would be visiting the White
House. On both occasions KSM resisted, asserting that the hijacking teams
were not ready. Bin Ladin pressed particularly strongly for the latter
date in two letters stress- ing the need to attack early.The second letter
reportedly was delivered by Bin
Ladin's son-in-law,Aws al Madani.178
Other evidence corroborates KSM's account. For instance, Mihdhar told his
cousin that the attacks were to happen in May, but were postponed twice,
first to July, then to September. Moreover, one candidate hijacker
remembers a general warning being issued in the al Qaeda camps in July or
early August, just like the warnings issued two weeks before the Cole
bombing and ten days before the eventual 9/11 attacks. During the
midsummer alert, al Qaeda members dispersed with their families, security
was increased, and Bin Ladin
disappeared for about 30 days, until the alert was canceled.179
While the details of the operation were strictly compartmented, by the
time
THE ATTACK LOOMS 251
of the alert, word had
begun to spread that an attack against the United States was coming. KSM
notes that it was generally well known by the summer of 2001 that he was
planning some kind of operation against the United States. Many were even
aware that he had been preparing operatives to go to the United States,
leading some to conclude that al Qaeda was planning a near- term attack on
U.S. soil. Moreover, Bin Ladin had made several remarks that summer
hinting at an upcoming attack and generating rumors throughout the
worldwide jihadist community. Bin Ladin routinely told important visitors
to expect significant attacks against U.S. interests soon and, during a
speech at the al Faruq camp, exhorted trainees to pray for the success of
an attack involving 20 martyrs. Others have confirmed hearing indications
of an impending attack and have verified that such news, albeit without
specific details, had spread
across al Qaeda.180
Although Bin Ladin's top priority apparently was to attack the United
States, others had a different view.The Taliban leaders put their main
empha- sis on the year's military offensive against the Northern Alliance,
an offensive that ordinarily would begin in the late spring or summer.They
certainly hoped that this year's offensive would finally finish off their
old enemies, driving them from Afghanistan. From the Taliban's
perspective, an attack against the United States might be
counterproductive. It might draw the Americans into the war
against them, just when final victory seemed within their grasp.181
There is evidence that Mullah Omar initially opposed a major al Qaeda
operation directly against the United States in 2001. Furthermore, by
July, with word spreading of a coming attack, a schism emerged among the
senior lead- ership of al Qaeda. Several senior members reportedly agreed
with Mullah Omar. Those who reportedly sided with Bin Ladin included Atef,
Sulayman Abu Ghayth, and KSM. But those said to have opposed him were
weighty fig- ures in the organization-including Abu Hafs the Mauritanian,
Sheikh Saeed al Masri, and Sayf al Adl. One senior al Qaeda operative
claims to recall Bin Ladin arguing that attacks against the United States
needed to be carried out immediately to support insurgency in the
Israeli-occupied territories and protest the presence of U.S. forces in
Saudi Arabia. Beyond these rhetorical appeals, Bin Ladin also reportedly
thought an attack against the United States would benefit al Qaeda by
attracting more suicide operatives, eliciting greater donations, and
increasing the number of sympathizers willing to provide logis-
tical assistance.182
Mullah Omar is reported to have opposed this course of action for ideo-
logical reasons rather than out of fear of U.S. retaliation. He is said to
have pre- ferred for al Qaeda to attack Jews, not necessarily the United
States. KSM contends that Omar faced pressure from the Pakistani
government to keep al Qaeda from engaging in operations outside
Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's chief financial manager, Sheikh Saeed, argued that
al Qaeda should defer to the Tali- ban's wishes. Another source says that
Sheikh Saeed opposed the operation, both out of deference to Omar and
because he feared the U.S. response to an
252 THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
attack. Abu Hafs the
Mauritanian reportedly even wrote Bin Ladin a message
basing opposition to the attacks on the Qur'an.183
According to KSM, in late August, when the operation was fully planned,
Bin Ladin formally notified the al Qaeda Shura Council that a major attack
against the United States would take place in the coming weeks.When some
council members objected, Bin Ladin countered that Mullah Omar lacked
authority to prevent al Qaeda from conducting jihad outside Afghanistan.
Though most of the Shura Council reportedly disagreed, Bin Ladin
persisted.
The attacks went forward.184
The story of dissension within al Qaeda regarding the 9/11 attacks is
prob- ably incomplete.The information on which the account is based comes
from sources who were not privy to the full scope of al Qaeda and Taliban
planning.
Bin Ladin and Atef, however, probably would have known, at least, that
o The general Taliban
offensive against the Northern Alliance would
rely on al Qaeda military support.
o Another significant al Qaeda operation was making progress during
the summer-a plot to assassinate the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah
Massoud. The operatives, disguised as journalists, were in Massoud's camp
and prepared to kill him sometime in August.Their
appointment to see him was delayed.185
But on September 9, the
Massoud assassination took place.The delayed Tal- iban offensive against
the Northern Alliance was apparently coordinated to
begin as soon as he was killed, and it got under way on September 10.186
As they deliberated earlier in the year, Bin Ladin and Atef would likely
have remembered that Mullah Omar was dependent on them for the Massoud
assas- sination and for vital support in the Taliban military operations.
KSM remem- bers Atef telling him that al Qaeda had an agreement with the
Taliban to eliminate Massoud, after which the Taliban would begin an
offensive to take over Afghanistan. Atef hoped Massoud's death would also
appease the Taliban when the 9/11 attacks happened. There are also some
scant indications that Omar may have been reconciled to the 9/11 attacks
by the time they
occurred.187
Moving to Departure
Positions
In the days just before 9/11, the hijackers returned leftover funds to al
Qaeda and assembled in their departure cities.They sent the excess funds
by wire trans-
fer to Hawsawi in the UAE, about $26,000 altogether.188
The hijackers targeting American Airlines Flight 77, to depart from
Dulles, migrated from New Jersey to Laurel, Maryland, about 20 miles from
Washing- ton, D.C.They stayed in a motel during the first week in
September and spent
THE ATTACK LOOMS 253
time working out at a gym.
On the final night before the attacks, they lodged
at a hotel in Herndon,Virginia, close to the airport.189
Further north, the hijackers targeting United Airlines Flight 93, to
depart from Newark, gathered in that city from their base in Florida on
September 7. Just after midnight on September 8-9,Jarrah received a
speeding ticket in Mary- land as he headed north on I-95. He joined the
rest of his team at their hotel.190
Atta was still busy coordinating the teams. On September 7, he flew from
Fort Lauderdale to Baltimore, presumably to meet with the Flight 77 team
in Laurel. On September 9, he flew from Baltimore to Boston. By then,
Shehhi had arrived there, and Atta was seen with him at his hotel.The next
day, Atta picked up Omari at another hotel, and the two drove to Portland,
Maine, for reasons that remain unknown. In the early morning hours of
September 11, they boarded a commuter flight to Boston to connect to
American Airlines Flight 11.The two spent their last night pursuing
ordinary activities: making ATM withdrawals, eating pizza, and shopping at
a convenience store. Their three fellow hijackers for Flight 11 stayed
together in a hotel in Newton, Mass-
achusetts, just outside of Boston.191
Shehhi and his team targeting United Airlines Flight 175 from Logan Air-
port spent their last hours at two Boston hotels.192 The plan that started
with a proposal by KSM in 1996 had evolved to overcome numerous obstacles.
Now 19 men waited in nondescript hotel rooms to board four flights the
next morning.
Credit: The 911 Commision Report
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
|
